#AI #ChatGPT #Grok: Once artificial intelligence really gets going, how fast can the economy grow?

I followed the lead set by Tim Harford in "If AI lifts off, will living standards follow?" and asked ChatGPT and Grok.

I asked ChatGPT:

"Please, feel free to speculate… though in less than 300 words:

Once artificial intelligence really gets going, how fast can the economy grow? Five per cent a year? Ten per cent? Fifty per cent?"

ChatGPT answered:

"Speculating freely: once artificial intelligence truly integrates across the economy, the growth rate could, in principle, exceed anything we’ve seen in modern history. Traditional constraints—labor supply, managerial capacity, coordination costs—are precisely what AI promises to relax.

At the moderate end, AI might sustain global growth in the 5–7% range for decades, roughly doubling the pace of advanced economies today. That would already be transformative: compound growth at 7% doubles output every 10 years.

A more extreme possibility is 10–20% growth annually, if AI automates not just routine work but also much of scientific discovery, engineering, and entrepreneurship itself. In that case, the bottleneck of “who invents the next breakthrough” loosens, and innovation becomes continuous and self-reinforcing. Such growth rates imply doubling the economy every 3–7 years—levels usually associated with small frontier economies catching up, not the entire world.

The most radical speculation—50%+ annual growth—would mean AI essentially creates a self-improving system of production, design, and distribution, with humans struggling to keep up. That’s not just economic growth in the classical sense but something more akin to a civilizational transformation, where “GDP” may cease to measure what matters.

So the spectrum runs from a modest boost (5%) to explosive acceleration (>20%), depending on how fast AI can (1) replicate human-level reasoning, (2) integrate with physical production, and (3) avoid coordination and social frictions. In practice, political, regulatory, and resource constraints may prevent the highest numbers—but technically, nothing rules them out."

Would you like me to anchor this in historical parallels (e.g., Industrial Revolution, electricity, internet) to show what kind of multiplier might be realistic, versus purely speculative?

I said: Yes please, but in in less than 200 words.

ChatGPT said:

"Historically, big technologies lifted growth but within limits. The Industrial Revolution doubled Britain’s per-capita growth from ~0.3% to ~1% a year—huge by historical standards but gradual. The spread of electricity and mass production pushed U.S. growth to ~2–3% sustained. The computer and internet era gave a one-time boost, but growth rarely exceeded 4–5% in advanced economies.

AI differs because it can speed up not only production but also innovation itself. If it amplifies discovery like electricity amplified muscle power, we could see global growth at 5–7% for decades—unprecedented at scale. If AI can recursively accelerate research, growth could climb to 10–20%, closer to the explosive catch-up of “Asian Tigers,” but applied globally.

The leap to 50%+ annual growth has no historical parallel; it would be more like a technological singularity than a continuation of economic history. Past revolutions suggest sustained boosts are real, but explosive, runaway growth would mark a civilizational break rather than just “faster GDP.”

Do you want me to sketch what kind of constraints (energy, politics, social adjustment) might hold AI growth closer to the historical pattern than the singularity path?

I said: Yes please, but in in less than 200 words

ChatGPT said:

"Several constraints could keep AI-driven growth closer to historical patterns. Energy is a hard limit: exponential growth in computing and production demands vast power, and scaling renewable, nuclear, or other sources takes time. Physical capital—factories, housing, transport—cannot be replaced overnight, even if AI designs them instantly. Human adaptation is another brake: societies need time to retrain, absorb, and regulate, and resistance from workers, firms, or governments slows diffusion.

Coordination frictions also matter. Nations may restrict AI exports, regulate its use, or impose safety checks, curbing global acceleration. Meanwhile, resource bottlenecks—rare earths, chips, robotics hardware—could stall deployment. Finally, inequality and political backlash may block full adoption if many feel excluded or threatened.

These forces suggest AI could plausibly raise growth to 5–7%, maybe 10%, but sustained 20%+ requires solving energy, materials, and governance hurdles as quickly as technical ones. History shows revolutions spread in waves, not instant leaps."

Would you like me to quantify how fast GDP could double under each plausible growth rate (e.g., 5%, 10%, 20%) to make the comparison more tangible?

I said: For today this is enough. Thanks!

