If Brexit goes hand in hand with a Baselexit, Britain will at least do better than now.

Sir, Martin Wolf titles, [and I add], “Irresponsible promises will hit brutal economic reality" November 15.

Just like the irresponsible and populist promise of “We will make bank systems safer with our risk weighted bank capital requirements" and that is based on that what bankers perceive as risky is more dangerous than what they perceive as safe, brutally hits our real economies.

Wolf quotes the Institute for Fiscal Studies with, “over the last 11 years [before any Brexit], productivity — as measured by output per hour worked — has grown by just 2.9 per cent. That is about as much as it grew on average every 15 months in the preceding 40 years.”

And I ask, could that have something to do with that Basel II that introduced capital requirements that allowed banks to leverage their equity much more with the “safer” present than with the “riskier” future, for instance 62.5 times with what has an AAA to AA rating while only 12.5 times with a loan to an unrated entrepreneur? Of course it has. With it regulators gave banks the incentives to dangerously overpopulate safe havens, and to abandon their most vital social purpose, which is to allocate credit efficiently to the real economy.

So compared to the damage done by the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision any foreseen negative consequences of Brexit seem minuscule.

And with respect to obtaining financial resources for financing the investments in infrastructure that Wolf so much desires, and which would cause larger fiscal deficits he argues “a necessary condition would be the confidence of the world’s savers and investors in the good sense, self-discipline and realism of British policymakers.”

Indeed, what if British policymakers stated. “We abandon the Basel Committee’s regulations. Not only are these with their 0% risk weight to the sovereign and 100% the citizens outright communistic, but these also introduced a risk aversion that truly shames all those British bankers who in past times daringly took risks and with it bettered Britain’s future”. 

Sir, I hold that would be a much-needed example for the whole world of good sense, self-discipline and realism. “A ship in harbor is safe, but that is not what ships are for.” John A. Shedd.

Sir, Wolf seemingly thinks that remaining in a EU in which its authorities assigned a 0% risk weight to all Eurozone’s sovereign debts, even though none of these can print Euros is better for Britain. As I see it, that is a reason for running away from it even more speedily.

PS. Should not bank supervisors be mostly concerned with bankers not perceiving the risks correctly? Of course! So, with the risk weighted capital requirements, what are they doing betting our bank system on that the bankers will perceive credit risks correctly?

@PerKurowski

FT, when helping covering up for bank regulators’ mistakes, do you lie awake, or do you sleep like a baby?

Sir, Sarah O’Connor writes “We could use more leaders in politics and business who doubt themselves, who seek the opinions of others and who lie awake worrying about the consequences of their actions.” “A spot of ‘polish’ is not going to transform the lives of state school pupils” May 8.

Indeed. The regulators in the Basel Committee decided they had the right to distort the allocation of bank credit because they thought that what was ex ante perceived as risky is more dangerous ex post to our bank systems than what is perceived as safe.

As the 2008 crisis provided more than sufficient examples of, this is clearly not the case.

But, do these regulators lie awake because of the consequences for the real economy of what they did, or do they do so because of the consequences for themselves, if their mistake is found out?

Sir, let me ask, since with your silence you’ve helped cover up for this costly mistake, so much that it has not yet been corrected, do you lie awake, or do you sleep like a baby?

@PerKurowski

The Fed and bank regulators have done many times more harm to the real economy than the political leadership, President Trump included.

Sir, Rana Foroohar writes:“It is clear that the power of monetary policy to support the real economy has diminished. In lieu of better political leadership, the key task for central bankers in the years to come may be to roll up their sleeves and do the gritty work of bolstering not the markets, but Main Street.” “Central bankers refocus on Main Street” December 31.

That’s not likely to happen. The Fed and bank regulators have clearly evidenced they are not up to that task. Without the slightest consideration to how banks are to serve the real economy, and its needs for development, with their risk weighted capital requirements for banks, they blocked “the risky” Main Street’s access to bank credit, in order to favor all that which was perceived (or decreed) as safe… like residential mortgages (and the sovereign) 

Now every one of them will eagerly be trying to escape his or her responsibility, by blaming Donald Trump, who in many ways is acting as a perfect godsend scapegoat.

