Does Martin Wolf’s “The tragedy of two failing superpowers” conform with FT’s beautiful motto of “without favour”?

Wolf opines about Donald Trump in terms of “a malevolent incompetent” and for this looks for the support of that totally unbiased Jeffrey Sachs who writes about “devastatingly of the ill will and ineffectiveness on display”. “The tragedy of two failing superpowers” April 1.

Sir, if this is what it comes down to, let me be clear that I much prefer the support of a highly incompetent but more principled Donald Trump, against our evidently thousand times more malevolent incompetents, like Hugo Chavez and Nicolas Maduro, than the support given to them by “extremely competent” Barack Obama and Jeffrey Sachs.

Wolf then writes: “For those of us who believe in liberal democracy” Really? Are we to believe that anyone who, for purposes of bank capital requirements, agrees with assigning a risk weight of 0% to his sovereign’s debt and 100% to fellow citizen’s debts, something which de facto implies that bureaucrats knows better what to do with credits for which’s repayment they're not personally responsible for than for example entrepreneurs, could be defined as a believer in a liberal democracy? I don’t think so, to me he would just be a disguised communist.

@PerKurowski

Why are tariffs on trade with others, worse than tariffs on access to bank credit for your own?

Sir, I refer to Martin Wolf’s spirited defense of free trade and not less spirited attack on Donald Trump for having turned the US into “a rogue superpower, hostile, among many other things, to the fundamental norms of a trading system based on multilateral agreement and binding rules.” “The US-China clash challenges the world” May 22.

Do I disagree? Not really, except noting that at least Trump follows the instinct to protect his own.

But where was/is Martin Wolf when bank regulators, for instance, with Basel II, require banks to hold 8% in capital when lending to their own unrated entrepreneurs, but allow his banks to lend to any other sovereign AAA to AA rated against no capital at all, or to any other foreign AAA to AA rated entrepreneur against only 1.6% in capital?

Sir, anyone who argues those differences in capital requirements are not de facto tariffs on the access to bank credit, have no idea of what they are talking about.

Truth is that since trade is about today, but credit is about tomorrow, I truly believe the Basel Committee and their affiliate regulators are, with their tariffs on the access to bank credit, doing much more damage than a Donald Trump.

But of course you dare not to favor the opinion of little me over that of your own chief economic commentator.

@PerKurowski

If China abandons the risk weighted bank capital requirements, and the West does not, the West is lost.

Sir, Martin Wolf with respect to China quotes premier Li Keqiang stating: “We will reform and refine monetary and credit supply mechanisms, and employ . . . a combination of quantitative and pricing approaches . . . to guide financial institutions in increasing credit supply and bringing down the cost of borrowing”… [and that he] stressed the need to “ease funding shortages faced by private enterprises”, “encourage private actors to engage in innovation” and “attract more private capital into projects in key areas”. “The Chinese economy is stabilising” April 3.

In his book Money: Whence it came, where it went” (1975), John Kenneth Galbraith speculates on the fact that one of the basic fundamentals of the accelerated growth experienced in the western and south-western parts of the United States during the past century was the existence of an aggressive banking sector working in a relatively unregulated environment. He wrote, “Banks opened and closed doors and bankruptcies were frequent, but as a consequence of agile and flexible credit policies, even the banks that failed left a wake of development in their passing.”

And that hits the nail. Risk taking is the oxygen of any development.

The current risk adverse risk weighted capital requirements for banks that assigns a risk weight of 0% to the Sovereign, 20% to any AAA rated corporation, 35% to residential mortgages and 100% to the unrated citizens, like those entrepreneurs on whom a nation’s strength depends on, is the perfect recipe for a secular stagnation.

God make us daring!

@PerKurowski

When restructuring Venezuela’s debt, start with identifying all odious credits.

Colby Smith writes “analysts reckon Venezuela has some $140bn debt outstanding with over $65bn owed to bondholders and another roughly $40bn due to China and Russia.” “Venezuela’s welter of debt will mean a messy restructuring” February 2.

The key word here is “reckon”… because the indebtedness of Venezuela has clearly not followed a transparent process. Frequently there are references to odious debts, but very rarely or never to the fact that these most often arise from odious credits that should never have been awarded. That “odiousness” extends from a shameful lack of due diligence to outright participation in corrupt acts.