It said:You’re very welcome! I’ll be here if you want to continue the thread another day. Wishing you a good evening!

I asked Grok:

"Please, feel free to speculate… though in less than 300 words:

Once artificial intelligence really gets going, how fast can the economy grow? Five per cent a year? Ten per cent? Fifty per cent?"

Grok answered:

"Once AI truly accelerates—say, with AGI or superintelligence by the 2030s or 2040s—economic growth could shatter historical norms. Current global GDP growth hovers around 3%, but AI could amplify it dramatically through automation, innovation, and productivity surges.

In moderate scenarios, experts predict AI adding 1-2% annually to GDP via task automation and R&D boosts, pushing total growth to 4-5%. More optimistic views, like McKinsey's, foresee $4.4 trillion in annual value by 2030, potentially lifting growth to 5-10% as AI transforms industries. 

But if we hit a "technological singularity," where AI self-improves exponentially, growth could explode. Some models suggest superexponential rates, with GDP doubling yearly (100%+ growth) or faster, leading to 50% as a conservative floor in early phases. Imagine AI emulating human minds at scale, eradicating scarcity and enabling post-scarcity abundance. 

Risks abound—job displacement, inequality—but the upside? A hyper-accelerated economy, growing at rates we can't yet fathom, potentially 50% or beyond in a runaway AI boom. Speculatively, 10% seems plausible mid-term; 50%+ in full singularity mode."

I said: Thanks!

It answered: You're welcome! If you have more questions about AI or anything else, just ask.

Note: The answers are copied exactly from those given to me by ChatGPT and Grok

Here my many other questions to ChatGPT – Grok on bank regulations.

Degrowth and downsizing are family

Sir, Soumaya Keynes in “What’s wrong with ‘degrowth’ research?”, FT September 20, mentions: “A… gap is research look­ing into ways of get­ting people on board with rad­ical eco­nomic change.”

I’m in the midst of a major downsizing project. From a large home to some much smaller without stairs apartments in other countries. That includes, among others, having to decide on what to do with monstrous amounts of very dear memorabilia; and foremost with what now evidences to be a life-long purchasing compulsion; put on steroids with the help of wife and daughters.

I’m certain that research on what a thousand of downsizers randomly selected did, and felt while doing it; assisted by some dozens of decluttering and downsizing consultants, would in so many ways immensely advance ‘degrowth’ research.

Sir, IKEA has recently started a program called “Second hand - let old furniture find new homes”. That sure sounds like growth by degrowth to me.

PS. What allowed the abundance of purchase power that propelled a purchasing compulsion? Among others, house prices inflated by bank regulations.

https://subprimeregulations.blogspot.com/2018/12/affordable-homes-or-investment-assets.html

Productivity, real salaries, employment rates, GDP should consider the increased consumption of distractions during work hours

Sir, Erik Brynjolfsson (and Andrew McAfee) writes: “If machine learning is already superhuman, why did we not see it in productivity statistics earlier? The answer is that its breakthroughs haven’t yet had time to deeply change how work gets done” “Machine learning will be the engine of global growth” July 27.

That is true, but we also need to realize that we have not done yet measured the effect of all the increased consumption of distractions during working hours.

In Bank of England’s “bankunderground" blog we recently read: “With the rise of smartphones in particular, the amount of stimuli competing for our attention throughout the day has exploded... we are more distracted than ever as a result of the battle for our attention. One study, for example, finds that we are distracted nearly 50% of the time.”

And on a recent visit to a major shop in the Washington area, thinking about it, I noticed that 8 out of the 11 attendants I saw were busy with some type of activity on their cellphones, and I seriously suspect they were not just checking inventories.

The impact of that on productivity, with less effective working time is being put into production, could be huge.

Also, going from for instance a 10% to a 50% distraction signifies de facto that full time or paid by the hour employee’s real salaries have increased fabulously.

And what about the real employment rate if we deduct the hours engaged in distractions? A statistical nightmare? Will we ever be able to compare apples with apples again?

And how should all these working hours consumed with distractions be considered in the GDP figures?

@PerKurowski

In terms of a short-termism that harms the long run, few are as guilty as current bank regulators.

