Well-invested small savings surpluses are better than big ones thrown away at fluffy sovereign spending projects.

Sir, Martin Wolf correctly points out “Without the shelter of the eurozone, the Deutschmark would have greatly appreciated in a low-inflation world” “How Germany avoided the fate of Japan” October 30.

Indeed it would have appreciated, but that does not necessarily mean that it would have been bad for Germany… or for the rest in the eurozone.

Wolf holds that Germans need to realize “that the euro is already working to their benefit, by stabilising their economy, despite its huge savings surpluses.”

Q. Without the euro would those huge savings surpluses exist? A. No!

Q. Without the euro could not whatever smaller saving surpluses have resulted much better invested? A. Yes!

Wolf points out: “Even at ultra-low interest rates, domestic private investment in Germany fell far short of private savings. [And] since the government too ran fiscal surpluses, in Germany, capital outflows absorbed all the private surplus [much through] German financial institutions, with their huge foreign assets”

And that’s their problem. Because of risk weighted bank capital requirements that favors financing the safer present over the riskier future, plus that insane debt privilege of a 0% risk weight assigned to all Eurozone’s sovereign debts, even though none of these can print euros, most of those German saving surpluses ended up financing mediocre eurozone governments… and building up such unsustainable huge debt exposures, that it will come back to bite all, the euro, perhaps the EU, and of course Germans too.

The day when Germans citizens realize the real meaning of that their banks need to hold around 8% of capital when lending to German entrepreneurs, but need zero capital lending to eurozone sovereigns, and that they will not be able to collect on those loans, those German citizens are going to be very wütend.

.And Sir, again, for the umpteenth time, Wolf returns to his: “The chance to borrow at today’s ultra-low long-term interest rates is a blessing, not a curse.” 

Wolf just refuses to accept that today’s ultra-low long-term interest rates, is an unsustainable artificial concoction that mainly benefits public debts, in other words, pure unabridged statism, based dangerously on that government bureaucrats know better what to do with credit, for which repayment they are not personally responsible for, than for instance the private entrepreneurs. When it comes to bank regulations a Communist Wall was constructed in 1988, one year before the Berlin Wall fell.

PS. The Euro had one characteristic that differentiated it from US$. That made me less optimistic as to its chances of success. The US$ is backed by a solidly unified political entity, USA. The Euro was aimed at creating unity and cohesion, not the result of it.

@PerKurowski

If ECB’s original QEs stimuli had not been distorted by credit risk weighted bank capital requirements, there would be much less need for additional QEs.

Sir, Claire Jones writes: “EU treaties prevent the ECB from financing member governments by buying their debt, a tactic known as monetary financing. This rule aims to protect the central bank from political pressure and avoid stoking inflation. QE involves the central banks of eurozone states buying huge amounts of government bonds, financed by the ECB”… [Is QE legal?] “ECB argues that QE does not amount to monetary financing as it is only buying the bonds in secondary markets from other investors, rather than purchasing the debt directly from governments”, “Easing German constitutional court to rule on ECB bond buying” July 31.

Sir, as clearly the intent of ECB is to help financing member governments, and “stoking inflation” a publicized goal, I must say that sounds like a real weak defense.

But be that as it may, the question is also whether QE really helps the recovery in a sustainable way? ECB’s still so large outstanding ECB holdings of European sovereign debt suggest it does not. 

The main explanation for that is to be found in the many dangerous distortions in the allocation of bank credit that the risk weighted bank capital requirements produce.

Just an example, currently all Eurozone sovereigns, courtesy of EU authorities, have been assigned a Sovereign Debt Privilege of a 0% risk weight, and this even though not of them take on debt denominated in a currency that is their own printable one.

The sum of QEs, plus that regulatory favoring, basically premised upon the notion that European government bureaucrats know better what to do with money they are not personally responsible for than for instance European entrepreneurs is drowning Europe in way too much statism.