All citizens in the world would greatly benefit from having a clear definition of what should be considered odious credits, and of its consequences. Without it, any Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) similar to the one proposed 2002 at the IMF by Anne O. Kruger, would be found wanting.

PS. Because Robin Wigglesworth has touched on this theme I am copying him. 

https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2016/05/06/2161045/donald-trump-and-the-sovereign-debt-restructuring-mechanism-revisited/

https://www.ft.com/content/fa6850cc-96c3-11e7-b83c-9588e51488a0

The US might be an SOB of a superpower, but it is our (or at least mine) SOB superpower.

Sir, Martin Wolf writes: “China is, not the real threat. The threat is the decadence of the west, very much including the US — the prevalence of rent extraction as a way of economic life, the indifference to the fate of much of its citizenry, the corrupting role of money in politics, the indifference to the truth, and the sacrifice of long-term investment to private and public consumption. It is indeed a tragedy that the best way we could find to escape from a financial crisis was via monetary policies that risked promoting new bubbles. We could be better than this.” “The rivalry that will shape the 21st century” April 11.

On the “sacrifice of long-term investment to private and public consumption” I could not agree more. But that is precisely why I have been attacking, day and night, obsessively, the risk weighted capital requirements for banks. These make our banks favor way too much the financing of the present “safer” consumption (houses-governments) and stay away, way too much, from financing the “riskier” future production (entreprenuers). Unfortunately too many, Martin Wolf included, have been indifferent to that truth.

But, that said, on the first part “the prevalence of rent extraction as a way of economic life, the indifference to the fate of much of its citizenry, the corrupting role of money in politics, the indifference to the truth”, is China really better than the west or the US? 

I don’t think so, but even if it was so, when push comes to show, there comes a point when you have to decide what superpower you prefer. I have no doubt preferring the west, the US… though Graham Allison of Harvard seems to harbor some doubts on that arguing that “China rivals the US in…ideology”.

In what I entirely agree with Wolf is when, explaining it so well, he states “The idea that intellectual property is sacrosanct is wrong. It is innovation that is sacrosanct. Intellectual property rights both help and hurt that effort. A balance has to be struck between rights that are too tight and too loose”

Yes, and for years I have suggested that balancing could start by taxing the profits obtained when competing protected by intellectual property rights, at a higher rate than profits derived from competing naked in the market. And since what becomes protected with IPRs is the last leg of our human heritage inventiveness, those taxes should perhaps also help to fund a Universal Basic Income, something which would be a de facto social dividend.

PS. That said, when Wolf says “the US can huff and puff about Chinese theft of intellectual property” then I am not sure really which SOB is Wolf’s favorite superpower.

PS. For full disclose, had it not been for the US, I would certainly not be around.

PS. All morphed faces look ugly but, in reference to Times’ recent cover, if faces have to morph, what faces would you prefer to see morphing, Trump-Putin, Trump-Xi Jinping or Putin Xi-Jinping?

@PerKurowski

If the west insists on autocratic regulatory intervention of its banks, then it is not much different from China

Sir, Martin Wolf writes: “The west let its financial system run aground in a huge financial crisis. It has persistently under-invested in its future. The west needs rejuvenation. It cannot rejuvenate by copying the drift towards autocracy of far too much of today’s world. It must not abandon its core values, but make them live, once again. It must create more inclusive and dynamic economies” “The challenge of Xi’s Leninist autocracy”

Indeed, but what that west in which we used to sing psalms like “God make us daring” has done, is to allow autocratic regulators, with their risk weighted capital requirements for banks, to put the natural risk aversion of our bankers on steroids.

If we do not allow our banks to compete freely without this type of autocratic intervention we are not that different from China.

Sir, frankly, does the west really need to allow its banks to earn higher risk adjusted returns on equity when lending to sovereigns, or to AAA rated, or on house mortgages, than when lending to its SMEs and entrepreneurs? I would have to say “NO!”

@PerKurowski

Where would China be if western world had not placed a reverse mortgage on their economies, in order to keep on buying?

Sir, with interest I have read Martin Wolf’s “How the developed world lost its edge” July 20. In my opinion Wolf ignores two major events that had these not happened would have radically changed the current outlook.

