When restructuring Venezuela’s debt, start with identifying all odious credits.

Colby Smith writes “analysts reckon Venezuela has some $140bn debt outstanding with over $65bn owed to bondholders and another roughly $40bn due to China and Russia.” “Venezuela’s welter of debt will mean a messy restructuring” February 2.

The key word here is “reckon”… because the indebtedness of Venezuela has clearly not followed a transparent process. Frequently there are references to odious debts, but very rarely or never to the fact that these most often arise from odious credits that should never have been awarded. That “odiousness” extends from a shameful lack of due diligence to outright participation in corrupt acts.

All citizens in the world would greatly benefit from having a clear definition of what should be considered odious credits, and of its consequences. Without it, any Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) similar to the one proposed 2002 at the IMF by Anne O. Kruger, would be found wanting.

PS. Because Robin Wigglesworth has touched on this theme I am copying him. 

https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2016/05/06/2161045/donald-trump-and-the-sovereign-debt-restructuring-mechanism-revisited/

https://www.ft.com/content/fa6850cc-96c3-11e7-b83c-9588e51488a0

When will the world stop referring to those giving odious loans, odious credits, as investors?

Sir, the Lex column “Venezuela debt/Maduro: crypto communist” of August 23 writes: “It beggars belief that a country with the world’s largest oil reserves has failed financially…when prices for oil, its sole commodity, fell. Borrowing has filled the gap… Investors, including the asset management arm of Goldman Sachs, can look forward to a lengthy default”

In your editorial of August 22, “The desperate plight of Maduro’s Venezuela” you wrote: “Much of the world, especially supporters of “Chavismo” from the Panglossian left, has been disgracefully silent about Venezuela’s crisis for too long. The country is all but a failed state. As a drug-trafficking hub and the source of a huge exodus, it is already an exporter of instability.”

And I must ask when is the world going to stop referring to those who help finance regimes that are notoriously inept or/and commits awful violation of human rights as “investors”, and not as the lowly and dirty financiers they are?

Is for instance financing the smuggling of drugs more morally reprehensible than financing a regime like Maduro’s? Would you ever dream of introducing to your family and friends one who had helped finance the construction of Auschwitz, as an investor?

Yes, credit ratings might be needed, but more does the world need ethic ratings. It is way past time the world begins to understand that most odious debt there is, has its origin in odious credits, and that we need a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism that takes that in consideration.

http://unsustainabledebtsustainability.blogspot.com

@PerKurowski

What would you as a bare minimum call creditors knowingly financing a government that in itself constitutes a brutal violation of human rights? Odious?

Sir, John Paul Rathbone, Robin Wigglesworth and Jonathan Wheatley, with respect to the surrealistic debt-restructuring initial steps in Venezuela quote Hans Humes of Greylock Capital, who is forming an investor committee with “Ultimately, there is going to be more money made in Venezuela than even in Argentina”. But the authors also rightly conclude in “The geopolitical and humanitarian consequences are likely to be larger still”, “Caracas plays its last cards” November 22.

Sir, “Food is in short supply” does not even begin to describe the tragedy.

Look at Venezuela as a prison. The food and medicines supplies it receives should be more than enough to keep all inmates healthy, but, since the guards have stolen so much of it, many prisoners, many children among them, are dying. And, in order to be able to steal more, the guards also took on huge debts in the name of the prison. And now the original creditors, or those who bought in at a later stage, and who all had all the possibilities of knowing very well what was going on, but that turned a blind eye to it when the interest rates offered by the guards were so irresistibly juicy, they want to be repaid. Will the guards do so? Will the prisoners allow that?

I have for decades called for Venezuela’s oil revenues, lately around 97% of all Venezuela’s exports, to be shared out to all its citizens, as the only way to guard against any odious or just plain dumb exercises of centralized statist power.