Sir, Jonathan Ford quote US academic Lynn Stout with “The pressure to keep share prices high drives public companies to adopt strategies that harm long-term returns: hollowing out their workforce; cutting back on product support and on research and development; taking on excessive risks and excessive leverage; selling vital assets and even engaging in wholesale fraud.” “Shareholder primacy lies at heart of modern governance problem” March 5.

Indeed, but I hold that low investments and poor productivity is also the result of regulators’ risk weighted capital requirements for banks based on ex ante perceived risks. These focuses on making the banks safe today, at the price of making it all worse off tomorrow, ex post. How? Because they dangerously push banks to overpopulate, against especially little capital, those safe havens that have always been the main threats to our banking systems; and because they keep banks from exploring those risky bays, those with entrepreneurs and SMEs, those that could give us the growth and the jobs of tomorrow.

@PerKurowski

Universal Basic Income seems to be the most neutral and efficient tool to handle the unknown upheavals the use of artificial intelligence and robots will bring.

Sir, Rana Foroohar writes: “A McKinsey Global Institute report out on Wednesday shows that, while digitalisation has the potential to boost productivity and growth, it may also hold back demand if it compresses labour’s share of income and increases inequality.” “Why workers need a ‘digital New Deal’” February 19.

That sure seems to make the case for a Universal Basic Income, a Social Dividend, both from a social fairness angle and from the perspective of market efficiency.

To preempt that really unknown challenge at hand, Foroohar proposes something she names “the 25 percent solution” based on how Germany tackled an entirely different problem, the financial crisis. What it entails makes me suspect it could risk reducing the growth and productivity that could be achieved, and waste so much of the resources used to manage the consequences, so that only 25 percent, or less, of the potential benefits of having artificial intelligence and robots working for us would be obtained.

I worry sufficiently about a possible new Chinese curse of “May your grandchildren live with 3rd class robots and dumb artificial intelligence”; to also have to add “May your grandchildren have to serve the huge debt derived from technocrats defending your generation from artificial intelligence and robots.

Sir, I had more than enough of besserwissers trying to defend us and when doing so causing much more harm. Like when regulators, full of hubris, promised “We will make your bank system safer with our risk weighted capital requirements for banks”.

http://myubi.blogspot.ca/2017/01/my-universal-basic-income.html

@PerKurowski

The financial-elite’s reluctance to ask bank regulators for clear explanations, seriously threatens the west’s liberal democracy and global order

Sir, Martin Wolf asks and answers: “What has created sharp (and usually unexpected) slowdowns? The answers have been financial crises, inflation shocks and wars” “The world economy hums as politics sour” January 10.

Indeed, but currently our economies are also suffering a slow but steady state slowdown as a consequence of the insane risk weighted capital requirements for banks, which were created in the name of making banks more stable. It all boils down to the following:

If a “safe” AAA rated offered a correct risk adjusted net interest margin to a bank, a loan to it could, according to the Basel Committee’s Basel II of 2002, be leveraged 62.5 times but, if that correct risk adjusted net interest margin was offered by a “risky” unrated entrepreneur or an SME, then a loan to these could only be leveraged 12.5 times.

As a direct result bank credit has been used to finance “safer” present consumption; to inflate values of mostly existing assets; and way too little to finance “riskier” future production.

In summary it amounts to having placed a reverse mortgage on our past and present economy, in order to extract all of its value now, not caring one iota about tomorrow, and much less about that holy social intergenerational contract Edmund Burke spoke about.

But Wolf could argue that this is evidently not true because: “Yet the world economy is humming, at least by the standards of the past decade. According to consensus forecasts, optimism about prospects for this year’s growth has improved substantially for the US, eurozone, Japan and Russia”

Sir, it’s all a debt financed economic growth. Like a family having a great Christmas by racking up debt on their credit cards. How much of the enormous recent growth of debt everywhere has gone to finance future builders like entrepreneurs and SMEs? The answer is surely a totally insignificant fraction.

Wolf here anew identifies threats: “The election of Donald Trump, a bellicose nationalist with limited commitment to the norms of liberal democracy, threatens to shatter the coherence of the west. Authoritarianism is resurgent and confidence in democratic institutions in decline almost everywhere.”