First, regulators told banks: “Go out in the market and negotiate the best risk-adjusted net margins you can. And then, in order to make sure you do not take risks, we will allow you to multiply these margins much more in the case of assets perceived as safe than in the case of risky assets.”

That of course led to the accumulation of excessive exposures and against very little capital (equity), to something ex ante perceived decreed of concocted as safe, like AAA rated securities and sovereigns, which when ex-post turning out very risky caused the 2008-crisis.

And then central banks, with their QEs and ultralow interest rates, hindered the necessary market cleanup, and kicked the 2008-crisis can down the road, a road made unproductive by previous mentioned regulatory risk aversion.

So what resulted? No adjustment and further indebtedness, which allowed prices of assets to increase and demand (among other of Chinese production) to be sustained… further allowing the Chinese to save. 

Wolf writes: “The rapid growth of both trade and cross-border financial assets and liabilities and trade, relative to global output, has come to a halt. In the case of finance, plausible explanations are risk-aversion and re-regulation”. “Risk-aversion”? Yes, but not any new one but that which result from regulators loading up, on top of bankers’ natural risk aversion, there own aversion based on the same perceived risks. The bankers lend you the umbrella when the sun shine’s Mark Twain, would never have believed his eyes had he seen such regulatory nonsense.

Sir, as I’ve written to you many times before, never ever has a generation taken on so much debt to finance their own consumption, and shown so little respect for the needs of future generations, those needs that include bankers lending to risky SMEs and entrepreneurs.

How can a Western world made great by taking risks, not lose its edge by avoiding it?

Wolf concludes with: “Rising populist pressure across the high-income economies makes managing these shifts far more difficult.” Indeed, but let us not forget that this mess began when some truly inept populist technocrats, like real life Chauncey Gardiners, convinced governments they knew what they we doing.

PS. Martin Wolf also fell for it.

@PerKurowski

Not just China needs to allocate capital to the more productive, dynamic and employment-generating parts of the economy

Sir, Eswar Prasad, a professor at Cornell University and senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, writes: “Fixing the financial system is not just about managing risks and avoiding disaster, but also about allocating capital to the more productive, dynamic and employment-generating parts of the economy.”, “How to fix China’s unstable financial system” July 19.

How do you do that, not only in China but everywhere, with bank regulators who do not care one iota about the efficient allocation of credit to the real economy, but only about banks avoiding what is perceived as risky?

Especially since 2004’s Basel II, banks have been allowed to multiply their capital with many times more the net risk-adjusted margins when investing in something “safe”, like the past and the present, like sovereigns, the AAArisktocracy and residential houses, than when investing in something “riskier”, like the future, like SMEs and entrepreneurs.

That has completely distorted credit allocation and for no particularly good reason, since there is never ever major bank crisis that result from excessive exposures to something ex ante perceived as risky when placed on banks’ balance sheets.

@PerKurowski

If the renminbi is as shaky and dangerous as Martin Wolf argues, why was it made part of IMF’s SDRs in October 2016?

Sir, Martin Wolf writes: “US policymakers should worry about China’s capital account, not its current account. That is where danger now lies… Given its macroeconomic imbalances, China could unleash considerable global mayhem… Capital would pour out, the renminbi would tumble and, in time, a globally unmanageable current account surplus would emerge…Today’s credit growth and consequent financial fragility are a direct consequence of the desire to prevent this from happening” “Chinese finance is storing up trouble” April 6.

Aha! And so what do we do? And so what does Martin Wolf suggest President Trump does when meeting his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping in Florida this week?

Is all this just another excuse to lash out at Trump, in this case Trump’s concerns with the deficits in the trade account, those deficits that Wolf strangely seems to argue are totally disconnected to the capital accounts. In truth all this about “the macroeconomic imbalance” reads just like pure vintage Wolf. 

He for instance insists with a “China’s external accounts already played a significant role in the run-up to the financial crisis of 2007-08.” Significant perhaps but still much smaller than the role the distortions produced by Basel’s risk weighted capital requirements for banks played… like for AAA rated securities and Greece

But Sir, we should ask, where was Martin Wolf when, on October 1, 2016, the IMF made the renminbi part of its Special Drawing Rights… and thereby de facto awarding it a reserve currency status? Was that not a much more important moment for Wolf to step forward and opine, than a meeting at a Mar-a-Lago in Florida this week?