So what would happen if now the Venezuelans agree, in a referendum, on doing just that and then proceed to carry out the necessary changes in its constitution; and asks the IMF or the World Bank, with the assistance of other banks, to set up an oil revenue distribution system that keeps all oil exports invoiced in the name of Venezuela’s 30 and so million citizens? I am no lawyer but would a judge in New York approve the embargo of Simoncito’s part of oil, that if received would help to feed and keep Simoncito healthy?

Desperate times calls for desperate solutions, but perhaps some desperate solutions carry the potential of turning into magical solutions. For an oil cursed nation like Venezuela, that might just be what opens up its future to a much better tomorrow.

But the rest of the world could also benefit immensely. We quite frequently hear about the need for a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, SDRM. If such mechanism started by clearly establishing the fact that most odious debts have its origins in odious credits. There often is prohibition against usury, but even more important for all us citizens all around the world, and especially for those generations of citizens coming after us, to have some sort of mechanism that disincentive the award of odious credits to governments.

In reference to that I am begging Venezuela’s National Assembly to request that Venezuela’s Supreme Court of Justice in exile initiates a process destined to carefully revise the origin of all Venezuela’s credits to see if they can be deemed legitimate or not.

https://perkurowski.blogspot.com/2014/05/risk-premiums-and-ethic-ratings.html

@PerKurowski

If I were Puerto Rican I would be on my knees thanking President Trump. I wish he did the same for Venezuela.

Sir, with respect to President Trump informing the markets they should wave “goodbye” to Puerto Rico’s outstanding $74bn bonds, Gillian Tett writes: “it is hard to argue that the foreign investors deserve much sympathy: they bought Puerto Rico debt precisely because this offered sky-high yields to compensate for equally high risks.” "Puerto Rico’s recovery depends on debt forgiveness” October 6.

Precisely, the creditors should not be able to eat the cake and have it too.

I have often argued that in any restructuring process one would not want lenders who lent to the sovereign at low rates, or acquired sovereign debt when no repayment problems were envisaged, bona fide lenders, to receive the same treatment as those lenders who lending at high speculative rates, perhaps even helped to create the crisis that demands a debt resolution.

And, nothing discloses the frontiers between bona fide and speculative debts better than the expected risk premiums when debts are negotiated. Perhaps any sovereign debt that reflects a risk premium that exceeds for instance by 4 percent the lowest interest rate paid for similar debt to other sovereigns, the speculative threshold rate, STR, should be classified as speculative sovereign debt, SSD.

And in the case of a restructuring of a sovereign debt, any creditor who entered in possession of his credit in conditions that would deem it to be a SSD, should have all interest received in excess of the allowed STR, automatically deducted from the principal.”

Would that work? I have no idea but at least it could help restrain creditors from financing sovereigns that have not earned the right to be financed.

PS. I wish President Trump would send a similar “goodbye” message to Goldman Sachs for financing the Venezuelan regime.

@PerKurowski

Worse than odious debt that some might feel urgently needed, is odious credit that needs not to be given

Sir, Robin Wigglesworth writes: “An archaic, often-mentioned but never-invoked legal doctrine called “odious debt” could be tested for the first time in history in Venezuela should the regime be ousted from power.” September 12.

I feel that for us citizens, everywhere, even more important than the concept of odious debt, is to define a legal doctrine on “odious credit”, this for the simple reason that the first would not exist without the latter.

In other words, are we to hold an uneducated trying to survive day-by-day thug like Nicolas Maduro, to higher moral standards than those highly educated in Goldman Sachs’ who, if their education is worth anything, should be able to survive without financing badly masqueraded violations of human rights? I think no!

Sir, we do need a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism, urgently, but if such an SDRM is really to mean something good for the world, then the concept of odious credit has to be an integral part to it.

http://unsustainabledebtsustainability.blogspot.com/2004/04/odious-credit.html

@PerKurowski

The Venezuelan National Assembly, the real not the fake, needs to be careful it does not legitimize odious credits

Sir, Henry Foy, Robin Wigglesworth and Gideon Long report on how “Venezuela [Maduro] has invited international bondholders to negotiations over its foreign debt as Caracas seeks to mitigate the impact of US sanctions and survive a deepening economic crisis.” “Venezuela sets up talks on foreign debt” September 9.

