What would the Milton Friedman of 50 years ago, have thought of the Martin Wolf of today?

Sir, I refer to Martin Wolf ‘s “Friedman was wrong on the corporation” December 9.

Wolf writes that among his contributions to the ebook Milton Friedman 50 Years Later, and in relation to what a “good game” would look like, that this is “one in which companies would not kill hundreds of thousands of people, by promoting addiction to opiates; one in which companies would not lobby for tax systems that let them park vast proportions of their profits in tax havens; [and] one in which the financial sector would not lobby for the inadequate capitalisation that causes huge crises”.

Really? Would Friedman have promoted “addiction to opiates”?

Really? What is parked in tax havens? Profits, or titles to assets that are for the most, 99.99%, not parked in these tax havens?

But yes, the financial sector certainly lobbied for a low capitalization, but why should this sector be more blamed than those regulators who, based on the nonsense that what’s perceived as risky is more dangerous to our bank systems than what’s perceived as safe, allowed it?

Wolf quoted Friedman with “there is one and only one social responsibility of business — to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition without deception or fraud.” Yes, that’s true. But what should not be allowed though are for instance regulators setting much lower bank capital requirements when lending to the government than when lending to citizens, something which de facto implies bureaucrats know better what to do with credit they’re not personally responsible for than e.g. entrepreneurs.

Wolf writes about "unbridled corporate power has been a factor behind the rise of populism, especially rightwing populism". For me worse is much more unbridled technocracy power. What's more populists than a Basel Committee telling the world: "We know all there is to know about what's to our bank systems, so we have decreed credit risk weighted bank capital requirements".

Sir, Wolf says he used to believe Friedman, but that he was wrong. I just wonder what Milton Friedman would have thought of the Martin Wolf of today

A final question, Martin Wolf, what if corporations taking upon themselves to act in a “corporate socially responsible way” generated less employment and had less profits, and therefore paid less taxes?

@PerKurowski

Expert technocrats, like those in the Basel Committee, can be shameless and dangerous populists too.

Sir, Takeshi Niinami writes “Japan’s populism leads to mounting government debt and short-term solutions for immediate issues without a clear long-term vision for recovery. This is not unique to Japan. I believe that the US and EU will begin taking quite a similar path” “Japan has a unique form of populism” September 16.

1988’s Basel Accord gave officially birth to the risk weighted bank capital requirements. This regulation, with its much lower decreed risk weight of sovereign debt than of private debt, set all who applied it on a firm course to too much debt and too little growth. 

Just its denomination “risk weighted”, as if the real risks could be known, is of course just another sort of shameless populism. That the world fell for it, is clearly because the world wanted it so much to be true, that it never found in itself the sufficient will to question its basic fallacy; that it considered that which ex ante is perceived as risky to be more dangerous ex post to our bank systems than what is perceived as safe, something which obviously is not so, as all major bank crises in history evidence. 

As I so often have said, that faulty regulation imposed a de facto reverse mortgage on the economy, which extracted the value it already contained, as banks focused more on refinancing the safer past than the riskier future. By refusing those coming after us the risk-taking that brought us here, the intergenerational holy bond that Edmund Burke wrote about was violently violated.

@PerKurowski

Any populism your populist can do mine can do better; mine can do populism much better than yours.

Sir, Gillian Tett, when discussing populism and populists writes, “Nor is it obvious that Mr Trump will lose in 2020. If you look at recent opinion polls, these offer as much reason for alarm as for cheer.” “Is the populist wave in the west here to stay?” September 14.

Clearly populism is in the eye of the beholder. For instance, if Hugo Chavez had hosted “The Populist Apprentice” he might very well have told President Donald Trump. “You’re fired!” 

As for me Sir, you know very well I opine that one of the worst and most destructive populism ever, was when the expert bank regulators in the Basel Committee told us that with their risk weighted bank capital requirements, our banks would be safer… not caring one iota about how that would distort the allocation of credit to the real economy and, to top it up, base these on that loony idea that what's perceived as risky is more dangerous to our bank system than what's perceived as safe 

@PerKurowski

“Any populism yours can do, mine can do better; mine can do populism better than yours” “No he can’t!” “Yes he can, yes he can, yes he can!!!!”