PS. Of course, Trump is Trump, and we should never completely ignore the possibility he will try to arrange a financial conference that could give to Mar-a-Lago the same type of historic fame that the Bretton Woods Conference awarded the Mount Washington Hotel. (What hotel owner would not love that?)

PS. Frankly, how can a country that blocks a search engine like Google has its currency included in IMF's SDRs?

How do you suggest a contrarian belief to a President without causing him great disconfirmatory feedback discomfort?

Sir, Tim Harford writes that when “I think I’m doing a good job, and then you tell me that I’m not… [research indicates] “that when this, which in the jargon is known as disconfirmatory feedback arrived, workers would then avoid contact with the people who had given them the unwelcome comments.” “If I’m cruising along in a complacent bubble, I badly need someone to explain what I’m doing wrong” January 11.

Bank regulators think they are doing great assigning a risk weight of 20% for what is AAA rated, and 150% for what is below BB-. I tell them they’re wrong, that what’s perceived as safe, contains much more danger than what is perceived as risky. I back it up with Voltaire’s “May God defend me from my friends, I can defend myself from my enemies” … and then the regulators avoid all contact with me. It sure looks like a case of reaction to a disconfirmatory feedback.

But, at a level of a Basel Committee for Banking Supervision should its members not have to be able to handle rationally any disconfirmatory feedback? And what about those even higher up?

For instance, I believe that in the race for jobs in the US, much more important than human competition from China and Mexico, is the fact that Americans have to compete with robots from everywhere that do not have to carry weights like payroll taxes.

Sir, I ask, how can I convey such a belief to a President without risking causing him great disconfirmatory feedback discomfort?

PS. Sir FT, since you have also mostly shut me up, could it be because I have gone over the level of disconfirmatory feedback you can handle? If so, how should we handle it? I ask because I have no wish to give up writing you my mind on so many things you might not agree with.

@PerKurowski

Why is obvious crony statism referred to as crony capitalism?

Sir, I refer to Martin Wolf’s “Why Xi cannot succeed with his reforms” December 14.

In it, Wolf quotes the following from Minxin Pei’s “China’s Crony Capitalism”: “The emergence and entrenchment of crony capitalism in China’s political economy, in retrospect, is the logical outcome of Deng Xiaoping’s authoritarian model of economic modernisation… because elites in control of unconstrained power cannot resist using it to loot the wealth generated by economic growth.”

But “Capitalism” (at least according to Wikipedia), “is an economic system based on private ownership of the means of production and their operation for profit. Characteristics central to capitalism include private property, capital accumulation, wage labor, voluntary exchange, a price system, and competitive markets. In a capitalist market economy, decision-making and investment is determined by the owners of the factors of production in financial and capital markets, and prices and the distribution of goods are mainly determined by competition in the market.”

Sir, so why does it refer to “crony capitalism” when it is clearly much more a case of “crony statism”? Could it be that the “unconstrained power of the elites” also cover the terminology we are to use? Like for instance when references are made to our economies being under the yoke of “neo-liberalism”, all while bank regulators gladly risk-weigh Sovereigns with 0%, and We the People with 100%. Or like when intrusive and complex bank regulations are mentioned to have happened in a period of "deregulation".

PS. Here is the current summary of why I know the risk weighted capital requirements for banks, is utter dangerous nonsense.

@PerKurowski

Venezuela’s debts to China should first be investigated, not first negotiated.

Sir, Lucy Hornby and Andres Schipani report that Chinese "Envoys seek assurances from opposition on debt in case president [Maduro] falls” June 20.

I don’t know about the opposition, but I sure believe that if any developed countries had been given those loans in such non-transparent terms, as Venezuela got those of China, its citizen would have, at least initially, given the Chinese the finger.

And so this is not for the opposition to negotiate, it is for the opposition to openly and transparently investigate.

Only after complete investigations have concluded, and the debt has been declared bona fide, and not derived from odious credits or odious borrowings, could then open and transparent negotiations begin. 