Sir, sincerely, what is all that compared to the fact that the world’s financial elites, either because it is not in their interests, or because lacking self confidence they are afraid they might have overlooked something, do not have the gut to firmly ask regulators: “Why do you want banks to hold more capital against what has been made innocous by being perceived risky, than against what is dangerous because it is perceived safe?”, and not accepting any flimsy nonsensical answer veiled in sophisticated voodoo technicalities.

Martin Wolf has moderated numerous important conferences on financial regulations, but not one has he dared to ask that simple question. Could it just be because he is scared he would then not be invited again as a moderator? Or is it that he just doesn’t get it.

And Sir, you have really not been living up to your motto either. Shame on you!

PS. And all that risk adverse regulations for nothing, since, as I have told Wolf and FT time after time, major bank crisis, like that of 2007/08, never ever result from excessive exposures to what is ex ante perceived as risky.

http://perkurowski.blogspot.com/2016/04/here-are-17-reasons-for-why-i-believe.html

@PerKurowski

No Ms. Tett! It was bank regulators clear lack of testosterone that caused the 2007 crisis and the current slow growth

Sir, Gillian Tett seems to argue that the 2008 bank crisis resulted from excessive testosterone. “Traders on a hot streak risk a double fault”

Not so Ms. Tett! I do not if he really said it but Mark Twain has been attributed opining that bankers lend you the umbrella when the sun shines and want it back as soon as it looks it could rain.

And never ever has there been a bank crisis caused by excessive exposures to something perceived as risky when placed on banks’ balance sheets.

But that did not stop scared lack of testosterone bank nannies to also require banks to hold more equity when lending to the risky than when lending to the “safe”.

So what happened? As banks earned much higher risk adjusted returns on the safe they could not resist the AAA rated securities backed with mortgages to the subprime sector, or sovereigns like Greece. And so a typical bank crisis, that of excessive exposures to what was ex-ante perceived as safe but that ex post turned out very risky ensued. In this case made specifically worse, by means of the lower equity banks had been authorized to maintain. For example in the case of the AAA rated securities Basel II, because of the standardized risk weights, banks were required to only hold 1.6% in capital, meaning an authorized leverage of 62.5 to 1. 

And since banks now find it harder to earn higher risk adjusted ROEs on more capital, they have abandoned lending to risky SMEs and entrepreneurs, those who open up roads on the margins of the economy, and so of course slower economic growth results.

The lack of testosterone is not a fundamental value of the Western civilization. On the contrary in churches we sometimes sang, or at least used to sing, “God make us daring!”

@PerKurowski

So now Brussels's technocrats want to issue AAA rated securities backed with European subprime sovereigns? When will they ever learn?

With “subprime sovereigns” I do not intent to classify any sovereign in a derogatory way. I use the term strictly with reference to the fact that for the sovereigns’ creditors being able to collect their credits, some sovereigns seem, are, safer than others.

Sir, Jim Brunsden a Guy Chazan write: “Brussels has called for sovereign debt from across the eurozone to be bundled into a financial instrument and sold to investors as part of a plan aimed at strengthening the single currency area… the move would require regulatory changes to make the securities attractive. One idea would be to grant the bonds the same “zero-risk weighting” that applies to government debt in the EU, which would exempt them [banks] from capital requirements.”... “We see this in the form of preferential regulatory treatment.” “Brussels seeks new asset class of eurozone sovereign debt” June 1.

Amazing! The European Commission has not woken up to the fact that “preferential regulatory treatment” distorts the allocation of bank credit to the real economy, which is one of the prime reasons Europe got into trouble and finds it so hard to grow out of it.

Had banks needed to hold as much capital when lending to sovereigns than when lending to for instance “risky” SMEs and entrepreneurs, Greece would never ever, no matter how much it might have cheated with information, have been able to accumulate such massive amount of sovereign debt.

Were banks required to hold as much capital when lending to sovereigns than when lending to for instance “risky” SMEs and entrepreneurs, then the latter would have found it easier to satisfy their credit needs, and European growth and employment would be higher and foremost much sturdier.

When will the hubris filled obviously statist technocrats in Brussels ever learn? Europe, get rid of them!

“No problem can be solved from the same level of consciousness that created it” Albert Einstein.

@PerKurowski

Who sold IMF the fake idea that risk weighted capital requirements for banks do not distort the allocation of credit?