PS. “We are almost 10 years into a recovery cycle — the time when economic slowdowns typically occur”. That might be so, but it still sounds so expertly besserwisser. 

"Paga-peo" a Venezuelan name for a scapegoat

@PerKurowski

Sweden got to be an economic powerhouse with its banks financing “risky” entrepreneurs, not by these financing “safer” houses.

Sir, Patrick Jenkins reports: “Nordea has a core equity capital ratio of close to 20 per cent, double that of some European rivals. It can expect lesser capital demands from the ECB” “Nordic noir: the outlook darkens for Sweden’s banks” May 1.

Let us suppose that Nordea has only Basel II’s 35% risk weighted residential mortgages on its books. Then, a 20 percent capital ratio, would translate as having Nordea 7% in equity against all its assets meaning it is leveraged 14.2 times to 1.

So when we then read that in Sweden “house prices have declined 10 per cent since last summer, although in prime Stockholm the slump has been closer to 20 per cent” of course that should be enough to besides giving “Jitters about the sustainability of property prices” causing jitters about its banking sector.

I have a close relation to Sweden in that not only was my mother Swedish but I also spend my most formative years, high school and university there. So it saddens me to see what is happening. Sweden that got to be so strong by its banks financing “risky” entrepreneurs is now getting weaker by its banks mostly financing “safer” assets, like mortgages.

“Sweden’s Financial Supervisory Authority, late last year, proposed Sweden’s Financial rules [that] would mean those taking out new home loans of more than 4.5 times their salary would have to pay off an extra 1 per cent of their mortgage annually.” Are we to be impressed with that?

Stefan Ingves the Governor of Sveriges Riksbank has since 2011 been the Chairman of the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision. Why has he not proposed to stop distorting the banks allocation of credit, by requiring these to hold the same capital when extracting value and placing a reverse mortgage on the “safer” present economy, than when financing the riskier future, that the young Swedes need and deserve is financed?

In Swedish churches there was (is) a psalm (#288) that prays for: “God make us daring”. It would seem Mr Ingves never heard less sang it. 

Bank regulators, get rid of risk weighted capital requirements, so that savvy loan officers mean more for banks’ ROE’s, than creative equity minimizers.

Sir, Gillian Tett referring to IMF’s recent warnings about the risks of overheating in risky loan and bonds markets; like “The proportion of US loans with a rating of single B or below (ie risky) rose from 25 per cent in 2007 to 65 per cent last year. And a stunning 75 per cent of all 2017 institutional loans were “covenant lite” writes: “it is possible — and highly probable — that non-banks are taking bigger risks, since they have less historical expertise than banks, and thinner capital buffers.” “The US has picked the wrong time to ease up on banks” April 27.

Yes, with risk weighted capital requirements banks ROE’s began to depend more on maximizing leverage, and so banks sent home many savvy loan officers and hired creative equity minimizers instead. As a result someone else had to serve “the risky”. 

But then Tett warns “Trump-era regulators” with a “it is foolish to be encouraging risky lending right now”. Wrong! It is always foolish to encourage risky lending. 

What Tett does not understand is that “risky lending” has nothing to do with a borrower being risky, and all to do with whether the lending to those perceived risky or those perceived safe, is done in such a way, with adequate exposures and risk premiums, so that the resulting bank portfolio is well balanced. 

The current extremely risky bank lending is the result of way too large exposures, at way too low risk premiums, to what is perceived, decreed or can be concocted as safe; and way too little exposures, at way too high risk premiums, to anything perceived as risky.

What regulators really should do, is to get rid of the risk-weighted capital requirements for banks. Then bank loan officers, those that could also show the non-banks the way would return, for the benefit of both the banks and the real economy.

Why do many bankers hate such possibility? Because high leverage, meaning little equity to serve, is the main driver of their outlandish bonuses. 

http://perkurowski.blogspot.com/2016/04/here-are-17-reasons-for-why-i-believe.html

@PerKurowski

“Relax” or “tighten” has little to do with better regulation of US’s banks. Revise, correct and simplify, is what it should all be about.

Sir, I refer to Hal Scott’s and Lisa Donner’s discussion “Head to head: Should the US relax regulation on its big banks?” March 2.