@PerKurowski ©

Cement generates carbon - tree stores carbon. Is that something for houses in China?

Sir, I refer to Gillian Tett’s “Can China’s buildings turn green?” April 23.

What I have understood talking with friends who might just be besserwissers as unknowledgeable on these matters as I am; China uses a lot of concrete when building, and cement generates massive amounts of carbon. If they built more houses with tree then they could instead be capturing carbon.

Is it so? Who knows, in the fight against climate change, we must be very careful, there are many climate change profiteers.

And that, to keep profiteers away, is why I am supporting a big tax on gas, distributed by means of a Universal Basic Income. That would also align the incentives in the fight against climate change with those in the fight against inequality.

@PerKurowski ©

The only bank credit-allocation taking place, in UK and China, is based on credit risk weighted capital requirements

Sir, David Pilling when writing about deregulation of bank interest rates opines that: “China now needs a better allocation of capital. It needs less money to be pushed into heavy industry, and more into services and innovative industries, many of them outside state control.” “Beijing cannot control babies or banks” November 5.

No Mr. Pilling, as long as China follows the dictates of the Basel Committee, as seemingly it does, that type of “better allocation” of bank credit does not exist. With the credit risk weighted capital requirements, the only real allocation, or more correct misallocation of bank credit that exists, is favoring what is perceived as safe and hindering the access to bank credit of what is perceived as risky. And of course that applies to UK too.

And Pilling also mentions: “Ending financial repression is an important step in the right direction”

No Mr. Pilling. The real financial repression, the one resulting from favoring with ultra low or no capital requirements for banks when holding assets of sovereigns, and which started in 1988 with the Basel Accord, is alive and kicking, even in your UK.

PS. What the Basel Committee has done is not much different from China trying to control babies.

@PerKurowski ©

If a credit from one sovereign to another were classified as a crime against humanity how would the IMF proceed?

Sir, in Venezuela going to the IMF for assistance, is such a hot potato that some might even be hauled in front of a court accused for antipatriotic behavior for even mentioning that possibility. But if at the end it has to go to the IMF, it is clear that Martin Wolf raises an extremely important issue, namely how the influence of some sovereign creditors could block constructive actions by the IMF to reach acceptable solutions. “Resist Russian blackmail over Ukraine’s debt” October 21.

And the same problem, of how to treat sovereign credits, would be present in any Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism. It has no easy solution… and the perfect might well prove to be the enemy of the good.

That said, a sovereign should have the right to go in front of some international court, in order to at least have the chance of getting the debts it owes, including to other sovereigns, classified as derived from odious credit, if for instance there is sufficient proof that substantial corruption was involved when the debt was contracted… and that the creditor had or should have had sufficient knowledge about it.

In the case of the most egregious malfeasance, where it can be sufficiently evidenced that many humans are suffering as a direct consequence of a debt having been contracted, one should be able to have that debt qualified as an economic crime against humanity.

And if a debt owed by a sovereign to a sovereign were to be qualified as resulting from an economic crime against humanity, by for instance the International Criminal Court in Hague, how would then IMF proceed? I really do not know… I am just an economist.

@PerKurowski ©

With the Basel Committee’s injudicious regulations, it is very difficult for a bank to give credit judiciously.

Sir, Henny Sender holds that “Banks must lend more judiciously to prosper in emerging markets” April 8. Who could disagree with that? That applies of course to all markets and not only emerging markets.

But in order to do that, banks need to focus 100 percent on the borrower and not, as now, spend too much time looking at how it can structure the loan so as to be required to hold the least of equity against it.

When we read about Stan-Chart’s “commodity-related exposures” and that “much of the lending uses property as collateral” one gets the feeling that perhaps the “minimize the equity” objective might have triumphed the “know your client” criteria.

And this is but one of the should-be-expected, unexpected consequences of the Basel Committee’s injudiciously distorting credit-risk-weighted capital requirements..

@PerKurowski

Unbelievable that with so much history, Europe, instead of with a “Bang!”, could be going down with a whimper.

Sir, Robert D Kaplan, in “America is growing impatient with Europe’s appeasement”, April 7, states as a matter of fact “Gutsy is not a word one would use to describe Europe’s political class”. Sadly, very sadly, it is very hard to debate that.