For the European Union to be saved financial power has to be taken away from its sovereigns (and Brussels) and devolved to its citizens.

http://teawithft.blogspot.com/2019/06/the-still-ticking-0-risk-weight.html

@PerKurowski

In the Eurozone’s sovereign debt mine there is a choir of canaries going silent but, seemingly, that shall not be heard.

Sir, Gideon Rachman concludes, “Almost all of the modern threats — from a resurgent Russia to climate change and trade wars — are much easier for Britain to deal with, by using the collective strength of the EU.” “Brexit is an idea left over from a bygone era” June 25, 2019.

That is correct, but only if we exclude mentioning the problems within Europe. I refer specially to the sovereign debt bombs that are ticking within the Eurozone, the agents of “the EU’s most federalising project — the euro.”

Yes, that Germany “is stubbornly resisting demands from Brussels and Paris for deeper economic union” does surely not help but the real problem is that the biggest problem with the Euro, is not really acknowledged. 

When Greece turned into a dead coalmine canary, how much discussion were there about the fact that EU authorities had assigned Greece, as to all other Eurozone sovereigns, for purposes of bank capital requirements, a 0% risk weight? And that 0% risk weight was decreed even though all Eurozone sovereigns contract debt denominated in a currency that de facto is not their own domestic printable one.

Basically no discussion at all even though that 0% risk weight guarantees European banks are going to lend way too to the Eurozone’s sovereigns. Greece was small and ended being forced by ECB to walk the plank. But if Italy’s debt bomb explodes would it accept doing so? I doubt it.

Sir, to be a Remainer without requesting from EU a clear plan on how to defuse that still ticking debt bomb that could take the Euro down and perhaps the EU with it, seems not to be a very respectful position either.

@PerKurowski

What would happen to German Bunds, denominated in Euros, if Italy refuses to walk the plank like Greece?

Sir, I am not sure I follow Kate Allen’s discussion about the future of German Bunds. It is almost as she was discussing these as denominated in Deutsche Mark. The fact is these are in Euros, the same currency other weaker eurozone sovereign-debtors have their bonds denominated in. For instance, what would happen if Italy refuses to walk the plank like Greece? “German bond buyers bank on smooth withdrawal from QE”, November 6.

The European Union has clearly not dedicated itself wholeheartedly to solve the fundamental challenges posed by the adoption of the Euro by so many of its members, twenty years ago. For instance the European Commission has wasted its time on so many issues of minuscule importance that were really none of its business. As a result that Euro, which was created to unite Europe, might now disunite it. 

So what would happen if the Euro breaks in pieces? I have no idea but, in the case of Germany, if asked, I assume holders of German Bunds would probably accept to convert these into German Neo-DM Bunds. But of course that would also put an end to the eurozone “weaklings” subsidizing Germany’s competitiveness… like what if 1US$ = 0.75 Neo-DM? It would be a whole new ball game for everyone, Germany included!

Sir, as I recently wrote to you, for all those who want a peaceful European Union to thrive, which of course should include both Britain’s Brexiters and Remainers, the acts commemorating the end of WWI, provides an opportunity for important reflections.

In this respect the European Commission, the European Central Bank, the European Parliament, all of them, when imposing armistice conditions on capitulating eurozone sovereign debtors, should do well remembering the Versailles Treaty.

PS. Greece walked the plank

@PerKurowski

What if Germans knew German authorities approved of giving Greece a 0% risk weight?

Sir, Mehreen Khan writes, “hawkish governments, led by Germany… are reluctant to award Greece more generous terms that mean their taxpayers are not paid back in full” “IMF signals need for more Greek debt relief” August 1.

The historical fact is that European central bankers, for the purpose of the risk weighted capital requirements for banks, assigned Greece a 0% risk weight. That meant banks needed to hold no capital (equity) when lending to Greece. That meant that among other German banks, caused Greece to take on that excessive debt that lead it to its current tragic predicament.

