On Brexit, as is usual these days in most issues, it would seem that both in Britain and EU, it is more profitable to divide than unite.

Sir, Martin Wolf writes that “In 2018 the EU’s exports to the UK were 79 per cent of its exports to the US and 153 per cent of its exports to China, though the UK economy was 14 per cent of that of the US and 21 per cent of China’s. The UK sent 47 per cent of its exports to the rest of the EU, against 13 per cent to the US and 6 per cent to China, though the US economy was 29 per cent bigger than the EU’s (excluding the UK), and China’s was only 16 per cent smaller.” “‘Global Britain’ is an illusion because distance has not died” May18.

It is not that very clear who depends most on whom for exports, Britain on EU, or EU on Britain? And I doubt you could really deduct that from these figures.

Nonetheless, that clearly evidences that it should also be in the interest of EU to come up with a counteroffer that could allow most of those who voted for Brexit to accept a Remain. As far as I know, there’s been nothing of that sort… even though, let me be very clear about it, neither does it seem Brexit proponents/negotiators have tried hard to propose something to EU that would make the Brexiters to accept a Remain.

In July 2017 in a letter to you I wrote: “I wonder why Martin Wolf, and most other influential Brexiters and Remainers, British foremost, supposedly, are not out there marketing the need for a very amicable Brexit, among all those Europeans that might wish the same, and who also the last thing they need, is for additional complications in their already hard as it is life.”

So why the lack of wanting to develop proposals that could bridge the differences between Brexiters and Remainers? Could it be, as is way too usual these days, that there is more political and financial profits in dividing than in uniting?

Sir, if so, what do we do about is, as that can only end up tragically bad, for all?

@PerKurowski

The worse the mortgages packaged, the higher the potential of securitization profits was (is)

Sir, FT’s big read by Mark Vandevelde and Joe Rennison “The story of a house” September 6, leaves out two important facts:

First: Christopher Cruise, who ran popular courses in mortgage origination, is quoted with “You had no incentive whatsoever to be concerned about the quality of the loan or whether it was suitable for the borrower” 

But yes you did, only in a direction quite different than usual. The worse the borrower and the worse the mortgagor, the higher the potential of profits of packaging it in a securitization sausage bound for a high credit rating. All involved in that securitization would profit, immensely, except of course those who were being packaged into that sausage. Imagine, if that sausage obtained an AAA to AA rating, US investment banks and European banks were allowed by the regulators to leverage 62.5 times their capital with these.

Second: “Société Générale, the French bank, was one of those that took out insurance against a collapse in the value of Davis Square, buying exotic derivatives contracts from the insurance group AIG.”

That was not solely for insurance. Because AIG was AAA rated, whatever lower rated securitized mortgages it added its signatures to also gave the banks the possibility of a mindboggling 62.5 times leverage. 

Profit potential: If you convinced risky and broke Joe to take a $300.000 mortgage at 11 percent for 30 years and then, with more than a little help from the credit rating agencies, you could convince risk-adverse Fred that this mortgage, repackaged in a securitized version, and rated AAA, was so safe that a six percent return was quite adequate, then you could sell Fred the mortgage for $510.000. This would allow you and your partners in the set-up, to pocket a tidy profit of $210.000

Sir, credit rating agencies using fallible humans did not stand a chance to get it right! 

@PerKurowski

When frozen in other types of “cash”, it is hard to free up cash to spend on good causes without losing much value

Sir, I refer to “Debt Collectors” September 16, in which Eric Platt, Alexandra Scaggs and Nicole Bullock search to explain what could happen to the “portfolio of cash, securities and investments worth roughly $840bn, held outside the US by just 30 US companies, because of tax reform designed to … encourage American companies to bring back jobs and profits trapped overseas”.

The article, though it refers to difficulties such as the “repatriation process itself could involve selling bonds” and the impact of that on interest rates, fails to illustrate the whole truth.

The reality is that all that “cash”, as well as all that “cash” held by other wealthy (for instance in Panama) except for the less than 1% that could be in real cash, is in other assets like securities investments, perhaps even in art collections.

So, in order to convert all that “cash” into real cash, those other assets have to be sold to others who are then required to give up their real cash for these. And, in that process, clearly a lot of the value of the “cash” would just change hands or disappear.

Why are these difficulties of converting “cash” into cash not more discussed? Because doing so would be sort of inconvenient for those redistribution profiteers who try to sell their politically beneficial envy, for instance that present in the “one percenters being against all us 99 percenters” theme.

What is a £20 million flat in London or a US$200 million Picasso hanging on a wall but the voluntary freezing of millions in alternative purchase power that could be out there in the economy competing for consumer goods… and generating inflation? Is a lowering of the value of hard-assets the inflation driver central banks want?

PS. Of course the above does not take away one iota of the need to relentlessly pursue those who have accumulated “cash” assets illegally, and might hold these in places like in Panama.

https://teawithft.blogspot.com/2016/04/tett-get-it-whats-stashed-away-in.html

https://perkurowski.blogspot.com/2016/10/i-tweeted-how-do-you-morph-200-million.html

http://perkurowski.blogspot.com/2016/01/the-wealth-of-62-richest-equals-that-of.html

Why should profits made with IPR protection, patents, be taxed the same as profits made in the nude?

Sir, I refer to Andrew Ward’s “FT’s Big Read on Drug Prices: Tweaking the formula” April 26.

First of all I did not know of Nice and I must admit I am impressed that some formal rulings exist on whether to fund the use or not of some medicines. That certainly must help to put a lid on some bureaucrats’ “flexibility”.

That said, the article reminds me of a question I have posed many times before, including in Op-Eds in my country Venezuela, and in letters to you.

Why on earth should profits derived from operations under the protection of an Intellectual Property Right (IPR), patents, be taxed at the same rate than profits obtained fighting it out in the markets, naked, with no protection at all?

Surely the revenues of a special IPR/Patent profit tax could be ploughed back into some type of insurance scheme that could help cover some medicine costs the society can in general not afford to cover.

@PerKurowski ©

When referencing cash, remember it is usually not really cash... & do we need special taxes on profits from patents?

Sir, I refer to Sarah Gordon’s “Be wary of the tax incentives in pharma’s deal financing” May 1, in order to make the following two observations:

First I believe that we should take the opportunity of the inequality frenzy that Piketty’s Capital has brought on, to discuss the treatment given to intellectual property right profits… as there can be little discussion that patents and similar, are among the biggest de facto inequality drivers. I, for instance, have held for some years that profits obtained under the umbrella of patents, and or of extravagant market shares, should be taxed higher than profits obtained from competing naked in the markets.

Second, when Gordon writes about the “$1.64tn of cash” that Moody estimates US companies held at the end of 2013, she would do better referring to “$1.64tn of liquid assets”… since we have no reason to believe the CFO’s of those companies keep stacks of notes hidden in their mattresses. I say this because we should not forget that any alternative use of these assets, will require their disposal… which has other effects in the market.

If only we could share into the loser’s bless

Sir, John Kay while explaining interestingly why frequently sensible investors willingly exchange very tangible money for unknown financial intangibles, “Why the winner’s curse could hit complex finance”, January 23, he might have underestimated the role of the advisor and the intermediary, whose normal incentive structure is based on deals completed and not deals avoided. As a financial advisor I have many times wished for that I could receive even a millionth part of the losses I have helped my clients to avoid, so as to be able to share the loser’s bless.