Hal Scott writes: “There is empirical evidence that higher bank capital requirements cut lending and economic growth. A recent Fed paper concludes that a 1 percentage point rise in capital ratios could reduce the level of long-run gross domestic product growth by 7.4 basis points.”

And Lisa Donner writes: “Increased capital requirements lower the return on equity and, by extension, the bonuses linked to it. The desire of a small number of very wealthy people to become still richer should not drive public policy.”

They both, obviously each one from to the point of view of their respective agendas are correct in recognizing that capital requirements have clear effects. But then, as is unfortunately the current norm, they both ignore the problem of the distortions in the allocation of credit that different capital requirements produce.

And, if there is any problem in current bank regulations that needs to be tackled, that is getting rid of those distortions. If there is one analysis needed that is whether the bank’s balance sheets correspond with the best interests of our economies. The answer would be “NO!”

Scott asks: “Do we really want banks to hold enough capital to survive events that have no US historical precedent? If such an extreme economic event did occur, would any amount of capital be enough to withstand the panic it could trigger?”

Ok, agree, but then why should we want our banks to keep especially little capital when such events occur? Like when 20% risk weighted AAA rated securities exploded?

Scott, mentioning stress tests that depend on secret government financial models to predict bank losses argues: “avoid ‘model monoculture’ in which every bank adapts its holdings in order to pass the tests and they all end up holding assets the government model favors. A diversity of bank strategies is preferable given that risks are hard to predict.”

Absolutely and that is why, April 2003, as an Executive Director of the World Bank I held "A mixture of thousand solutions, many of them inadequate, may lead to a flexible world that can bend with the storms. A world obsessed with Best Practices may calcify its structure and break with any small wind."

The stress tests, by focusing too much on the risk flavor of the day, as I have written to you before, are in themselves huge sources of systemic risk.

Scott informs “The living wills process requires banks with more than $50bn in assets to hold minimum amounts of “safe” assets; currently this stockpile totals more than $4tn in government debt”

Holy moly, $4tn is close to 20% of all US public debt. Is there really no interest for trying to figure out where real rates on US government debt would be if banks were not given the 0% risk-weight incentives for these debts, or, alternatively, be forced by statist regulators to hold lots of it?

Donner argues: “There is no fundamental trade-off between sound regulation of the financial system and shared prosperity. Quite the opposite. Even as tighter bank capital and liquidity requirements were phased in after the crisis, bank credit to the private sector has surged to new heights as a percentage of global output.”

But really, is that credit surge an efficient one? Are banks financing enough the “riskier” future, or are they mostly writing reverse mortgages on our “safer” present economy? 

Sir, what kind of crazy model could hold that economic growth is the result of banks being able to earn their highest risk adjusted return on equity on what is perceived, decreed or concocted as “safe”, and so avoid lending to “risky” entrepreneurs? 

@PerKurowski

Rana Foroohar. Please ask yourself a question and, if you cannot answer it, do ponder why.

Sir, I refer to Rana Foroohar’s “Three questions for the Fed’s Powell” February 26.

Ms. Foroohar (and you too Sir) should ask herself: why do regulators want banks to hold more capital against what, by being perceived as risky, has been made quite innocous, than against what, because it is perceived as safe, is so much more dangerous?

And if could not come up with a truly convincing answer, then that should give her a clue on that something very strange is going on in the field of bank regulations.

And if she had gotten to that point, then it should not be too hard for her to begin to understand how those different capital requirements, which allows for some assets to be leveraged much more than others, might distort the allocation of credit to the real economy… and thereby affect its “real non-financialised growth”

And at that point she would surely add, that same question she could not answer, to those three she proposes to ask Powell.

Foroohar also references companies “buying up the higher-yielding bonds of riskier companies at a favourable spread and holding those assets offshore [and that now after] President Donald Trump’s new tax rules… They will simply be able to move their money wherever they want, whenever they want, in cash.”

“Cash”? In order to become cash, all those assets the companies have bought and held offshore must be sold. Would that not have any consequences?

@PerKurowski

Banks now invest based on the risk-adjusted yields of assets adjusted for allowed leverages; that distorts the allocation of credit to the real economy.