Some will argue that Greece also played statistical shenanigans with its economic data. That is true, but if German banks had to hold as much capital on loans to Greece than what they needed to hold against loans to German entrepreneurs or German small businesses, you could bet your last Deutsche Mark, sorry your last Euro, on that German banks, no matter how good economic data on Greece looked, would not have lent it a fraction of what they did. 

And now IMF’s calculations find Greece’s debt costs will “begin an uninterrupted rise” after 2038, to about 20 per cent of the country’s gross domestic product every year.” Sir, is it really fair to single out some groups of European citizens to pay for the mistakes of everyone’s European authorities? Should that not be a totally shared responsibility?

Germans should be aware that at this very moment German banks, are required to hold much less capital when lending to its government or to some other governments, than when lending to German citizens… and that dooms Germany, sooner or later, to end up being another over-indebted Greece. And that applies to banks and nations much everywhere.

May I make a suggestion to Germans, and all Europeans, and all Americans, and all other? If so, that would be to get rid, immediately, of bank regulators that are either so statist so as to assign the sovereigns a 0% risk weight, or so loony so as to believe that what is perceived as risky is more dangerous to their bank system than what is perceived as safe.

PS. And don’t tell us they did not know they were favoring sovereign debt so much

PS. Some in Germany are aware of the problem

@PerKurowski

I am not sure what, but, to hold the Eurozone together, requires something politically very difficult to be done.

Sir, you write: “IMF…economists reckon the real exchange rate was between 10 and 20 per cent weaker than appropriate in Germany, which continues to run huge trade surpluses, but overvalued by between 3 and 10 per cent for Spain. This is not a problem that a central bank can fix” “Central bankers and currency conflicts” July 28.

That is a central problem with the Euro, from day one, from when the bridges were burnt, and way too little has been done to solve it, in fact most efforts seem to have been to ignore it. 

And Sir, don’t tell us that central bankers have the right to be so unaware of this problem, so as for instance having assigned Greece a 0% risk weight, which caused Greece run even larger deficits, and Germany even larger surpluses, all mostly financed by German and French banks.

And, truthfully, have central bankers, with their hubris filled “whatever it takes” messaging communicated sufficiently their limitations to the politicians? I don’t think so.

What can be done to solve it? I have no firm idea but, what about a Euro effect compensation tax, by which surplus countries would be charging higher sales taxes than deficit countries, and all those revenues were shared out to all European equally by means of a Universal Basic Income? Would that be politically impossible? Perhaps, but if not something politically very difficult is done about this problem, it will become politically impossible to hold the Euro are together. 

The governments, the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission, cannot persist counting on European central bankers, like a Mario Draghi, to solve it. 

@PerKurowski

A major difficulty for EU is that what caused the last crisis, and attempts against its economic dynamism, shall not be named

Sir, Judy Dempsey writes that Merkel’s “conservative bloc would not buy into an agreement that would require Germany to spend more to bail out badly run economies” “Macron and Merkel will struggle to present a united front” June 19.

Have Merkel’s “conservative bloc” been told that their bank regulators assigned a risk weight of 0% to Greece and so that therefore Greece got way too much money?

Have Merkel’s “conservative bloc” been told that their regulators require banks to hold more capital against loans to German unrated entrepreneurs, than against loans to any EU sovereign?

Sir, I am sure that if central bankers and regulators were hauled in front of some really independent authority, and asked to comprehensibly explain so much of the crazy things their risk weighted capital requirements for banks entail, that would help clear the air and lead to much more constructive discussions in the EU about its future.

Who knows, perhaps such real discussions that would at long last hold some EU technocrats accountable, could even tempt a reversal of Brexit.

http://perkurowski.blogspot.com/2016/04/here-are-17-reasons-for-why-i-believe.html

@PerKurowski

The euro did not derive from a union but was used to build a union, and that still poses great-unresolved challenges.

Sir, I refer to Philip Stephens’“Trump, Italy and the threat to Germany” June 8.