Sir, Shawn Donnan, referring to a IMF paper recently released by Christine Lagarde, “Gone with the Headwinds: Global Productivity”, writes that IMF economists warn: “The world’s economy is caught in a productivity trap thanks to an abrupt slowdown caused by the 2008 global financial crisis, which will yield more social turmoil if it is not addressed hold that” “IMF raises fear of slowing productivity” April 4.

Bank assets, based on how they are perceived ex ante, can be divided into safe and risky assets. The “safe”, by definition, currently include sovereigns and corporates with good credit ratings, and residential mortgages. The “risky” include what is unrated or what does not possess very good ratings… like loans to SMEs and entrepreneurs. It is also clear that she safe includes more of what is known; meaning what’s in the past or present, and the risky more of what is unknown, meaning what lies in the future.

Then suppose regulators had transparently told the banks: “We hate it so much when you take risks so that, from now on, if you finance something that is perceived as safe and stay away from what is perceived as risky, we will reward you by helping you to make you much higher risk adjusted returns on equity”.

In such a scenario, could it not be reasonably expected that IMF would be identifying regulatory risk aversion as something that could be slowing productivity? I mean, as John A Shedd said: “A ship in harbor is safe, but that is not what ships are for"

But, rewarding the banks for going for the safe, and staying away from the risky, is exactly what the current risk-weighted capital requirements for banks does.

And the IMF, even though here the report mentions: “Growing misallocation during the pre-global- financial-crisis financial boom [and] The global financial crisis might have worsened capital allocation further by impeding the growth of financially constrained firms relative to their less constrained counterparts.” says nothing about distorting bank regulations having something to do with this misallocation; an only produces second-degree explanations such as “banks may have “evergreened” loans to weak firms to delay loan-loss recognition and the need to raise capital”. How come?

April 3, in FT, Anjana Ahuja in reference to Robert Hare’s 1993 “Without Conscience: The Disturbing World of the Psychopaths Among Us,” wrote the following:

“Uncertainty is unsettling and certainty is alluring. Beware anyone who offers the latter with charisma, especially at this jittery juncture. Arm yourself against the charlatans…not only criminal psychopaths but the white-collar kind — who overstate their abilities, denigrate subordinates, have a tenuous grip on truth and seek greater power with shrinking oversight.”

Could it really be that one or more of these spellbinding salesmen of certainty illusions, technocratic besserwissers, managed to enthrall and blind the whole IMF? If so, Mme Lagarde owes herself and the IMF to find who they were… and to put a stop to it.

May I suggest she starts doing so by sending around to all those in the IMF that have had anything to do with bank regulations, some of those questions that, without any luck, I have tried to get answered, many times even in the IMF. Here’s the link: http://subprimeregulations.blogspot.com/2016/12/must-one-go-on-hunger-strike-to-have.html

But perhaps IMF already knows who those “charlatans” were, and just want to spare some members of their mutual admiration club some very deep embarrassments. If so then IMF is not fulfilling its responsibilities, as it should.

Too much is at stake! More than ever the world need to develop the capability of filtering out any fake experts, no matter how nice they are and no matter how important the networks they belong to.

PS. Twice I have had the opportunity to ask Mme Lagarde on this subject, and twice she kindly answered me, but nothing seems to have come out of it 

http://subprimeregulations.blogspot.com/2011/09/my-question-at-civil-society-townhall.html

http://subprimeregulations.blogspot.com/2013/10/my-question-for-umpteenth-time-to-world.html

PS. In December 2016, during the IMF’s Annual Research Conference, Olivier Blanchard also agreed with me there were needs to research how these capital requirements distort.

http://subprimeregulations.blogspot.com/2016/11/olivier-blanchard-agrees-there-is-need.html

@PerKurowski

What about suing bank regulators for malpractice; and those who falsely promised us rose-garden type pensions?

Sir, Gillian Tett, pointing “to the US presidential election result”, writes it “has unleashed wild swings in equity and bond prices…. This could dent the fortunes of many of those who have a 401(k)… There is another reason why 401(k) holders might want to scan their statements: litigation… an explosion in class action lawsuits over alleged malpractice in these pension plans… excessive fees” “Lawyers shake up a sleepy pension world” November 25.