Sir, Simon Kuper ends his “Secrets from the populist playbook” March 16, with “Some new politicians, notably the new Democrat congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, can rival Trump for engagement. To some degree, we are all populists now.” “Secrets from the populist playbook”, March 16.

Indeed but the populists must also be measured with respect to the success they have when selling their populism.

For instance, our current bank regulators must be some of the most successful populists ever. Just think how they have managed to convince the world (most or all in FT included) that by imposing risk weighted capital requirements for banks, they are reducing the risks for our bank system. With that they have distorted the allocation of bank credit all over the world, weakening the economies and increasing the dangers of a systemic meltdown of our banks. 

Sir, I am from Venezuela, and so unfortunately I know too much about populists, but, when compared to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s and the Financial Stability Board’s populism, Hugo Chavez was just a quite gifted amateur.

@PerKurowski

PS. My 2019 letter to the Financial Stability Board (FSB)

Bank regulations placed populist socialism on steroids, but neo-class-wars represent challenges

Sir, David McWilliams writes:“Mr Bernanke’s unorthodox “cash for trash” scheme, otherwise known as quantitative easing, drove up asset prices, left baby boomers comfortable, but the millennials with a fragile stake in the society they are supposed to build… spawning a new generation of socialists. Soaring asset prices, particularly property prices, drive a wedge between those who depend on wages for their income and those who depend on rents and dividends “‘Cash for trash’ was the father of millennial socialism”, March 2.

I agree. With QEs central banks renounced to all possible cleansing benefits a hard landing could provide, and decided to kick the can forward. But that is not the whole story. 

By distorting the allocation of bank credit with risk weighted capital requirements, which much favored the “safer” present/properties over the riskier future/ventures, it was de facto bank regulators who caused the crisis.

As a brief background, after Basel II in 2004, for all European banks and for US investment banks, the following were the standardized allowed leverages for banks: a) for loans to sovereigns rated AAA-AA the sky was the limit; b) 62.5 times when holding AAA rated securities; c) 62.5 times when holding any asset, no matter how risky, if it had a default guarantee issued by an AAA rated entity, like AIG; d) 35.7 times when holding residential mortgages and e) 12.5 times when lending to unrated entrepreneurs or SMEs.

The 2008 crisis was caused, exclusively, by excessive bank exposures to assets perceived as safe, and that could be held against the least of capital. In US and Europe it was the b, c, d and e assets, and a bit later in Europe, sovereigns, like Greece, that not withstanding it did not have an AAA rating, not withstanding it was taking on debt in euros, which de facto is not their domestic printable one, was assigned by EU authorities a risk weight of 0%.

After the crisis, with Basel III, some new capital regulations were introduced, notoriously a minimum leverage ratio, but the distortions produced by the risk weighted capital requirements are still alive and kicking a lot on the margin, there were it means the most.

As a consequence the can has been kicked forward in precisely the same wrong direction from where it came. Therefore, the day it begins to roll back on us, it could be so much worse.

McWilliams opines: “One battle ground for the new politics is the urban property market”. Indeed, there is a de facto class war going on between those who want their houses to be great investment assets too, and those who simply want to afford to own a home. Just as there is a de facto new class war between those who want higher minimum wages and those unemployed who want any job.

For the time being the old and new socialists on the scene have not been forced to take sides in these wars, as they still gather that going after the filthy rich will suffice to become elected. But the more voters realize that what the wealthy have is not money but assets, and that converting those assets into redistributable money can have serious unexpected consequences for the value of assets, some of which could trickle down on every one… that day redistribution driven populism will lose some power.

Hear this question: “Do you want us young to afford houses or do you want our parents’ houses to be worth more? Make up you mind, you cannot serve both.”

@PerKurowski

Those who fell for the “We will make your bank systems safer with our risk weighted capital requirements” populism should not throw the first stone

Sir, Martin Wolf reviewing three books related to the rise of populism writes “Populist forces are on the rise across the transatlantic world … It may also prove to be a historical turning point, away from liberal democracy, global capitalism, or both.”“The price of populism” October 27.