Legitimate debt/credit, sort of legitimate debt/credit, more dubious debt/credit and clearly odious debt/credit composes Venezuela’s public debt. It behooves Venezuela, as well as all citizens in the world who could in the future face similar challenges, to make sure that in any negotiations here referred to, there are true representatives of the Venezuelan citizens, in order to make sure that differentiation occurs, and that there is no legitimation of debts that do not entirely merit it.

In this respect I hope the Venezuelan National Assembly, by voting, not by some finger-pointing appointments, selects who are going to represent it in any of these negotiations; and then formally notifies all interested parties of their names, that including all officials of the Paris Club.

Clearly those Venezuelan citizens representatives must present no conflicts of interest with either creditors or with those in government that have been involved with the “contracting” of such debt.

PS. What’s “sort of legitimate debt/credit”? That which is legitimate in legal but not in moral terms.

http://unsustainabledebtsustainability.blogspot.ca/2015/10/we-must-not-allow-vulture-funds-to.html

@PerKurowski

Should/will the holders of Venezuela’s “Hunger Bonds” have priority over the hungry?

Sir, John Dizard, in reference to the current financial difficulties of the state of Illinois points out that Judge Joan Lefkow of the Federal District Court in Chicago made the point of “Bondholders do not have priority over welfare recipients”. That according to a muni portfolio manager would signify that the judge “is starting the process of reprioritizing the primacy of debt service under state law and the state constitution.” “Illinois’ journey to junk credit is sending shockwaves through the muni industry” June 17.

Let me apply that to Venezuela. Would that judge order that those many Venezuelans, including children, who die because of lack of food and medicines would have the same pari-passu rights as the holders of what Ricardo Hausmann has named “Hunger Bonds”?

It really does not sound so farfetched, or unjust, considering that the holders of those “Hunger Bonds” must be, as reflected in the risk premiums, perfectly aware of the tragedies in Venezuela resulting from widespread corruption and violations of human rights, including the current violent repression of those demonstrating against the government.

Sir, many have argued that the world urgently needs a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism, SDRM. I agree but for more than a decade I have held that must start by defining clearly what credits are clearly bona-fide, doubtful or plain odious.

Dizard writes: “One of the key questions to ask about distressed sovereign credits is whether the paper is owned by locals. Even during Nigeria’s troubles in the 1970s and 1980s, the central bank continued to pay its promissory notes, even as its bank loans went into default. Nigerian officials owned some of the notes.”

Clearly in a case like Venezuela the Venezuelans should have a right to know exactly who were the financiers of their malign regime, and of how they came into holding these credits.

The “need” for holding Venezuelan paper so as to conform to some Emerging Market portfolios might have entrapped some investment funds. In such cases no much shame falls on them but of course they should voluntary submit their investments to a debt to food and medicines conversion program, and the product donated to the poor.

Personally I am trying to motivate a constitutional reform in Venezuela that would assign the property of its natural resources directly to the citizens. I wonder what judges would then authorize the embargo of a tanker that carried oil to be exchanged for food and medicines for the hungry owners of the oil.

I do that not for the purpose of getting away from onerous financial commitments but for the much more important mission of not having future Venezuelan governments to have a chance to do, ever again, what this XXI Century Socialistic revolution has done to my homeland.

Whether this would make it “more difficult and expensive to sell bonds if the state wants to fund pension obligations or fix its highways” is of little or no concern to me. In fact, the more I look around in the world and read of unfunded pension obligations that might be satisfied with debt to be paid by future generations… those limitations sounds like great news.