Let me put all that in a different perspective. The current risk weighted capital requirements for banks, introduced by the Basel Committee, represent a regulatory risk aversion that when layered on the banks natural risk aversion, signifies millions of SMEs and entrepreneurs will not have access to that bank credit that could help our real economies to move forward, in order not to stall and fall.

So when in twenty years time, all those 401(k) accounts do not hold what was expected on these, remember you wasted time suing for excessive fees, instead of suing against future depriving regulations. Regulators might argue they did not know… but should that be a valid excuse for those who present themselves to us as experts?

Why do those 401(k) fees that most certainly are too high, seem so especially high now? The real explanation is that the economies are not producing close to the seven percent real annual returns that too many institutions around the world assured pensioners they should expect on their savings. Those promising impossible rose gardens should also be sued… and for good measure include also those withholding truths.

@PerKurowski

How can economies gain vitality when banks finance more basements for jobless kids to stay with parents, than SMEs?

The Basel Committee’s risk weighted capital requirements for banks set the risk weight for financing residential houses is 35%, while the risk weight for loan to unrated SMEs is 100%.

That clearly means regulators feel it is better for banks to finance the “safer” basements where jobless kids can live with their parents, than to finance the “risky” SMEs that could create jobs for the kids, so they too could afford to become parents.

And to top it up, since they assign a risk weight of 0% to the sovereigns, these statist regulators also believe that bureaucrats know better what to do with bank credit credits than the private sector. 

So Sir, I am truly aghast that with such regulatory lunacy well alive and kicking, you can still believe in what you opine in “The eurozone economy regains some vitality” October 25.

@PerKurowski ©

World Bank’s “Ease of doing business” rankings, ignores the regulatory distortion of bank credit

Sir, Rachel Sanderson writes: “Competitiveness has improved… Last year Italy climbed nine places in the World Bank’s “ease of doing business” rankings”, “Italy’s business chiefs buckle up for a shock as reform vote looms” October 20.

That World Bank report, great in many ways, with respect to “getting credit” does unfortunately omit considering whether bank regulations distort the access to bank credit or not.

And so the real main-street value of any recorded “ease of doing business” improvements can come to naught, if, for instance SMEs and entrepreneurs do not have fair access to bank credit; something which they don’t have in Italy, or in any other country that has been smitten by the Basel Committee’s dangerous and foolish risk aversion.

The pillar of current bank regulations is the risk weighted capital requirements. It allows banks to leverage their equity and the support they receive from society differently depending on the ex ante perceived risk. Less risk, more leverage, higher risk adjusted returns on equity.

So the following risk weights should suffice to understand what is going on… that is if you want to understand.

Risk weights: Sovereign 0%, AAArisktocracy 20%, residential housing 35% and the unrated “risky” SMEs and entrepreneurs, the fundamental drivers of the economy, 100%. What more could I say? Perhaps reminding anyone interested that no major bank crisis ever has been caused by excessive exposures to something that was ex ante perceived risky when booked.

Had these regulation been in place when banks originally began to operate in Italy, none of them, and neither the economies, could have developed as they have. 600 years of real banking and soon 30 years of loony Basel Committee reigned banking. Italia capisce?

@PerKurowski ©

Free Greece from regulatory shackles that make banks finance more the safer past & present than the riskier tomorrow

Sir, when commenting on the tensions between a “eurogroup” of ministers and the IMF about how to solve the problem called Greece you, as you should, clearly argue in favor of some additional relief of that debt “overhang that can only depress confidence”, “The IMF should stay in the Greek rescue squad”. October 12.

The problem though is that even if all Greece’s debt was condoned, but bank regulations stayed the same, that nation would just repeat its and most other countries’ recent mistakes.

Sir, nothing expresses a more depressed confidence in tomorrow as Basel’s risk-weighted capital requirements for banks. If Greece, and all the rest, is not freed from it, its banks have no chance of allocating credit so as to achieve a sturdy and sustainable growth. And besides if such growth does not happen, the banks’ own stability is also endangered.

That Europe, IMF, and the rest of regulators, do still seem to be unaware of what nasty effects their current bank regulations produce, is just amazing. Or perhaps they are all aware of it, but, with a little help from their friends, like FT, are just circling their wagons in order to defend their little mutual admiration club of technocrats.

There should be claw-back clauses for failed regulators and blind journalists (and editors) too!