Indeed, but to me that started some decades ago when bank regulators, as if they where clairvoyants, told us they could make our banks systems safe by imposing risk weighted capital requirements on banks. “Wow, risk-weighted, that’s sure scientific!” 

Sir, if that’s not populism what is? The world, FT and even Martin Wolf fell for it, lock stock and barrel.

Referring to Robert Kuttner’s “Can Democracy Survive Global Capitalism?” Wolf agrees when Kuttner mentions the “incompetent deregulation of finance, especially the growth of short-term cross-border capital flows and the plethora of regulatory loopholes.”

Really? When regulators allowed with Basel II to leverage 62.5 times with assets human fallible credit rating agency have assigned AAA to AA rating, what more loopholes do you really need?

Kuttner also argues against “the disastrous counter-revolution of the 1980s and the relaunch of deregulated capitalism” NO! What “deregulated capitalism” can there be when regulators assign a risk weight of 0% to the sovereign and one of 100% to the unrated citizens? That Sir is regulated crony statism.

@PerKurowski

Paul Volcker warns public administration training is no longer on universities’ radar. Neither seems conditional probabilities and Bayes’ rule to be

Sir, interviewed by Gillian Tett, Paul Volcker’s tells her, “I would like my legacy to be some attention to public service. When I grew up good government was a good slogan. But now the phrase ‘good government’ is a mockery [and] universities have effectively abandoned practical public administration training, focusing instead on ‘policy’",“Volcker sets a challenge for the next generation” October 26. 

And Ms. Tett laments, “Few students want to make the type of financial sacrifices that Mr Volcker did for many decades, in the name of public service”

That concern has great merits, especially because the alternative would be to see our public service posts filled with experts in negotiating what crony statism could have to offer.

The Paul Volcker as Fed chair in the 1970s crushing inflation was a hero of mine. Unfortunately I woke up to the fact he helped doom to failure our banking system.

Getting the clue from Charles Goodhart’s “The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: A History of the Early Years 1974-1997”, in Steven Solomon's “The Confidence Game: How Unelected Central Bankers Are Governing the Changed Global Economy” of 1995 I read:

“On September 2, 1986, the fine cutlery was laid once again at the Bank of England governor’s official residence at New Change… The occasion was an impromptu visit from Paul Volcker… When the Fed chairman sat down with Governor Robin Leigh-Pemberton and three senior BoE officials, the topic he raised was bank capital…

Adequate capital – the bank’s buffer against bankrupting loss- was the keystone of a central banker’s mission to uphold financial system safety and soundness.

They literally wiped the blackboard clean, then explored designing a new risk-weighted capital adequacy for both countries… 

It included… a five-category framework of risk-weighted assets… It required banks to hold the full capital standard against the highest-risk loans, half the standard for the second riskiest category, a quarter for the middle category, and so on to zero capital for assets, such as government securities, without meaningful risk of credit default.”

That led to the Basel Accord, Basel I in 1988. And of course, setting the capital requirements for the banks based on the risks that bankers cleared the most for, credit risk, had to dangerously distort the allocation of bank credit to the real economy. As I say over and over again, any risk, even if perfectly perceived, will cause the wrong actions if excessively considered.

Suffices to say that 100% of the assets that caused the especially large 2007-08 crisis were assets that, because they were perceived as especially safe, generated especially low capital requirements for the banks.

When I consider the total silence by universities on the consequences for the stability of our banking system and for the dynamism of our economies produced by the risk weighted capital requirements for banks, I am also saddened.

Universities, like Harvard Business School, do have “Conditional Probabilities and Bayes’ rule” on the curriculum. Could it be that professors are kept too busy preparing these courses so to have time to look out at what’s happening in the world? Or could it be their students, like Paul Volcker, never understood them.

Sir, wake up! When hubris filled besserwisser regulators tell you: “We will make your bank system safer with our risk-weighted capital requirements”, as if they were great clairvoyants, and you believe them, you have fallen for some pure, unabridged and very dangerous populism. 

The risk weighted capital requirements for banks guarantee especially large exposures, to what’s perceived as especially safe, against especially little capital, which dooms bank systems to especially severe crises.