@PerKurowski

Should financing gas chambers in Auschwitz be right if the risk premiums are right?

Sir, Steve Johnson quotes Claudia Calich, the emerging markets debt manager at M&G Investments: “with a lot of the countries [EM bond funds] invest in . . . If you start to be very strict on every country, there would be very few that are squeaky clean in terms of democracy and human rights.” “Investors bet Venezuela crisis triggers default” June 6.

What does she mean to be “very strict”? Not investing in a country because of corruption and mismanagement, in which people die for lack of food and medicines, and where human rights’ violations are committed, is that being too strict?

The world needs a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM), and the first order of issue of such mechanism, should be to classify the credits being presented for collection into bona fide, suspicious and outright odious. 

As a citizen, I can’t wait for that date when credits given to a government, with interest rates that exceed in some substantial way those paid by other safer sovereigns, have their collection possibilities automatically restricted by a SDRM. For instance those buying bonds for 30 cents on the dollar, should not be able to present for collection more than those 30 cents.

Those knowingly financing human right violations should also be deemed accessory to those crimes. 

Sir, financiers might need credit ratings, but we citizens need ethics-ratings even more. Those ethics ratings should of course reflect the existence of accusations for violations to human rights. . 

http://unsustainabledebtsustainability.blogspot.com

@PerKurowski

Do not odious debts derive directly from odious credits or odious borrowings?

I refer to Jonathan Wheatley’s, Andres Schipani’s and Robin Wigglesworth’s FT: Big Read on the finances of Venezuela “A nation in bondage” November 11. I am taken aback by its distant coolness to what are life and death issues. “revenue-to-payments ratio”?

Sir, I have often asked, and not only in reference to Venezuela: does not what is being financed have anything to do with financing… is it only a matter of risk premiums being right? Let me go extreme to make my case. Should a bond issue that financed some extermination chambers be repaid? And should it then matter whether those chamber use Zyklon B, or the lack of food or medicines. Of course, whether those responsible for any deaths did it with intent, or only because of sheer ineptitude, matters a lot. But for informed financiers? How much “We didn’t know” can you really claim these days?

Sir, the world would be well served by having a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism but, for such a SDRM to also serve We the People well, and not only governments and their financiers, it would have to start to identify very clearly what should be considered odious debt derived from odious credits and odious borrowings.

And it should also define very clearly how much financiers could aspire to have their cake and eat it too. The article quotes Siobhan Morden, a Latin American strategist at Nomura saying “Investors who this year bought a PDVSA bond maturing in April 2017, for example, have made a 70 per cent profit, thanks to coupon payments and a price rise of 50 cents on the dollar as the bond approaches maturity” 

Two questions stand out: The first: should these bondholders be repaid the same as those who purchased the issue originally and held on to it? Perhaps yes, perhaps no. 

The second: Anyone out there thinks this 70% profit over a short period was just a result of a strict financial analysis, or did it contain some inside information that could affect its legal validity.

FT, yes I am Venezuelan, and so I might very well be too much on the crying side on this issue, but what would you in FT say if UK fell into the hands of a totally inept government and this one is kept in place by financiers out for a quick buck?

Sir should only a non-payment cause a default of sovereign bonds? Are there not implicit moral negative covenants that could be called on by the world, such as not letting your people starve only to serve the debt?

PS. Just to make my arguments clearer and therefore hopefully stronger in Venezuela I have been on this issue long before the Chavez/Maduro times.

@PerKurowski

Is there no moral issue in Venezuela bondholders being paid as a result of people being denied food or medicines?

Sir, Jonathan Wheatley writes: “In a broad sense, Caracas is already a serial defaulter. It has defaulted on its people by denying them access to the dollars they need for essential imports…” “Only one of Venezuela’s creditors is being paid without fail, on the button, every time: its international bondholders” “Venezuela clutches at straws in desperation to avoid bond default” September 28.