Stephens writes: “Germany has been a “taker” — importing stability from neighbors and allies.” Indeed, but Germany has also imported the economic weaknesses from neighbors benefitting from a euro lower than what it would be if responding solely to Germany.

Yes, “The euro did not cause Italy’s economic ills, but it does close off the old escape route of devaluation”, except of course for those economies that, on the margin are the strongest, e.g. Germany.

Knowing they were benefitting unduly from the euro was perhaps the reason why the ordinarily much more disciplined Bundesbank Germans supported that insane notion of assigning, for the purpose of the capital requirements for banks, a risk weight of 0% to euro partners like Greece. For a while growing public indebtedness hid the costs of a stronger than suited for the weaker economies euro, but that lifeline has now clearly run out of steam.

What should the eurozone do know in order to survive? The answer must be finding a sustainable solution to the immense challenge that existed from the very start, when elites decided to build a union based on the euro instead of having a euro derived from a union.

Americans dream as American. How many Europeans dream as European?

To salvage the European Union, its authorities must be held responsible for the travails of Italy, Greece and other.

Sir, with respect to what’s happening in Italy you write: “The guardians of the single currency failed to mend the roof while the sun was shining… Even if disaster has been averted on this occasion, the economic and political fragility of the eurozone remain all too clear” “Italy sets a stress test for the eurozone, again” June 2.

True. From the very start, soon 20 years ago, it must have been clear for all the proponents of the Euro that adopting it, meant for all countries using it giving up the possibility of adapt to different economic circumstances through foreign exchange rates adjustments.

And a Germany would benefit with a too weak for it Euro, and others, like Italy and Greece would suffer a too strong for them Euro.

What have the Eurozone authorities done to meet that challenge? Way too little! They busied themselves with all other type of lower priority issues and outright minutia. Worse yet, they also stupidly silenced the full disequilibrium signals that the interest rates on the Euro members’ public debt level could send the markets by assigning to all a 0% risk weight. Something that made the sun seem shine brighter than what it really did!

Fabio Panetta, the Deputy Governor of the Bank of Italy in a speech in London in February 2018, with respect to the possibility of raising the capital requirements on sovereign debt had the temerity to say: “The problem of high public debt should be addressed by Governments directly, with determination. It should not be improperly tackled with prudential regulation.”

If I were an Italian or a Greek, given a chance I would have told (shouted) him: 

“With your 0% risk weighing you regulators imprudently created temptations for our politicians to be able to take on much more public debt at much lower rates than would otherwise have been the case, and now you argue they should have been able to resist such temptations? Just the same way you argue that banks should have resisted the temptations to leverage over 60 times with assets that carried an AAA rating? Have you and your colleagues no shame?” 

Sir, while regulators keep on giving banks more incentives to finance the “safer” present consumption than the future “riskier” production, the chances for Europe (and America) to get out of its problems lie, at least in the case of Italy, as so many times before, in the strength of its economia sommerza.

@PerKurowski

If bitcoin poses no threat because it’s perceived as risky, why agree with regulations that hold lending to entrepreneurs is dangerous because they are risky?

Sir, I refer to your “Do not worry about bitcoin — at least not yet” December 8.

Of course while bitcoin are perceived risky they pose no major danger. What I cannot understand though is why you do not extend that same reasoning to bank regulations?

What if suddenly bitcoin holdings were suddenly in terms of safety rated AAA by credit rating agencies, and regulators allowed banks to leverage over 60 times with these? That would make these bitcoin really dangerous, as happened when Basel II allowed banks to leverage with AAA rated securities.

That leads me to comment: “A flawed blue print for reform of the Eurozone” also of December 8.

Sir, if it were up to me I would not allow any expert technocrats to come even close to any institution in the Eurozone, before having received a satisfactory answer on why their regulators want banks to hold the most capital against what is perceived as risky. As I see it, it is when something ex ante perceived very safe ex-post turns out to be very risky, that we would like our banks to hold the most of it.