PS. If regulators want to use risk weighted bank capital requirements, these should be based not on the credit risk of assets per se, but on the risk for the bank system the assets pose, conditioned on how risks are perceived and acted on by bankers. Who has the power to tell them so?

@PerKurowski

Nothing helps other populist quacks to surge, than allowing your own populist quacks free reigns.

Sir, you write “If mainstream politicians can show their policies work, unlike the quack remedies peddled by political insurgents, they have a chance of wooing voters back. If not, they will be eclipsed by today’s populists — or worse ones waiting in the wings.” “Waning co-operation will make the next financial crisis worse” September 14.

That is one hundred percent true. But the best way to fight what “quack remedies” are peddled out there, is to get rid of the quack remedies peddled by your own populists.

Such as that one marketed by the current populist bank regulators who insist they can make our bank systems safer with their risk weighted capital requirements for banks.

These only distort the allocation of credit, expelling true risk-taking into the shadows while dangerously building up especially large bank exposures against what’s especially perceived or decreed as safe, against especially little capital.

Have you FT done enough to expose that quackery? I certainly do not think so. Much the contrary, you seem to have set your mind on helping the regulators to cover up their mistakes.

PS. Here is a somewhat more extensive aide memoire on the mistakes with the risk weighted capital requirements for banks.

@PerKurowski

Different bank capital requirements for different assets are worse than too little or too much bank capital.

Sir, Lex opines “Debates over bank capital resemble tennis rallies… On one side of the net you have the big global banks. They say they have plenty of capital and that forcing them to operate with more is a restraint on trade. Pow! On the other side are the regulators, who say more capital is better because you never know what losses you may have to absorb. Thwack!” "Bank capital: silly old buffer" August 31

But there are some few, like me, who argue that much worse than there being much or little capital, is that there are different capital requirements for banks, based on the perceived risk of assets. Riskier, more capital – safer, less capital. In tennis terms it would be like judges allowing those highest ranked to be able to play with the best tennis rackets, and the last ranked to play with ping-pong rackets. And of course that distorted the allocation of bank credit.

Populism? What’s more populist than, “We will make your bank systems safer with our risk-weighted capital requirements for banks”? 

PS. Here is somewhat more extensive aide memoire on the mistakes in the risk weighted capital requirements for banks.

@PerKurowski

The US 2008 financial crisis was born April 28, 2004

Sir, Janan Ganesh writes: “A financial crisis that was experienced as a fragmented chain of events is being commemorated as just one: the fall of Lehman Brothers, 10 years ago next month",” “Political distemper preceded the financial crisis” August 30.

That is only because the truth shall not be named. In the case of the United States, that crisis started on April 28, 2004 when the SEC decided that the supervised investment bank holding company ("SIBHC"), like Lehman Brothers, “would be required periodically to provide the Commission with consolidated computations of allowable capital and risk allowances (or other capital assessment) consistent with the Basel Standards." 

When the Basel standards approved in June 2004 included allowing banks to leverage a mind-boggling 62.5 times with any asset that have been assigned by human fallible credit rating agencies an AAA to AA rating, or had been guaranteed by an AAA rated corporation like AIG, the crisis began its construction. That in the European Union the authorities also included allowing banks to lend to sovereigns like Greece against no capital at all would only worsen the explosion.

Populism? What’s more populist than, “We will make your bank systems safer with our risk-weighted capital requirements for banks”? 

PS. Here is somewhat more extensive aide memoire on the mistakes in the risk weighted capital requirements for banks.

@PerKurowski

The US 2008 financial crisis was born April 28, 2004 – and different bank capital for different assets are worse than too little or too much bank capital.

Sir, I must refer to Janan Ganesh’s “Political distemper preceded the financial crisis” August 30, in order to make the following two comments:

1. “A financial crisis that was experienced as a fragmented chain of events is being commemorated as just one: the fall of Lehman Brothers, 10 years ago next month.”

That is only because the truth shall not be named. In the case of the United States, that crisis started on April 28, 2004 when the SEC decided that the supervised investment bank holding company ("SIBHC"), like Lehman Brothers, “would be required periodically to provide the Commission with consolidated computations of allowable capital and risk allowances (or other capital assessment) consistent with the Basel Standards." 