Let me ask: What would be a correct description of he who collects from a debtor knowing that he is being paid by a government because it denies food and medicines to its people? Or is that a moral irrelevance?

And what if the international bondholder’s would all just turn up to be close affiliates to the current government? I mean “A PDVSA bond maturing in 2017, on which a $2.3bn payment is due on November 2, is trading at about 80 per cent of par — hardly a sign of panic” could be indicative of it. Would it then just be another case of corruption? Insider trading?

The world needs a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) but, for that to be of any service or at least not a disservice to We the People, it needs to start with clearly defining what should be considered as odious credits or odious borrowings. As a minimum all bonds should not be bearer bonds, as we citizens should always have the right to clearly be able to identify who are financing our governments, and in what conditions, so that if we are not able to hold our governments accountable, like in Venezuela, we are at least able to hold its (our) creditors accountable.

@PerKurowski ©

Should bonds that finance violations of human rights have to be repaid?

Sir, I find it hard to comprehend the big raucous one can often hear about financing what endangers the environment, or companies that employ children; and then reading “Venezuela’s hospitals do not have medicine, the stores do not have food or toilet paper, but there is an almost surreal confidence that bondholders will do quite well out of the coming restructuring, even with the damage done by governmental incompetence and corruption” “Chaos reigns as Caracas makes every effort to please foreign bondholders” John Dizard, September 3.

Sir, what if the International Court of Justice decided, as it should, those bonds should not be paid, on account they were financing the violation of human rights?

I have been for many years, soon many decades, been voicing support for the need of a Sovereign Debts Restructuring Mechanism, but that SDRM must begin by defining very clearly what is to be considered as odious credits and odious borrowings. If not, We the People, will get screwed.

Is Venezuela violating human rights? There’s food and medicine scarcity, and people are dying because of it, but petrol (gas) is being given away at US$ 1cent per liter (US$ 4cents per gallon). So you tell me!

@PerKurowski ©

As an interested Venezuelan, when lending to a Zimbabwe, should there be no ethical considerations?

Sir, David Pilling and Andrew England report that “Zimbabwe is close to putting the final touches to a debt-arrears package that could see it receive an emergency injection of funds from the International Monetary Fund and other multilateral institutions”, “Cash-starved Zimbabwe closes in on deal to clear debt arrears” July 8.

And for that Zimbawe is receiving the advise of Lazard in order to arrange a seven years loan of $986m from the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank), in order to pay back arrears to the World Bank and IMF sin order to access more credit.

That sounds so rational, so hygienic, but should there not be a small question about whether if lending to Zimbabwe is ethical? I mean its government has not behaved too well, and there is no guarantee it will, and any new credit might just help to postpone any urgently needed change.

And so, independently of how juicy the risk premiums or the commissions might be, do the lenders really believe these loans will help Zimbabwe, and not only help some criminals, some technocrat or some bureaucrats?

Because if the lenders decide to bet on the government, and the government does not deliver, should they anyhow have the right to hold the citizens or any future government to repaying their non-earned winnings?

Sir, as a Venezuelan, I am naturally very interested in hearing your opinions on this.

And Sir, I have for decades argued that the world needs a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism but, for that SDRM to work in the best interests of us citizens, it needs to begin by identifying clearly what should be classified as odious credits or odious borrowings.

@PerKurowski ©

As a Venezuelan, I would sure like to know who those financing those who are destroying my country are

Sir, Elaine Moore and Andres Schipani report “Venezuela keeps paying foreign lenders despite blackouts and food queue riots” May 10.

But, when considering all that is going on in Venezuela, why should its creditors be treated with such neutral anonymity? Who are they? Is it okay for them whatever the nation does, as long as they get their high interest rates?

I am not implying there is something similar horrible going on in Venezuela, but are these investors who could for instance finance cremation ovens in Auschwitz, without blinking their eyes, as long as the price was right?