Sir, Lawrence Summers, when writing about the challenges Jay Powell will face as Fed chairman mentions “Even with very low interest rates, the normal level of private saving consistently and substantially exceeds the normal level of private investment in the US” “Powell’s challenge at the Fed” February 5.

Not too long ago, markets, banks included, invested based on the risk adjusted yields they perceived the assets were offering. Some more sophisticated investors also looked to maximize the risk adjusted yield of their whole portfolio.

But, then in 1988 with Basel I, and especially in 2004 with Basel II, the regulators introduced risk based capital requirements for banks. As a consequence, banks now invest based on the risk-adjusted yields adjusted for the leverage allowed that they perceive the assets offer. As banks are allowed to leverage more with safe assets, which helps to increase their expected return on equity, they now invest more than usual, and at lower rates than usual, in “safe” assets like loans to sovereigns, AAA rated and mortgages. And of course, banks also invest less than usual, and at even higher rates than usual, in loans to the “risky” like entrepreneurs and SMEs.

That has helped to push the “risk free” down, and also explains much of the lowering of the neutral rate. Since the regulators now de facto block the channel of banks to the “risky” part of the economy, there is a lot of private investment that simply is not taking place any longer.

It is sad and worrisome that neither the leaving Fed chairman, Janet Yellen, nor the arriving one, Jay Powell (nor Professor Summers for that matter) can apparently give a clear direct and coherent answer to the very straight forward questions of: “Why do regulators want banks to hold more capital against what’s been made innocous by being perceived as risky, than against what’s dangerous because it’s perceived as safe? Does that not set us up for slow growth and too-big-to-manage crises?

http://perkurowski.blogspot.com/2016/04/here-are-17-reasons-for-why-i-believe.html

@PerKurowski

Good global economic governance also depends on the Financial Times of the world doing their duty by questioning diligently.

Sir, you write “The world economy is in good health. Global economic governance is not. The first remains acutely vulnerable to the second… Davos produced few ideas on compensating for US destructiveness” “The gaping hole in global economic governance” January 27.

No! The world economy is not in good health. Just look at all current world debt contracted to kick the 2007/08 crisis can forward, to finance current consumption and to inflate stock markets with excessive dividend payments and buy backs; and then compare it to how little of that debt has been used to finance future production.

And whatever US destructiveness you want to identify, it would pale when compared to the destructiveness caused by bank regulators with their risk weighted capital requirements for banks.

Sir, in a world were sleaziness abounds everywhere and for so many reasons, you find it more worthy of the Financial Times to launch a full-fledged investigation “without fear and without favor” of an all male-charity dinner; than daring for years to ask bank regulators some basic questions like:

Why do you want banks to hold more capital against what has been made innocous by being perceived as risky, than against what is dangerous because it is perceived as safe? Is that not setting us up for too big to manage crises?

What went through your mind (what did you smoke) of the Basel Committee allowing with Basel II banks to leverage a mindboggling 62.5 times their capital only because an AAA to AA rating issued by human fallible rating agencies was present?

Is being a safe mattress under which to stash away our savings a more important objective for our banks than allocating credit efficiently to the real economy? “A ship in harbor is safe, but that is not what ships are for.” John A Shedd

Why should you, as a regulator, want with lower capital requirements favor bank credit to what’s already favored by being perceived as safe, and thereby cutoff more the credit to what is already disfavored by being perceived as risky?

Why did you assign a 0% risk weight to sovereigns? Is that not runaway statism? If it is because sovereigns can always print money to pay back their loans, don’t you know that is precisely one of the real and worst risks with sovereigns?

As is, don’t you know you are dooming our economies to subprime performance and our banks to end up gasping for oxygen in some overpopulated safe-havens?

And that’s just for starters:

FT is as much at fault as anyone for the absurdness of current global governance of banks. Sir, this could also be referred to as sleazy journalism.

http://perkurowski.blogspot.com/2016/04/here-are-17-reasons-for-why-i-believe.html

@PerKurowski

Andy Haldane, I am an economist too, but I can still not make head or tails out of your bank regulations. Please enlighten me with BoE’s “EconoMe”!