When the Basel standards approved in June 2004 included allowing banks to leverage a mind-boggling 62.5 times with any asset that have been assigned by human fallible credit rating agencies an AAA to AA rating, or had been guaranteed by an AAA rated corporation like AIG, the crisis began its construction. That in the European Union the authorities also included allowing banks to lend to sovereigns like Greece against no capital at all would only worsen the explosion.

Oops! The following part had nothing to do with Janan Ganesh, but all with Lex's "Bank capital: silly old buffer"

2. “Debates over bank capital resemble tennis rallies… On one side of the net you have the big global banks. They say they have plenty of capital and that forcing them to operate with more is a restraint on trade. Pow! On the other side are the regulators, who say more capital is better because you never know what losses you may have to absorb. Thwack!”

But there are some few, like me, who argue that much worse than there being much or little capital, is that there are different capital requirements for banks, based on the perceived risk of assets. Riskier, more capital – safer, less capital. In tennis terms it would be like judges allowing those highest ranked to be able to play with the best tennis rackets, and the last ranked to play with ping-pong rackets. And of course that distorted the allocation of bank credit.

Populism? What’s more populist than, “We will make your bank systems safer with our risk-weighted capital requirements for banks”? 

PS. Here is somewhat more extensive aide memoire on the mistakes in the risk weighted capital requirements for banks.

@PerKurowski

Populism is not the exclusive domain of politicians and autocrats. Even technocrats practice it and experts fall for it

Sir, Ray Dalio, Bridgewater’s founder, told Gillian Tett “that the proportion of the western world voting for populist candidates had risen to 35 per cent. The figure, from a report by his firm, was starkly higher than at the start of the decade, when it was 7 per cent.” She finds that “unnerving on several levels” “Economics alone does not explain the surge of populism” August 4.

It is now ten years since a crisis caused exclusively by assets that because these had been perceived, decreed or concocted as safe banks could hold against very little capital turned out to be risky. And still so few question the wisdom of basing regulations on the belief that what is perceived as risky is more dangerous to our bank system than what is perceived as safe.

So Sir, I find it even more unnerving that seemingly 99.9% of regulatory experts, economists and financial journalists do still seem to believe, and ever refuse to question, those populist regulators who tell us they know all about bank risks, so as to make our banks safer with their risk weighted capital requirements.

Yes, many voters might fall for nice sounding populist promises, but others too, perhaps even you Sir, can sometimes not be able to resist these. Imagine, safe banks at no cost, does that not just sound too sweet not to believe?

@PerKurowski

Why does the “Without Fear and Without Favour” FT, not ask bank regulators questions I have suggested for a decade?

Sir, Gillian Tett writes: “The financial world faces at least three key issues, with echoes of the past: cheap money has fuelled a rise in leverage; low rates have also fostered financial engineering; and regulators are finding it hard to keep track of the risks, partly because they are so fragmented. “The corporate debt problem refuses to recede” January 9

Sorry, it is much worse than “regulators finding it hard to keep track of the risks”. It is that regulators have no understanding of how they, with their risk weighted capital requirements for banks, have in so many ways distorted the reactions to risks.

And much more than cheap money fueling a rise in leverage, it is the bank regulators who, like with Basel II in 2004, allowed banks to leverage a mind-blowing 62.5 times with assets only because they possessed an AAA to AA rating, started it all. . 

And when it comes to financial engineering, it is the regulators who caused banks to send into early retirement many savvy loan officers, in order to replace these with skilled equity minimizer modelers, who allowed for the highest expected risk adjusted returns on equity (and the biggest bonuses). 

The regulators, by favoring what is “safe” on top of what is perceived as “safe” is usually favored, only guarantee that safe-havens will become dangerously overpopulated, against especially little capital. Great job chaps!

Why has Ms. Tett, or many other in FT, not asked regulators, for instance what I believe I the quite interesting question of: Why do you want banks to hold more capital against what, by being perceived as risky, has been made innocous to the bank system, than against what, precisely because it is perceived as safe, is so much more dangerous?