If you finance someone who is committing human rights violations, does that not make you an accomplice? And don’t tell me these lenders, in today’s globalized world, are innocently unaware of what is happening in Venezuela,

As a Venezuelan I would sure like to know who those financing those who are destroying my land are. I am by no means saying they are all the same. Many of them might have lent money to the revolution when things though bad seemed more normal. But most of all I would like to know if among them are some of the vultures that already had by other means been eating of what soon seems to become a carcass of a nation… and now want to have another last bite.

The world’s governments might urgently need a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism… but we citizens, we only really need it, if it comes together with a clear definition of what are odious public credits and what are odious public borrowings.

PS. And it is not a new issue for me

@PerKurowski ©

Where are the citizens, the taxpayers, in all the discussions about sovereign debt restructuring?

Sir, I refer to Robin Wigglesworth’s and Elaine Moore’s interesting discussion about sovereign debt restructuring. "FT Big Read. Sovereign Debt." May 9.

In it they state: “The International Monetary Fund and finance industry bodies have spent the past few years overhauling aspects of the sovereign bankruptcy architecture….

In April 2013, the US Treasury orchestrated an informal group of creditors, bankers, lawyers and governments to find a solution to the problem. Over the course of a year the ‘Sovereign Debt Roundtable’ meetings were attended by representatives from multilateral institutions, major governments and the London-based International Capital Markets Association.”

And I have to ask: Should not citizens be present there in order to make sure they are not forced to pay what could be considered odious borrowings by the governments or odious credits given by the lenders.

I know that all the costs or additional risks for creditors that could result from any Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism will be reflected, one way or another, sooner or later, in the interest rates of the loans. Even so I am all for a SDRM as it represents a golden opportunity to reduce the risks that we citizens, we taxpayers, are taken to the cleaners, by any arrangements between governments and their bankers.

For instance, it would be great if governments, who cannot earn the right to be trusted by the markets sufficiently, and therefore had to accept risk premiums over x%, had no access to markets, otherwise being willing to accept, on us citizens’ behalf, interest rates in line with payday loans.

And what if the feeling you have is that those collecting payday high interests are some creditors who are "very" close to the government?

Equally a creditor that knowingly lends to a government that is not functioning, as it should, that is for instance violating human rights, should not see his debt classified for repayment in the same conditions than more bona fide lender.

Sir, let me give an example from Venezuela. Would you like your children have to repay a foreign debt contracted, at high interest rates, only because a government, even though there is lack of food and medicines, sells petrol at less than 2 US$ cents per liter?

Whenever we sit down to work out unsustainable debt… I would like that debt qualified.

PS. And there’s more and more and more on this issue.

@PerKurowski ©

Venezuela, and the world, is in need of a clear definition of what are odious credits and odious borrowings.

Sir, you write “China, which has loaned Caracas more than $65bn in return for oil deliveries, potentially has a big role to play. Having extended some of these loans’ maturities, officials in Beijing said that they hoped “Venezuela can properly handle” its current situation” “The ice finally begins to crack in Venezuela” May 19.

For me there are odious credits and odious borrowings, and you can bet Britain would never ever, or at least not currently, be allowed to take on public debt in such a non-transparent way, as when China lent money to the 21st Century Socialism.

You write: “A lack of basic goods and medicine has led to protests and lootings. Shortages of foreign currency, prioritised to pay overseas debts, have forced a 40 per cent drop in imports in the past year”

Who are these powerful foreign creditors that force the government to prioritize paying debt over securing food and medicine to its people? Could they be the same vagabonds that have ruined the country and are now set on to re-ruin it?

Should the creditors and or their advisors, knowing what the government was doing, have lent to Venezuela only because the risk premiums were attractive? And if so, should they have a right to be repaid?

I am not by far implying that something similar was the case in Venezuela, but, only to make the point, let me ask: Should one financing the cremation ovens of Auschwitz have a right to be repaid?