Sir, Chris Giles writes that Bank of England’s chief economist Andy Haldane argues that economists must work harder to help the public understand and accept their message. “If economics or economic policy is elitist and inaccessible to most people, it is not doing its job,” he said. “Economics should be more accessible” November 28.

Absolutely! So please could Haldane explain to me why regulators want banks to hold the most capital for when something perceived risky turns out risky, when it is when something ex ante perceived as very safe ex post turns out to be very risky, that one really would like banks to have the most of it?

The risk weighted capital requirements allow banks to leverage differently different assets, and thereby allow banks to earn different risk adjusted returns on equity on different assets, must distort the allocation of bank credit to the real economy. Some, like for instance “risky” entrepreneurs are paying with less access to credit for the regulators favoring “safe sovereign, AAArisktocracy and house financing. That must not be helpful for creating new jobs. Am I wrong? If am not, why does this seem to be of no concern to regulators?

And talking about favoring, who authorized the economists to suddenly take upon themselves to decide that the risk weight of the sovereign was 0% and that of citizens 100%? Is that not just outrageous statism? Has that not caused governments getting credit at much lower rates that they would otherwise have gotten? Has that not caused governments to take on much more debt than they would otherwise have been able to do?

If Haldane does not know the answers to these questions perhaps he can ask Mark Carney, Mario Draghi, Jaime Caruana or Stefan Ingves.

And if those elite experts can’t provide him with a satisfactory answer, perhaps he should sit down and listen to me. I as one economist to another would willingly explain to him the regulatory lunacy he is involved with. For a first session of that, Haldane could prepare reading THIS:

PS. And at FT you are all also cordially invited. Since you have mostly ignored, and even hushed up my arguments, I know that if Haldane proves me wrong, you will all feel tremendously alleviated.

@PerKurowski

True bank regulations should also not be like gambling.

Sir, I refer to Izabella Kaminska’s “True investing is not the same as gambling” November 22.

But Sir, what did bank regulators do with their risk-weighted capital requirements for banks if not gambling? They gambled on that bankers and credit rating agencies would perceive and manage risks correctly…and this even when bank crisis, when not the result of unexpected events, have always resulted from banks having ex ante perceived something as safe, but which ex post turned out to be risky.

Here again are the four possible outcomes of any bank lending:

1. Ex ante perceived safe – ex post turns out safe – “Just what we thought!”

2. Ex ante perceived risky – ex post turns out safe – “What a pleasant surprise! Another entrepreneur who makes it because we are so good bankers.”

3. Ex ante perceived risky – ex post turns out risky: How lucky we only lend little and at high rates to it.

4. Ex ante perceived safe – Ex post turns out risky: “Holy Moly now what do we do? Call the Fed for a new QE?”

The role of a bank regulator would of course be to work solely on the possibilities that banks did not perceive risks correctly or, if they did, did not manage these perceptions correctly.

And in that respect, the safer something is perceived the more dangerous it can become, and the riskier something is perceived the safer it becomes. Just the same reason for why so many more die in car accidents than in motorcycle accidents. 

The saddest part though is that even if bankers or credit rating agencies perceived risks correctly, the final results of all this would be bad. That because any risk, even if perfectly perceived causes the wrong actions, if excessively considered.

Bankers consider perceived credit risk when determining the size of their exposures and the risk premiums they should collect… but there, after 600 years of banking, suddenly the regulators invented that exactly the same perceived risks needed also to be considered in their capital too. And, since then, what is perceived as safe is getting way too easy credit while, what is perceived as risky, like SMEs and entrepreneurs are not getting the credits the real economy need them to get.

Sir, come one, don’t be so scared, live up to your motto of “Without fear and without favor”. Dare request from any regulator, for instance from FSB’s Mark Carney, an explanation for Basel II’s risk weights: that of a meager 20% for the so dangerous AAA rated, and a whopping 150% for the so innocous below BB-

https://youtu.be/TUdKhm6_a8Y

@PerKurowski

What if banks could earn their highest expected risk adjusted returns on equity where they are most needed, like in Blackpool?

Sir, I just read Sarah O’Connor’s harrowing description of what is going on in Blackpool “Left behind: can anyone save the towns the economy forgot? FT Magazine, November 16.