One explanation that comes to my mind is John Kenneth Galbraith’s “If one is pretending to knowledge one does not have, one cannot ask for explanations to support possible objections”, “Money: Whence it came, where it went” (1975)

Sir, the Basel Committees’ “With the risk-weighted capital requirements we will make banks safer”… is cheap and dangerous populism hidden away in technocratic sophistications. Sadly it would seem the Financial Times has fallen for it, lock, stock and barrel.

Oops! I guess I will never be invited to a "Lunch With FT" 

http://perkurowski.blogspot.com/2016/04/here-are-17-reasons-for-why-i-believe.html

For the complexity of banks, regulating demagogues gave us the simple solution of risk weighted capital requirements

Sir, Martin Wolf writes that current “upheavals [2007-08 Crisis, Great Recession] have, as so often before, opened the way to demagogues, promising simple solutions to complex problems… Brexit… Trump…Catalonia”, “A political shadow looms over the world economy” October 14.

Indeed, but much of the upheavals were caused directly by the members of an exclusive mutual admiration club of populist regulators, who sold the world that monumental piece of demagoguery of risk-weighted capital requirements for banks. “You all relax… we have weighted the risks.”

And though they never defined explicitly the purpose of banks, because seemingly they do not care about that, implicitly, de facto, their risk-weights indicate what the banks should do, and what not. That is so because less capital, means higher leverage, which means higher risk adjusted returns on equity.

So now we have: thou shall lend to sovereigns, to members of the AAArisktocracy and to finance residential houses; and thou shall not lend to risky SMEs and entrepreneurs.

And when the first results of those regulations, the excessive exposures to AAA rated securities, and to sovereigns like Greece appeared and caused crises, they did not rectify, they kept their risk weighting, and their central bank brothers kicked the cans down the road with QEs and ultralow interest rates.

So look at the stock market going up while becoming riskier because of the de-capitalization that results from taking up loans to pay for dividends and buybacks.

So look at house prices being overinflated, as evidenced by the lagging of rental values; while central bankers turn a blind eye to house prices not being in the consumer price index, but that rentals are.

So look at how sovereign debt levels are growing almost everywhere.

The monstrous silence about the distortions produced by bank regulations, like by influential opiners like Martin Wolf, is only helping to generate even more nutrient ingredients to all too many populists in waiting. God help us!

@PerKurowski

PS. My 2019 letter to the Financial Stability Board (FSB)

What’s 100% political correct has not even to be close to real feelings on Main Street

Sir, Gideon Long strangely thinks it is important to quote one obscure member of an unconstitutional assembly that represents perhaps less than 15% of Venezuelans with “If you think of invading us we’ll make [the] Vietnam [war] look small,” and then to describe that this member’s shouts “earned him a rapturous standing ovation”. “Trump threat ‘lets Maduro blame US for his woes’” August 14.

To reaffirm the validity of that Long refers to a poll in which “9 per cent of respondents felt the crisis would only be resolved by foreign military intervention”.

Suppose instead a poll asking: “If foreign military intervention was the only way to get rid of the current regime, (as Long quotes a Venezuelan woman believing) would you approve of it?” The way I read the feelings in my homeland (albeit from a foreign land), that question would be responded affirmative by a majority of Venezuelans.

Of course if that would happen, once the necessity has been removed, Venezuela’s Main Street would most probably, sort of thanklessly, again align itself to more political correct attitudes and blame Yankee imperialism for much. C'est la vie! 

PS. The way Gideon Long transmits information about Venezuela makes me think he might be one of those who can't resist a lefty talking purty.

@PerKurowski

Martin Wolf, beware; we all, including you, are not so immune to populism as we would like to think.

Sir, Martin Wolf opines on the dangers of populism and haughtily instructs us with: “those who wish to resist the rising tide of populism have to confront its simplifications and lies”… “The economic origins of the populist surge: Political turmoil in several western democracies is a legacy of the global financial crisis” June 28.

Before preaching us Wolf should know that beside easy to see through vulgar populisms, like the Chavez’ kind, there is also much more sophisticated but not less dangerous populisms, and to which the elite could also easily fall prey.