In the world there is much need for a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism but, if that is going to make us citizens any good, before entering in the notion of odious debts, it must clearly define what is odious credits and odious borrowings.

By the way, if such a definition had existed, and could have applied to odious mortgages such as those that ended up in AAA rated securities, then you might have saved yourself from the 2007-08 crisis.

PS. Are those recommending investors to lend to a country that has made no merits to receive credit, only because the rewards are high, not de facto pimping a country?

PS. Any government having to pay 3% more for public debt than the one paying the least, should not have right to contract debt.

@PerKurowski ©

Argentina, and so many others need, urgently, clear definition of what are odious public-sector credits and borrowings

Sir, I refer to Benedict Mander’s “Macri is surrounded by former bankers as he seeks international investment” May 13.

I have always been convinced that most of debt that at any point of time gets to be qualified as “odious”, has had its beginnings in odious credits or in odious borrowings.

Odious public sector credits are those that lenders approve even though they know the resources will not be put to a good use, only because the risk-premiums are right. A really extreme example of this would be an oversubscribed public bond issue to finance something like the crematoria ovens of Auschwitz. 

Odious public sector borrowings are those carried out by governments, in lieu of real correcting measures, or because of other political short term interests, without any consideration as to how it is going to be repaid and who are going to repay, usually those of a generation down the line.

And so therefore I have always held that, no matter how important it was to introduce a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) that had to begin by defining clearly what should be considered as odious credit or odious public borrowings. That since these, for the good of us all, should not receive the same treatment as bona-fide credits.

And in this respect when I read that “luring money back into an economy starved of investment after a decade of interventionist policies” is considered “a vital element” I feel it might be time again for us to prepare to cry for Argentina.

And, just in case, this has nothing to do with who governs Argentina, in fact I very much welcome the recent change. It is what I have opined in my country Venezuela, pre-Chavez, during-Chavez, and that I will surely also opine after the long overdue Chavez/Maduro change comes into fruition.

To use a credit card to buy food and medicine for the people is understandable but, for governments to load up on credit card debt as a substitute for doing the reforms that are needed, or to finance new investments supposed to “take care of it all”, that is just immoral.

When it comes to public sector debt, and for instance capital requirements for banks, it would serve us citizens much better if ethic or good governance ratings were used instead of simple credit risk rating… a good credit risk rating resulting from the government receiving large oil revenues, is just to add salt to injury.

@PerKurowski ©

Odious debt is often mentioned, but its origin is most often those odious credits and odious borrowings that abound

Sir, Benedict Mander, with respect to Argentina issuing debt writes: “These yields don’t exist anywhere else in the world in countries with such low levels of debt,” said [enthusiastically] Facundo Gómez Minujín, managing director at JPMorgan’s Argentina unit. “Argentina targets $30bn debt issuance” May 2.

Is that not a sign that Argentina, if it took on debt, should demand to pay less or just leave it like that?

And by the way, what has the fact that Argentina has low level of debts to do with anything? Is not debt to be contracted only if you have something really worthy to do with it, something that will allow you to repay the debt and leave some decent returns?

I do not know much about Argentina, and I do not intend any similitude, but I do know that I profoundly dislike all those who knowing how bad it was run, and how little with its huge oil revenues it should need credit, still financed the disastrous XXI Century Socialism Venezuela, only because risk premiums seemed good. Had they not done so, Venezuela could perhaps already have been able to rid itself of The Tragedy. Had they not done so, Venezuela would not, on top of all its other current mindboggling difficulties, need to add the service of totally unproductive contracted debt.

For me good governments are those who stay out of debt even if conditions seem fair, only on account that debt basically represents advance fiscal revenues, to be paid later by the next generation.

We do need a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) but, if it is going to produce reasonable results for the citizens, then it has to begin by defining very clearly what is odious credit and what are odious borrowings. I have sometimes argued that any public borrowing that offers to pay more than a specified number of basis points over what the best debtor is paying, could be considered as odious.