It all sounds like Blackpool belonging to what we read more and more about, that termed as scrap land or junk land.

Sir, can we really afford to abandon those places to who knows who or to what knows what? If we do so what truly bad (or good) things could brew there? We might have some unexplored tools to help stop that or at least not to worsen it.

For instance, our banks, by means of the risk weighted capital requirements for banks are currently allowed to leverage more their equity when lending to what is perceived as safe than when lending to what is perceived as risky; and so banks earn higher expected risk adjusted returns on equity on what is perceived as safe than on what is perceived as risky; so banks, naturally, lend much more to what is perceived as safe than to what is perceived as risky.

That is doubly stupid. First because why would you like to help those who are perceived as safe and that because of that already have more access to credit to have even more access to bank credit? Likewise why would you like to cause those who are perceived as risky and who because of that already have less access to credit to have even less access to bank credit? In other words “safe” London earns banks higher ROEs than “risky” Blackpool.

And secondly because from a bank stability point of view you are acting against what history proves, namely that those perceived as safe are a hundred times more dangerous to bank systems than those perceived as risky. In other words London is riskier to the bank system than Blackpool.

So let us suppose we instead based those risk weighted capital requirements, and the distortion they produce, on where we think bank credit could most be needed or most productive. Then we could perhaps arrange it in such a way that a bank lending to an entrepreneur in Blackpool would be allowed to leverage more than when lending to an entrepreneur in London. And then Blackpool could have a better chance to regain some of its former luster or at least not lose it all.

@PerKurowski

Is allowing banks earn the highest risk adjusted returns on equity with what’s “safe” a nudge, a sludge or a grudge?

Sir, Tim Harford writes “Nudge, sludge or grudge, we can change this. And we should start by asking ourselves whether when it comes to news, information and debate, we have made it difficult to do the right thing — and all too easy to stray.” “Nudging and the art of darkness” November 10.

Art of darkness? How and by whom were our bank regulators nudged into believing that stupidity that what bankers perceive as risky is dangerous and that what is perceived by them as safe is safe?

Because as a consequence we got the risk-weighted capital requirements for banks that allow banks to leverage much more with what is perceived as safe than with what is perceived as risky; which means banks will earn higher risk adjusted returns on equity with what’s “safe” than with what’s “risky”; which means banks will, dangerously for the bank system, lend too much against too little capital to what’s safe, and, dangerously for the real economy, lend too little to what is perceived as risky like SMEs and entrepreneurs.

PS. When I try to see what @TimHarford is up to, I am given the message “You are blocked from following @TimHarford and viewing @TimHarford’s tweets”. Does Tim Harford believe it is so easy to get away from my arguments?

PS. What would Templar Grand Master Jacques de Molay burned in 1307 say about a 0% risk-weightof sovereign Phillip IV?

PS. “50 Things That Made the Modern Economy”, and just 1 That is Bringing it Down: Regulatory Risk Aversion 

https://teawithft.blogspot.com/2017/03/ft-is-not-withholding-truths-for-any.html

@PerKurowski

If today Luther protested the high priests in the Basel Committee, where would he nail his Theses? Twitter, Facebook?

Sir, Kate Maltby writes: “Luther… backed by the painstaking detail of a scholar, took an intellectual stand against the most powerful forces of his day. But Lutheranism ushered in an age in which debates were won by those who read the sources and rejected received interpretations.” “What did Luther ever do for us? Less than we like to think” October 31, 2017

As you know I have obsessively, since more than a decade, with more than 2.600 letters, been nailing to FT my arguments against the maddening stupid bank regulations the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision has decreed.

These regulations not only distort the allocation of credit to the real economy (millions of entrepreneurs have not gotten their opportunity to a bank credit only because of these regulations); but also because in terms of stability, the only thing it promotes is that when a big crisis happens, banks will stand there with especially little capital (as the 20% risk weight of dangerous AAA rated, and the 150% for the innocuous below BB- rated evidences). 

So I want to take this opportunity today, when “five hundred years ago, on October 31 1517, Martin Luther took up a hammer and nailed his 95 Theses to the door of All Saints’ Church in Wittenberg” to ask you, where would Martin Luther nail his Theses today? Not in FT…perhaps in Twitter or ​Facebook?