For example: The Basel Committee, and other bank regulators announced: “Banks and evil banksters are not to be trusted. They want to earn huge returns on equity by taking too many risks with your deposits, and then leave you as taxpayers to clean up their mess. But don’t you worry! We are going to fix that for you, with our risk-weighted capital requirements. More risk more bank capital - less risk less capital”.

And too many super duper experts, like (white guy :-)) Martin Wolf, fell for that nonsense.

This regulation, by creating incentives for banks to build up dangerously large exposures against very little capital to what was perceived as safe, like for instance to AAA rated securities backed with mortgages to the subprime sector, and to sovereigns like Greece, clearly failed and caused the 2007/08 crisis. But the same regulators now tell us: “Be calm, we have everything under control”, and too many keep believing them just the same.

And so now we are offered: some risk independent capital requirements, which could cause the remaining risk-weighing to be even more distortive on the margin; liquidity requirements that will equally distort; some tests of the stresses a la mode the regulators deem to be important; the creation of living wills by bankers who must surely find it hard to know what’s left to will after a severe crisis; and making sure banks do not apply too much of their own risk models but use more of the (loony) standardized Basel risk weights. In summary, all our regulators are managing to do is to assure the creation of more and more systemic risks.

And if someone like me denounces that regulators dangerously distort the allocation of credit to the real economy, those who have fallen to that regulatory populism, like Wolf, have the toupee of telling me that the evil banksters have an obligation to see through all that, and still do what is right. 

So now green is safe so you can finance it, but red is risky so you cannot. That entirely ignoring that green could just be safe houses with basements in which the young can live with their parents, while red could be the risky SMEs and entrepreneurs that if financed, could help the young to find the jobs they need in order for them to afford to buy houses.

Sir, frankly, have you ever heard of such technocratic bullshit populism?

But could I also not be the victim of populism? Surely! Which is why I wake up each day en-garde, ready to question everything, including what you opine Sir, sorry!

PS. Structural unemployment, brought on by robots and automation, is one of the greatest threats to social cohesion. That is why I wish for my world to try a universal basic income scheme, before it is too late. Once social cohesion breaks down it is so much harder to mend it… Venezuela dixit. Does this make me having fallen for some silly populism? If so, tell me so!

@PerKurowski

“Whut you goin' to do when a [lefty] gits starts to talk purty? I'm jist a [socialist] who cain't say no”

Sir, Janan Ganesh writes: “At some indistinct point in the recent past, the left lost its monopoly on rebellion. To rebel was to be conservative or libertarian. It was more transgressive to buck the sensitivities of the age on race, gender, sexual preference, climate change, civil liberties, mental health and religion than to walk on eggshells around them. This shift in what it meant to be a radical was the price of the left’s success in the culture wars. The more it policed language, the more it inadvertently glamorised anyone who gave voice to unreconstructed sentiments — even if… they almost never mean them.” “Counter-elite mentality” May 6.

The left also lost out when it was not able to resist the siren songs of false sirens like Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez and Nicolas Maduro. I am always reminded of Oklahoma’s Ado Annie singing “I Cain't Say No!”

“Whut you goin' to do when a [lefty] gits flirty

And starts to talk purty? whut you goin' to do?

Whut you goin' to do when he talks that way

Spit in his eye?

I'm jist a [socialist] who cain't say no”

Also, even though they understand that terms like “deplorable” do not serve any useful recruiting purpose, they just can’t resist going on and on, like with for instance their current “We and time will make you understand how truly dumb you were/are voting for Trump”, arguing every little minuscule happening into a Trump fault, losing perspective on things.

Frankly, a President who can drop an A-bomb basically at his will cannot fire an FBI director for whatever cause at his will?

@PerKurowski

The populism of bank regulators like Mario Draghi, has hurt Italy much more than Berlusconi’s

Sir, Wolfgang Münchau, discussing a “centrist populist. Take Silvio Berlusconi”, writes that he “left a legacy of economic devastation. Italy’s economic growth is anaemic, its debt burden too high and the banking system too weak…. The euro-zone lacks a joint government and is premised on economic convergence and rules-based governance. Its survival depends on the absence of populism” "Centre-ground populists pose the real threat" February 27.