For instance would you like your banks regulated by those who assigned sovereign Greece a 0% risk weights and German entrepreneurs 100% and thereby caused German banks to lend more to Greece than to their local entrepreneurs? I sure would not!

@PerKurowski

The weaker Euro-nations pay quite a lot for Germany’s export advantages.

Sir, Paul Clifton writes about the advantages provided to German exports by the fact that other countries help to keep the Euro value down "The euro gives Germany a permanent cost advantage" August 23. That, which is entirely correct, should also have us refer to the disadvantages for those other.

In November 1998, just before the launch of the Euro, in an Op-Ed titled “Burning the bridges in Europe” I wrote: “The possibility that the European countries will subordinate their political desires to the whims of a common Central Bank that may be theirs but really isn’t, is not a certainty. Exchange rates, while not perfect, are escape valves. By eliminating this valve, European countries must make their economic adjustments in real terms. This makes these adjustments much more explosive. High unemployment will not be confronted with a devaluation of the currency, which reduces the real value of salaries in an indirect manner, but rather with a direct and open reduction of salaries or with an increase of emigration to areas offering better possibilities.”

And in November 2009, in a letter to you I asked about “what it would have looked like if for instance Greece still had the Drachma and Germany the Deutsche Mark… clearly Greece would be able to devalue and use that politically more friendly approach of being able to inflate yourself out of the problems, instead of having to impose "Germanic discipline" on their citizens.”

@PerKurowski

If a manufacturing trade deficit leads to deficits of skills, then that can be something truly serious.

Sir, Professor Robert H Wade when commenting on Martin Sandbu’s “Trump’s love of manufacturing is misguided” of February 15 writes: “manufacturing typically has strongly positive “externalities”, especially in innovation, and that the innovation intensity of manufacturing depends on close, physical links between production and innovation (“learning while doing”).” “Manufacturing has positive externalities” February 17.

Indeed, just think of where you, I and we all would have been, if America had not had that manufacturing capabilities and those skills that allowed it to build up what Franklin Roosevelt called “The Arsenal of Democracy”, and which allowed for the defeat of Germany’s impressive war machinery during World-War-II.

And currently, the possibility of some other nation ending up with 1st class robots, and your own with 2nd or even the 3rd class robots should clearly be a source of much concern to everyone.

My current pray is “God save my grandchildren from being surrounded by dumb artificial intelligence and 2nd class robots”. But that said perhaps intelligent artificial intelligence could be worse, since then we humans might turn into having to be its obedient servers. Who really knows?

​PS. Here is what I commented previously​ on Sandbu's article

PS. This is personal. Without “The Arsenal of Democracy” I would not be.

@PerKurowski

The fiercest manufacturing competition will be for the most capable robots, and there you never want to fall behind

Sir, Martin Sandbu writes “The economic nationalism of President Trump and Messrs Navarro and Bannon can be described as Germany-envy…Like so often with machismo, the envy is rooted in insecurity — a feeling of inadequacy compared with the perceived strength sported by these economies” “Trump’s love of manufacturing is misguided” February 15.

I can agree with much of Sandbu’s arguments, but that part of his article is simply under the belt out of place Trump bashing, which leads to nothing constructive at all. But, having gotten that out of my system, let me refer to another more vital issue.

When you lose manufacturing jobs, you do not only lose jobs, you lose skill-building opportunities; and to be able to retain some of the manufacturing skills in your country could also be part of your national security needs.

To understand that argument it suffices to read A.J. Baines “The Arsenal of Democracy”. Had America’s manufacturing capacity not existed in America, Sandbu would have lived under German rule, and I would not exists, since it was Americans that rescued my polish father from a German concentration camp… so perhaps we should both thank God for American “machismo”, and fret its possible disappearance.

Moreover, since “automation is reducing the need for manufacturing jobs everywhere” one can wonder if the dwindling manufacturing is not a great learning ground for robot and automation development. If so, giving up on that, one could face the serious problem of not ending up with the absolutely best robots.