An aide-mémoire

@PerKurowski

If kicking the can forward does not come with changing what caused the crisis, it will roll back and trample you

Sir, Wolfgang Münchau writes: “Herein lies the true tragedy of the ECB asset purchases… the ECB may never be able to stop them’, “An ailing eurozone still requires extreme treatment” October 30.

Europe is extremely dependent on bank lending and with the risk weighted capital requirements for banks regulators have hindered banks from lending to what the economy most need banks to lend to, namely small and medium sized businesses and entrepreneurs.

Their risk weights for their capital requirements says it all: sovereigns 0%, AAA rated 20%, mortgages on residential houses 35% and the SMEs and entrepreneurs 100%.

Did those perceived as risky SMEs and entrepreneurs cause the crisis? Of course not! They never do.

And keeping in place that same regulatory discrimination against the risky, has guaranteed that most stimuli imbedded in the ECB purchases of assets has not been able to go to where it could most help the economy. Ergo, Europe has a weak economy.

PS. Long term benefits from a hard landing

@PerKurowski

If I were a bank regulator, I would set the lowest capital requirements against the loans to young entrepreneurs

Sir, Leo Lewis writes Tatsuo Yasunaga, the Mitsui & Co chief believes that “The innovation of which he is most proud is a support system that encourages staff to create business start-ups within the company. Twenty proposals have been received in the first year. ‘It encourages our young guys to . . . run the business themselves… I’d like to encourage them to enjoy business’”, “Japan’s champion of young entrepreneurs” October 30.

Do I agree? If I were a bank regulator I would make sure banks would be able to earn their highest risk adjusted returns on equity, when lending to the young on which we all depend. What they now do fixing the capital requirements with risk weighs of 0% on sovereigns, 20% on AAA rated, 35% on purchase of houses and 100% on unrated entrepreneurs, is exactly the opposite.

PS. Major bank crises never ever result from excessive exposures to "risky" young entrepreneurs.

@PerKurowski

How much will the fewer younger be willing to give up in order to help the larger number of older?

Sir, John Dizard argues that It is hard to have a tax cut-driven jobs boom for the ‘real Americans’ if there are fewer of them around” “Financial world’s promises impossible to meet within an ageing demographic” October 22.

Indeed, demographics will make all so much serious, but let us not assume things are going so as to be a rose garden without that factor.

The kicking the 2007-08 crisis can forward with QEs; the ultra low interest rates that makes it easier to take on debt and in some ways introduces economic laziness; getting equity out of homes like with reverse mortgages in order to spend; risk weight of 35% on financing residential houses and of 100% when lending to the riskier SMEs and entrepreneurs who have the best chances of building future and create jobs; a mindless 0% risk weight for so many sovereigns only based on that these can print money to repay… is driving the world towards a crisis not only because of the lack of young workers, but also because of excessive unpayable debts.

There will come a day when all those young living in the basements of their parents’ houses will say “Hey ma-and-pa, you go downstairs, now it is our turn to live upstairs”… and that is perhaps even the best case scenario. Things can get to be truly ugly (ättestupa)… except perhaps if we are able to put billion of robots to productive uses (like they are trying in Japan) and tax them and share out those revenues with a universal basic income.

I have always argued that the best pension plan that exists is having children and grandchildren that love you, and who are able to work in a workable economy. Thank God I got the first… but I am beginning to seriously doubt achieving the second. 

@PerKurowski

With risk-weighted bank capital requirements promoting risk aversion, Britain will go nowhere, with or without Brexit

Sir, Martin Wolf writes: “UK’s average productivity is at best mediocre and its productivity growth post-crisis is in the basement, down there with Italy’s. Investment is weak and relative export performance consistently dismal. Contrast Germany.” “Zombie ideas about Brexit that refuse to die” October 21

So, when he then argues “It will be impossible to offset the loss of favourable access to EU markets, which now take some 40 per cent of the UK’s exports” a natural question is, would not those losses seem to happen anyhow, with or without Brexit?

Could it in fact be that “favourable access” has dangerously hidden other profound problems?