Again,Münchau says not a word about that during the last decades nothing has been as destructive for the Western world of our grandchildren, than those hubris filled populist technocrats who with their risk weighted capital requirements, offer us to deliver stable and safe banks… at no cost. 

A 0% risk weight for the sovereign, in this case “safe” Italian politicians and bureaucrats, and a 100 % risk weight for “risky” Italian SMEs and entrepreneurs, could never have produced anything but anaemic growth, and the dangerous overpopulation of some supposedly very safe havens.

When will FT and all its famous columnists understand that denouncing the regulatory distortion in the allocation of bank credit is vital to our future?

@PerKurowski

The 2007-08 crisis and the relative stagnation thereafter would not have happened without current bank regulations

Sir, Ed Crooks writes “Trump has threatened to “do a number” on Frank-Dodd banking regulations aimed at preventing another financial crisis.” “Populists push to roll back rules” February 22.

Well no! Except for the intent of eliminating overreliance on credit rating agencies, something that has yet to happen, the Dodd-Frank Act did not eliminate those populist bank regulations that caused the last financial crisis, or the relative economic stagnation thereafter.

Some real runaway populism, that happened when hubris filled technocrats thought they could, and at no cost, diminish the risks for the banking system with their risk weighted capital requirements for banks.

What did and does that regulation cause?

That the banks create dangerously large exposures to what is perceived, rated, decreed or concocted as safe, e.g. AAA rated securities and Greece. 

That the banks award too little credit to what can supply dynamism to the real economy, e.g. SMEs and entrepreneurs.

Crooks also writes: “In a 2012 OECD expert paper, David Parker of Cranfield University and Colin Kirkpatrick of the University of Manchester reviewed the state of academic knowledge and concluded that there were large gaps in our understanding of the effects of regulation policy”

I have not read that paper, but I am sure the conclusions must be absolutely correct. For instance, when regulators stress test banks, they do not even care to look at what should perhaps have been on their balance sheets, in order to satisfy the credit needs of the real economy.

It is amazing how the Financial Times insists on keeping all this hushed up.

Does that mean FT agrees with the regulatory statism reflected in assigning to the sovereign a risk weight of 0% while hitting us “We the People”, with 100%?

Does that mean FT finds nothing dumb in assigning a 20% risk weight to the so dangerous AAA rated, while hitting the innocuous below BB- rated with 150%?

Sir, here between you and me, what favours do you owe the bank regulators, or why are you so afraid of them?

PS. The Dodd-Frank Act is so surreal that in its 848 pages it does not even mention the Basel Committee

PS. I dare you to read an Op-Ed I wrote in 1999 about the dangers with regulations

PS. I dare you to read the remarks I gave to bank regulators in 2003 while being an Executive Director of the World Bank.

@PerKurowski

If we are to avoid Nazi mentalities to take over, citizens need to be able to express their deeper inner concerns

Sir, I refer to Richard Milne’s “Rise of populists poses dilemma for Nordic mainstream” February 14.

As a son of a polish citizen who had to suffer concentration camps for almost five years, I am as far away as can be with sympathizing with Nazis. And of course I see with disgust anyone “pictured with Nazi memorabilia or uttering racist comments”. But Sir, that does not determined them to be, in any way, “uniquely awful”.

To argue so just opens the door to the exercise of dangerous political hypocrisy while closing the door on the possibilities of citizens to express their usually not at all bad meaning, deep concerns.

For a citizen, in a fairly small society like Sweden to be worrying about immigrants does not make him a bad citizen… it makes him just a citizen worrying about immigrants. Is that so hard to understand or is that what some do not want to be understood?

Sir, the repression of citizens’ feeling and worries, is precisely the best fertilizer for movements that can be taken over by Nazi type mentalities. Healthy societies need to be able to discuss, to ventilate, everything that bothers them, not only what’s political correct to discuss. 

A personal PS: My mother was Swedish. 93 years old, she passed away last Friday. On Thursday night, two not at all Swedish looking immigrants, vociferating in a totally foreign language, transported her home. I have rarely met a person more open to treat all without any kind of distinctions than my mother, but had she not the right not to feel totally at ease?

@PerKurowski