I know it is way too extreme, and has absolutely nothing to do with Argentina or Venezuela, but the question needs to be asked, so that the point I am making becomes utterly clear: Would bonds issued for the construction of the crematoria ovens in Auschwitz be included in any debt restructuring… or should these just be thrown out… or should the financiers also be judged?

@PerKurowski ©

“Government, I will lend you fresh money if you favor me with huge risk premiums” Does that not sound a bit corrupt?

Sir, Max Seddon and Laura Noonan write about the plans of Russia to issue its first sovereign bond since the US and Europe imposed sanctions on Moscow, and of some reactions of Washington to that. “Russian bond poses dilemma for bankers” February 26.

And in this respect: “The Treasury told the banks that while there was technically no ban against helping the Russian government raise money, the banks would have to be mindful of the fact that the money could be diverted into activities that were not consistent with US foreign policy.”

But what about the case of money that could be diverted into activities that was not consistent with Russian citizens’ interests? Is that irrelevant?

I ask because I am Venezuelan, and the government of my country has taken on loads of debt, something that clearly is not justifiable in the midst of an incredible oil boom. And all this odious credit/debt is now supposed to be repaid by all citizens who had absolutely nothing to do with how the loan proceeds were used, in much because of a big lack of transparent information.

And the financier’s of Venezuela have been quite aware that things in Venezuela were not fine and dandy. Among publicly notorious issues was that the government was selling oil to some countries a highly subsidized prices for its own political benefit; giving away gas to its own citizens for a value that exceeded all social spending put together; the existence of rampant corruption; and that its human right’s behavior was being questioned over an over again.

But the financiers loved the risk premiums, and so I ask:

In the case of a loan to an individual government official in return for a favor, there would be no doubt that it could be classified as an act of corruption, and the financier could be held liable in the US under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.

But, what about a loan that provides money to a whole government, in return of the favor of extravagant risk premiums, could that not also be classified as an act of corruption?

The world no doubt needs a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) but, if that is going to help the citizens of the world, which it primarily should do, that must begin by making clear the difference between bona-fide normal credits and odious credits.

@PerKurowski ©

Even though there is hunger, could Venezuela be servicing religiously its debt because of who the bondholders are?

Sir, even though Venezuela is suffering lack of food and medicines, it is doing all it can to pay its foreign bondholders. Andres Schipani quotes Bank of America’s Francisco Rodriguez in that “Venezuela could continue paying bondholders for longer than it keeps paying Maduro’s salary”, “Maduro’s Venezuela on the brink of default" February 12.

Could it be that all these bondholders are in fact the same usual local friends of the government and who in these bonds have just found another way to further exploit this poor-rich country? I mean it is hard to visualize any ordinary reasonably responsible investor, no matter how big the spreads, putting money in Venezuelan bonds while knowing without doubt that the resources raised by debt will be wasted just the same way as the greatest oil-boom in history has been wasted.

The world needs a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM) but, for that to serve us citizens any useful purpose, and not even be counterproductive, it must begin by establishing clearly the differences between bona fide lending and odious credit.

@PerKurowski ©

We’ll soon need a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism SDRM for most countries of the word. Especially for the “safe”

Sir, Chris Giles writes: “Three times in four weeks, BoE has opted to provide more economic stimulus” “The Bank of England is a dove with clipped wings” December 3.

And reading it, all stimuli had, one way or another, to do with facilitating governments to have easier access to credit so as to be able to run larger deficit spending schemes. It is truly scary stuff.

Add to that, that for the purpose of setting the capital requirements for banks, the sovereigns have been assigned a zero percent risk weight while those who most generate the strength of a sovereign, the private sector, have been assigned risk weights from 20 to 150 percent, and it should be clear to all that we are heading towards the mother of all sovereign debts crises… especially that of those sovereigns perceived as the safest.

@PerKurowski ©