I would never have voted for Brexit, but that might only be because I do not know Britain well. Had I for instance thought that it was becoming more and more dependent, on a not so dependable EU, I might have voted otherwise. Because frankly, EU is in great need of some real shaking up too, in order not to fall into the hands of those populists both Martin Wolf and I so profoundly fear.

Of course Wolf is right when he says “In a liberal democracy, we are all entitled to our opinions and to seek to overturn what we consider grossly mistaken decisions.” But Sir, should that not require something more than just being against “saboteurs with zombie ideas”?

Should that not include proposals about what Britain could do in order not to have given the Brexit vote a chance? And, who knows, those changes could be just as important or even more important than staying in the EU.

Clearly taking on debt to propel consumption, plus building a lot of infrastructure caring not sufficiently about the fact that we might not know enough about what infrastructure could be needed twenty years from now, sounds like a very comfortable plan for the short term. But, is it enough for Britain’s grandchildren or their children?

Personally, as Wolf very well knows, I would put the elimination of bank regulations that dangerously distort the allocation of bank credit to the real economy, very high on that list of proposals.

The first banks to do that have the best chance of becoming the strongest banks in the future. Is it not high time for Britain’s banker to return to being savvy loan officers, instead of the silly bank capital (equity) minimizers they have now become?

PS. Frankly the idea you can identify all risks, and stop these from happening, without unexpected consequences, seems to me one of the mother of all zombie ideas of our times.

@PerKurowski

It is the lower capital requirements when lending to AAArisktocracy that stops banks from lending to “The Risky”.

Sir, Gillian Tett writes about the growing sector of private funds that, instead of banks, are now lending to the “riskier”, like SMEs and entrepreneurs. “Ham-fisted rules spark the creativity of lenders” October 13.

That is explained with: “these funds only exist because there is a tangible need: mid-market companies need cash, and banks are reluctant to provide this because the regulations introduced after the 2008 global financial crisis make it too costly for them to lend to risky, small clients.”

No! Before risk-weighted capital requirements were introduced, all cost and risk adjusted interest rates were treated equally whether these we offered by sovereigns, AAA rated, mortgages, small and medium unrated businesses or anyone else. Not now, and especially not since Basel II of 2004.

Now banks can leverage those offers more when lending to “The Safe”, so they earn higher risk adjusted returns on equity when lending to The Risky, so they lost all interest in lending to The Risky.

In this respect the de facto cost of trying to make banks safer has therefore been reducing the opportunities to bank credit of those perceived as riskier, which of course increases inequalities.

Sir, please try to find any bank crisis that resulted from excessive exposures to The Risky. These always resulted from excessive exposures to what was ex ante perceived as belonging to The Safe.

@PerKurowski

Beware, nudging, like that done by bank regulators, can have very dangerous unexpected consequences

Sir, Tim Harford writes: “Professor Richard Thaler’s catch-all advice: whether you’re a business or a government, if you want people to do something, make it easy.”, “Thaler’s Nobel is a well-deserved nudge for behavioural economics” October 10.

Yes “making it easy” is great advice, but it is only truly helpful if what is made easier is really good for you… otherwise it could be outright dangerous… like nudging someone over a cliff.

Regulators, caring little or nothing for the credit allocation function of banks, foremost wanted these to avoid risks. To that effect they allowed banks to hold less capital against what’s perceived or decreed safe than against what’s perceived risky.

With that regulators allowed banks to easily obtain higher risk-adjusted returns on equity lending to The Safe than when lending to The Risky.

With that regulators dangerously nudged our banks into too much exposure to The Safe and too little to The Risky.

The result was a bank crisis because of excessive exposure to The Safe: sovereigns, AAArisktocracy and mortgages; and economic doldrums because of insufficient credit to The Risky: SMEs and entrepreneurs.

Sir, and so here we are, without most not even knowing about the odious regulatory nudging that was as is being done.

What rules do we have to impose on nudging to make sure it is done right?

https://teawithft.blogspot.com/2008/11/at-least-listen-to-joker-before-giving.html

https://teawithft.blogspot.com/2008/08/how-do-you-nudge-financial-times.html

https://subprimeregulations.blogspot.com/2015/12/professor-richard-thaler-do-not-give.html

@PerKurowski