@PerKurowski ©

FT, get off my cloud! Stop betting our future on technocrats and bureaucrats, instead of on SMEs and entrepreneurs

Sir you write: “Mr Draghi is justified in claiming that the ECB’s stimulus is working…[though] growth remains well below the level needed to drive sustained improvements in living standards.” So you basically egg Draghi on, just as you egg on governments to spend more of what they don’t have. “Draghi’s fight to uphold the ECB’s credibility”

Come on, the ECB has now after 18 months of aggressive bond buying, injected 1 trillion euros in cash into the economy… about 10% of the Eurozone’s GDP, and yet very little real sturdy sustainable economic growth has resulted. Don’t the technocrats ask themselves why?

Seemingly not; perhaps because that would require them to face that nightmarish possibility that the risk weighted capital requirements for banks, that regulation to which so many of them are closely associated to, is exactly as stupid as I have been telling them for way over a decade.

Mario Draghi is the chair of the Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision of the Basel Committee, and was the Chair of the Financial Stability Board. It is clear he would see his professional reputation severely tarnished by having to recognize publicly such simple facts of life that what is perceived as risky is, most often, much less dangerous than what is perceived as safe... and that therefore the Basel Committee’s bank regulation pillar, makes absolutely no sense.

The current credit risk weighting of the capital requirements for banks, hinders monetary and fiscal stimulus from reaching the risky SMEs and entrepreneurs, those who most could want and need the resources, those who most could do some real growth with those resources.

Sir, no matter how much runaway statists insist, it is just not true that the zero percent risk weighted sovereign bureaucrats know better how to deploy bank credit efficiently, than our 100% risk weighted private sector SMEs and entrepreneurs. Get off my cloud!

@PerKurowski ©

An Inclusive Growth Commission has a much more important thing to do than pushing public investments.

Sir, Stephanie Flanders, chief market strategist for Europe at JPMorgan Asset Management, and the chair of the Inclusive Growth Commission, holds that “when the government’s cost of borrowing has fallen down to below 1 per cent [that] the best response to Brexit would be to boost demand [with] public investments”, “Britain’s chance to show the world how to do stimulus” July 15.

Let me ask the Inclusive Growth Commission chair the following:

What would happen to the already more expensive health insurance premiums of the old or sick, if regulators decided that in order to make insurance companies safer these needed to hold more capital when insuring these “risky” than when insuring the “safe” young and healthy? In relative terms, and compared to the premiums before, the old and the sick would then face even higher premiums than the young and healthy.

And that is what the risk weighted capital requirements for banks do. The ex ante perceived, decreed or concocted as safe will, in relative terms and when compared to “risky” SMEs and entrepreneurs, now pay much lower interest and have much more access to bank credit. In other words regulators  decreed inequality.

And that is bad for growth, and of course bad for inclusion. And since the sovereign, the government, has been decreed infallible, the least risky, and given a risk weight of zero percent, these regulations, paid by the risky, have given statism a great boost.

And so the chair of an Inclusive Growth Commission, would do much more for growth and inclusion fighting for the removal of these regulations, and that so distort the allocation of credit to the real economy.s

Most monetary and fiscal stimulus begins or ends up flowing through the banks and so the real question should be: What would be the borrowing rates of the Sovereign if banks needed to hold as much capital against loans to it, than what they have to hold against loans to unrated citizens?

This regulatory subsidy of public sector borrowings will catch up on us all, sooner or later, as it already did in Greece. When that happens our children and grandchildren will not accept our argusment “Oh but it was so cheap”.

PS: Here is a memo that explains some of the loony mistakes in Basel Committee’s regulations

@PerKurowski

A mindless structural reform of regulations castrated the banks and helped to kill the dynamism of the economy.

Sir, Martin Wolf quotes Robert Gordon with “Ours is an age of disappointing growth because the technological breakthroughs are relatively narrow”, and then dicusses what could be done. Wolf concludes “The tendency to believe that some “structural reforms” will fix this is, similarly, an act of faith. It is essential for policy to promote invention and innovation, so far as it can. But we must not assume an easy return to the long-lost era of dynamism”, “An end to facile optimism about the future” July 13.