And right below, giving credence to such an affirmation, we find Martin Wolf writing in “China will struggle to keep its momentum”, that “The world must pray the Chinese authorities manage this transition successfully. The alternative is not to be contemplated”; which basically reads like an anxious European convinced that his future is all-dependent on China’s.

Really, if Europe thinks it will be better off accommodating to Putin’s Russia; or if it thinks that its economy will be better off depending on China’s; (or if it feels that its bankers should earn their returns on equity solely with what is perceived as safe), then sadly it would seem that Europe is lost before the fight has even begun.

But hidden, somewhere in its gutters, there must be a reserve of European elites who can understand that it is time to stand firm… since it seems unbelievable that with so much history Europe, more than going out with a Bang! could be going down with a whimper.

Aren’t there any Bravehearts or Churchills in Europe anymore?

And, having observed the growing nanny mentality in America, its elite should be careful too. When drones are viewed as more convenient than boots on the ground, many strange things can happen.

@PerKurowski

Since development seems not really mean the same for UK than for China, why should UK join AIIB?

Sir, I am from Venezuela, and the United States has at least recently criticized what is happening in my country, while China in most non-transparent ways has mostly dedicated itself to finance and take advantage of what is happening in my country. And that I confess is one subjective reason for why I find it so hard to agree with Martin Wolf’s “It is folly to rebuff China’s bank”, March 24.

But that said I also feel that in order not to lose yourself in the new globalized world, you need to be able to reassert who you really are, now more than ever. And in that respect, few are so close as the US and Britain. In April 1999, feeling that the UK could become slightly uncomfortable with EU and with the Euro, and having heard about the ideas of Conrad Black and Paul Johnson, I even speculated in an Op-Ed about “A new English language empire”.

In essence I find no good reason why the UK should lend some credibility, against what is clearly no real influence, to an organization that does not really share its values. I am certain that, at least for the time being, when Wolf and I, UK and US, speak about development, we mean something quite different than what current China does… or at least so I hope.

PS. And, sincerely, I find Martin Wolf’s “As a former staff member of the World Bank” statement, indicating that as far as not living up to the “highest global standards”, AIIB and World Bank would stand on similar ground, to be clearly out of line.

PS. And by the way, to present oneself as a development buff, while at the same time not objecting to those credit-risk-weighted equity requirements for banks that clearly stand in the way of development, is sort of silly.

@PerKurowski

We citizens need an international tribunal where we can have our odious sovereign debts recognized as odious credits.

Sir I refer to Ricardo Hausmann’s “Venezuela’s economic collapse owes a debt to China” January 21. It reflects much of what I have been writing for years as a columnist in Venezuela… before I was censured in July 2014

Hausmann writes: “the debt was never authorised by the Venezuelan parliament due to the specious argument that it was not debt, but “finance”, because it was not to be paid in dollars but in oil. As a consequence, spending the money was never part of the national budget, thus escaping all forms of control and bypassing oil-revenue sharing rules, which would have transferred part of the income to opposition state and local governments.”

He is absolutely right but, it is even worse than that, since Venezuela’s Constitution explicitly prohibits encumbering not extracted oil that way.

And so now the real question is: In the future, when these odious credits from China are declared odious debts not to be paid, how much is the rest of the world going to support us Venezuelans?

Should there not exist an international tribunal were citizens can go and have their grievances on odious debts be recognized as odious credits? I mean we could be talking about much more than China.

Banks, tell me who your “absolutely infallible” are, and I will tell you who your “really risky” are.

Sir, Thomas Hale, Christopher Thompson and Josh Noble report on that “most major Chinese banks have existing Tier-1 capital adequacy ratios of at least 9.5 percent according to CLSA, meeting Basel III requirements”, “China financials lead EM debt sales” July 16.

What does that really mean? Which are the low-risk weight bank assets in China? For instance in the case of European banks these were AAA rated securities, mortgages in Spain and loans to infallible sovereigns like Greece.

For instance if we divide the risk weighted capital Tier-1 ratio of a bank by its un-weighted leverage ratio, then we have a better idea of how much could be hiding in the officially sanctioned safety… the fictitious safety ratio... the Basel Risk Ratio