Sir, I have tweeted: “God, please save my grandchildren from being dependent on dumb artificial intelligence and 2nd class robots”

PS. Of course there is also the great race for the most intelligent artificial intelligence.

PS. But what if we have the best robots?

@PerKurowski

Spreads between sovereign debts are also a function of different bank capital requirements.

Sir, you write: “The spread between German 10-year bond yields and those of France and Italy has widened, reflecting concerns over political instability.” “US bond yields receive a boost from fiscal policy” November 26

That might be so, but you should not exclude that it could also have to do with the possibilities of changes in credit ratings, as these would impact the risk weights that partly determine the capital requirements of banks.

Germany is rated AAA with a zero risk weight and is far away from a higher risk weight.

France rated AA, has also a zero risk weight, but is closer than Germany to the next level of risk weights, 20%

Italy is rated BBB-, with a 50% risk weight, and if it loses that rating, its next risk weight would be 100%... with great consequences for banks.

Sir, as you see, the spreads between sovereign debts are not only a reflection of markets, but also a reflection of regulatory distortions.

How anyone can think that subsidizing the borrowings of a sovereign, with lower capital requirements for banks, is helpful for the real economy is beyond my comprehension, unless of course one is a runaway statist. 

At least in Greece, 100% risk weighted, banks have now to hold the same amount of capital when lending to that sovereign, than when lending to a Greek SME. Had it been that way all the time, Greece would not have suffered its recent crisis.

@PerKurowski

Mario Draghi, explain to a German widget maker why you assign him a higher risk weight than to a French bureaucrat

Sir, Claire Jones’ quotes Adam Posen, a former member of the UK central bank’s Monetary Policy Committee with: “at the time after the financial crisis when lending to small businesses had fallen off a cliff. It was very compelling to hear from small businesses what credit rationing felt like in practice.” “Beer and bratwurst in Bavaria a missed opportunity for ECB” October 26, to ask one question.

Sir, how do you think Mario Draghi could explain to a German widget maker that his bank, when lending to him has to hold much more capital than if it lends to his government or to some other governments, like the French one?

I ask because in essence those risk weighted capital requirements, tilted in favor of the sovereign and against We the People, de facto implies that regulatory technocrats like Draghi, think bureaucrats are better able to decide what to do with bank credit than for instance German SMEs or entrepreneurs.

Come to think of it, Adam Posen was very lucky the “eight very small business owners” he recalls meeting then at the pub, had not the faintest idea about what was going on… they probably still do not.

PS: Again, here is an aide memoire on some of the monstrous mistakes of said regulations.

@PerKurowski ©

The German banks overextension to the shipping industry represents a great opportunity for investigative journalism.

Sir, James Shotter writes: “Before the financial crisis, lending to the shipping industry was big business for many German banks. [Now] however, those maritime exposures have assumed a nightmarish quality.” “Perfect storm looms over shipping lenders” September 21.

What a wonderful opportunity to do some real journalistic investigation. Why does not Shotter dig in and research what bank capital requirements the financing of the shipping industry generated for German banks? And then try to figure out whether German banks would have been so dangerously overexposed to it, had they been required to hold the same capital as when lending to German SMEs and entrepreneurs.

@PerKurowski

Mario Draghi, if a nanny, would tell children “Beware of the foul smelling and be kind to the nice giving you candy”

Sir, Wolfgang Münchau comes out in a full-fledged defense of Mario Draghi and ECB against Germany. He argues that had Berlin raised investment spending at home the ECBs´ job of cutting short-term rates to negative levels and buying financial assets, in order to achieve its inflation target would have been easier and it would not have had to cut rates by as much. “The high cost of Germany’s savings culture” May 9.

I will not argue against this but just remind Münchau that no matter how much Germany cooperates, if the resulting stimuli cannot flow to where it can be best used, the whole exercise might just complicate matters more.