But “structural reforms” can kill dynamism too. And as you Sir and Wolf already know, in my opinion, nothing has done more harm to the economy than the risk weighted capital requirements for banks introduced with Basel I in 1988, and applied much more intensely with Basel II in 2004.

By allowing bank to leverage more their equity, and the support they receive from society with “safe” assets, regulators made it harder for those perceived as risky, like the SMEs and the entrepreneurs, to compete for access to bank credit.

Since perceived risks were already cleared for with the size of the exposures and the risk premiums charged, having bank clear again for those same perceptions in the capital, basically castrated our banks.

Now banks no longer help provide the “risky” proteins the economy needs in order to grow new muscles, they just finance the “safer” carbs that only makes the economy more obese.

Sir, when compared to what is needed to give the future a fair chance to deliver something good, it is clear that never ever before has a generation consumed so much borrowing capacity to sustain its own current consumption.

PS. And with their zero risk weight to sovereigns, and 100% of citizens, bank regulators de facto stated that government buracrats make the best use of bank credit. If that is not runaway loony statism what is?

@PerKurowski ©

FT, once again you ignore, God knows why, one of the prime causes for “The precarious state of the global economy”

Sir, I refer to your editorial “The precarious state of the global economy” February 26.

For the record I notify you that you have once again ignored in your analysis the following, God knows for what reason: 

Current credit risk weighted capital requirements for banks, especially in times of scarce bank capital; by allowing banks to earn higher expected risk adjusted returns on equity on what is perceived or deemed to be safe asssets than on risky assets; is hindering banks from lending sufficiently and in sufficiently reasonable conditions to those ex ante perceived as risky, like the SMEs and entrepreneurs. And that must obviously have a big negative impact on the economy.

And seemingly all for nothing, Stefan Ingves, the current chair of the Basel Committee, when as the chair of Sveriges Riksbank, in November 2015, in Svenska Dagbladet commented on Swedish banks had this to say: “Banks have changed the way they calculate risk weights, the risk-weighted capital adequacy therefore look good. But in the end they do not have much more capital than before the financial crisis.”

FT, might your stubborn silence about my arguments have painted you into a corner?

@PerKurowski ©

“In a world where debt overhang holds growth back for years” what could happen to the safety of “safe assets”?

Sir, David Oakley writes about the possibility that “QE will only properly end when all the bonds purchased mature”. And “For fund managers, it means government bonds may have a more lasting appeal as yields remain lower for longer because of an underlying demand for safe assets in a world where the debt overhang holds growth back for years.” “We are the QE generation, and it is quite a burden” February 1.

But a more relevant question could be: “in a world where the debt overhang holds growth back for years” what could happen to the safety of those “safe assets”?

Here we are with central banks sitting on a great portion of sovereign bonds they cannot retire without affecting the market too much; while at the same time they fix the risk-weight of these bonds, for the purpose of the capital requirements for banks, at zero percent, while that of those who are the only ones who could help growth, the private sector, has a risk weight of 100 percent. Is that not an example of sheer human lunacy that has us begging urgently for some artificial intelligence to bail us out?

@PerKurowski ©

With Portfolio Invariant Perceived Credit Risk Weighted Equity Requirements for Banks, Europe, the whole G20, is doomed.

Sir I refer to the reports and warning about Europe’s economy, November 13.

As long as regulators insist on using Portfolio Invariant Perceived Credit Risk Weighted Equity Requirements for Banks, Europe, in fact the whole G20, is doomed.

What more can I say that I have not already explained to you in more than a 1600 letters about what these regulations with their misguided credit risk aversion cause, and that you prefer to ignore?

By George I think FT’s got it: “A ship in harbor is safe, but that is not what ships are for” John A Shedd, 1850-1926.

Sir you write: “politicians… need banks to lend money and support economic growth (rather than inventing esoteric products to boost their bonuses). A bank that never takes any chances is not doing its job”, “Complicated banks face complex rules” August 8.

And so, are you finally waking up to the fact that banks have other purposes than not just going belly up and costing taxpayers some money? About time, why did it take you so long?

The regulators though still seem to be sleeping on it, as they insist with their risk-weighted capital requirements for banks… which are based exclusively on credit risks already cleared for by other means, and not having one iota to do with any lending money or economic growth purpose... much the contrary as these requirements profoundly distorts the allocation of bank credit.