And in this respect Draghi is a bank regulator who believes those rated below BB- are more dangerous to the banking system, than those rated AAA... and that should be indicative enough that he, and his regulating colleagues, are simply not up to the job.

@PerKurowski ©

Yes to a tax on carbon. But no to hidden subsidies or it going to tax revenues profiteers/distorters

I come from an oil extracting country, Venezuela, and so of course I should be horrified of a carbon tax that, one way or another, would affect the value we get from liquidating a barrel of non renewable oil forever.

But I am not, because in order to act responsibly towards the planet that our children will inherit, I accept the need to impose some restrictions on its use.

And I therefore entirely agree with Tim Harford in that “We can’t rely on high oil and coal prices to discourage consumption: the world needs — as it has needed for decades — a credible, internationally co-ordinated tax on carbon.” “Cheap oil and its consequences”, December 20.

But how the revenues produced from that tax should be handled, is an issue of utmost importance.

Let me start with the hardest concept to understand for all who do not posses oil on their own. The reason why you can charge a very high tax at the pump is the very high convenience value consumers give to petrol/gas. And so it is not really correct for a country that did not give up that non-renewable resource, to, by means of taxes, capture all that rent for its own benefit.

In some ways it would be like if oil extracting countries imposed a tax on the consumption on all foreign products that have especial attractiveness to their local consumers… a kind of luxury tax directed solely to the luxuries provided by others. What would for instance France say about a tax that in an oil extracting country they taxed French wines valued over a certain price range?

And we are not talking about peanuts. As I wrote in a letter published in FT in 2003 at that time, before the big increase in oil prices, for every $1 received by the one supplying the petrol, the European taxman got $4. And sometimes at that time, like in Germany and Spain, much of those tax revenues were even used to subsidize coal, like rubbing salt into the wound, and this even while the petrol tax was justified in environmental terms.

So how do I suggest the carbon tax revenues are applied? I have no defined idea about it, except wanting to avoid that some carbons get a better treatment than others, and that all those revenues fall into the hands of vulgar tax revenues profiteers or distorters.

What if all carbon taxes collected in the world were put in a big pot and thereafter just distributed in equal shares to all citizens of the world? That could both dent existing world inequalities (a stimulus for the economy), and increase the general interest in the fight for a better environment.

@PerKurowski ©

Holier than thou extreme political correctness causes incorrectness, and that is only human

Sir Gideon Rachman quotes Der Spiegel with “Germany these days is a place where people feel entirely uninhibited about expressing their hatred and xenophobia.” “The end of the Merkel era is within sight” October 27.

I do no know about Germany but, when I visited Sweden earlier this year, what I felt was a lot of inhibitions to express even the slightest indication of not being fully comfortable with many foreigners in their small cities, many of them in public places begging.

Clearly not being allowed to vent normal human reactions builds up pressures that, sooner or later, will make humans explode.

@PerKurowski ©

When Volkswagen is fined, as it should be, let all its diesel car buyers get some VW shares, instead of cash.

Sir, Wolfgang Münchau writes about “Volkswagen’s threat to the German model” October 5. Of course, that would be the case, if Volkswagen is forced to “a fire sale of assets in order to pay damages and fines [that] could easily add up to more than €100bn.”

But that would just be a typical stupidity of our days, like when our banks are fined, and then we find their lending capacity utterly diminished.

I am not a German, but if I were, I would urge the government to see that each Euro Volkswagen had to pay in fines because of its truly shameful “manipulation of emission tests”, was to be paid in shares issued at current market prices to the owners of diesel cars... those concerned about pollution. 

That would not weaken Volkswagen, much the contrary it could strengthen it. If our successful companies do wrong, there’s nothing in it for us to be vengeful, on the contrary there is a great opportunity to be constructive. Never weaken the strong to make them work better… strengthen them… but, then again, that’s just little me thinking.

@PerKurowski ©