Should one want to have anything to do with an investment bank like Goldman Sachs that finances odious regimes?

Sir, I have no idea about what Robert Smith describes in “Goldman questioned on Verisure debt sale”, November 10; and, though it sure sounds a bit shady, I have not enough interest in pursuing the understanding of it.

That said, I would have to add though: Do you really want to have anything to do with an investment bank that finances odious regimes, like that of Venezuela?

If yes, where do you draw the line? North Korea?

PS. The vultures out there should not forget that between the case of Argentina and that of Venezuela there are some fundamental qualitative ethical differences.

And all this suffering while gas (petrol) is sold at less than US$ 1 cent per gallon

https://teawithft.blogspot.com/search?q=Goldman+Sachs+Venezuela

@PerKurowski

Argentina, and so many others need, urgently, clear definition of what are odious public-sector credits and borrowings

Sir, I refer to Benedict Mander’s “Macri is surrounded by former bankers as he seeks international investment” May 13.

I have always been convinced that most of debt that at any point of time gets to be qualified as “odious”, has had its beginnings in odious credits or in odious borrowings.

Odious public sector credits are those that lenders approve even though they know the resources will not be put to a good use, only because the risk-premiums are right. A really extreme example of this would be an oversubscribed public bond issue to finance something like the crematoria ovens of Auschwitz. 

Odious public sector borrowings are those carried out by governments, in lieu of real correcting measures, or because of other political short term interests, without any consideration as to how it is going to be repaid and who are going to repay, usually those of a generation down the line.

And so therefore I have always held that, no matter how important it was to introduce a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) that had to begin by defining clearly what should be considered as odious credit or odious public borrowings. That since these, for the good of us all, should not receive the same treatment as bona-fide credits.

And in this respect when I read that “luring money back into an economy starved of investment after a decade of interventionist policies” is considered “a vital element” I feel it might be time again for us to prepare to cry for Argentina.

And, just in case, this has nothing to do with who governs Argentina, in fact I very much welcome the recent change. It is what I have opined in my country Venezuela, pre-Chavez, during-Chavez, and that I will surely also opine after the long overdue Chavez/Maduro change comes into fruition.

To use a credit card to buy food and medicine for the people is understandable but, for governments to load up on credit card debt as a substitute for doing the reforms that are needed, or to finance new investments supposed to “take care of it all”, that is just immoral.

When it comes to public sector debt, and for instance capital requirements for banks, it would serve us citizens much better if ethic or good governance ratings were used instead of simple credit risk rating… a good credit risk rating resulting from the government receiving large oil revenues, is just to add salt to injury.

@PerKurowski ©

Odious debt is often mentioned, but its origin is most often those odious credits and odious borrowings that abound

Sir, Benedict Mander, with respect to Argentina issuing debt writes: “These yields don’t exist anywhere else in the world in countries with such low levels of debt,” said [enthusiastically] Facundo Gómez Minujín, managing director at JPMorgan’s Argentina unit. “Argentina targets $30bn debt issuance” May 2.

Is that not a sign that Argentina, if it took on debt, should demand to pay less or just leave it like that?

And by the way, what has the fact that Argentina has low level of debts to do with anything? Is not debt to be contracted only if you have something really worthy to do with it, something that will allow you to repay the debt and leave some decent returns?

I do not know much about Argentina, and I do not intend any similitude, but I do know that I profoundly dislike all those who knowing how bad it was run, and how little with its huge oil revenues it should need credit, still financed the disastrous XXI Century Socialism Venezuela, only because risk premiums seemed good. Had they not done so, Venezuela could perhaps already have been able to rid itself of The Tragedy. Had they not done so, Venezuela would not, on top of all its other current mindboggling difficulties, need to add the service of totally unproductive contracted debt.

For me good governments are those who stay out of debt even if conditions seem fair, only on account that debt basically represents advance fiscal revenues, to be paid later by the next generation.

We do need a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) but, if it is going to produce reasonable results for the citizens, then it has to begin by defining very clearly what is odious credit and what are odious borrowings. I have sometimes argued that any public borrowing that offers to pay more than a specified number of basis points over what the best debtor is paying, could be considered as odious.

I know it is way too extreme, and has absolutely nothing to do with Argentina or Venezuela, but the question needs to be asked, so that the point I am making becomes utterly clear: Would bonds issued for the construction of the crematoria ovens in Auschwitz be included in any debt restructuring… or should these just be thrown out… or should the financiers also be judged?

@PerKurowski ©

A “lack of accountability” worthy of the Guinness Book of Records

Sir, Louis Brennan refers to Peter Doyle's letter highlighting the “unprecedented scale” of the IMF’s forecasting error in relation to its 2010 programme for Greece, in order to argue for “reform of institutions such as the IMF and the ECBm so that an ethos of transparency and accountability obtains in their operations and decision-making.”

Though forecasting errors are usually seen in the rear window, and though IMF sits in the uncomfortable position of at times influencing so much so as to make their forecasts come true, damn if you’re right, damn if you’re wrong, no one can deny Brennan has a valid point.

But, in terms of lack of accountability, that is really peccata minuta when compared to that of the Basel Committee’s. Let me just describe it this way. Neither Hollywood nor Bollywood would ever dream of placing the responsibility for the production of a Basel III, in the same hands of those who produced that incredible box-office flop that was Basel II.

But there they are, with some of their players, like Mario Draghi and Jaime Caruana, having even promoted. It should apply to the Guinness book of records.

PS. In the case of IMF, and as it there had a much more active role, I regard Argentina as a much worse mistake than Greece

When discussing sovereign debt restructuring, let us begin with the beguine

Sir I refer to Martin Wolf’s “Holdouts give vultures a bad name” September 3.

Without opining on the sovereign debt problems of any particular country (like in this case Argentina’s) I have often said we need more clarity in the terms we use.

For instance any sovereign debt holder who acquired the debt at moments when it paid low risk premiums, and the debtor country seemed to be going in the right direction with sustainable debt, should be classified as a bona fide sovereign creditor.

On the opposite side, any debt holder who acquired the debt at moments when it was paying high-risk premiums, because the debtor country was deemed to be going in the wrong direction, towards unsustainable debt, should be classified as a speculative sovereign creditor.

And there are no clearer frontiers between those two categories, than the implicit risk premiums at the moment of investing in that debt… for example 400 basis points over the lowest rate paid by sovereigns for similar debt.

And I believe that, if a country needs to renegotiate its debts, the speculative holders should not expect to have the cake and eat it too, meaning collecting high risk premiums and full capital. For instance, any interests collected over a certain base risk premium defined, should first be deducted from principal owed, in order to allow for some justice with respect to the bona-fide creditors.

The above is not intended as a fully thought out solution, especially when we know that many speculative debt holders could dress up their positions as bona-fide, but at least it also helps to remind us that, both among hold-outs and restructured there could be good and not so good creditors.

But I say all this because just as important, or even more important than any restructuring of sovereign debt, is to send the right signal about when these debts were originated… as so much of renegotiated sovereign debts should never have really come into existence.

I believe us citizens who suffer bad governments, can always benefit from new tools that put some dampers on their possibilities to contract debt, usually only to benefit some few, and to be paid by future generations. Where would for instance the debt-squandered-away levels be for many countries where it not for holdouts?

And so, when discussing sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, we should begin with the beguine. 

For example any debt restructuring for a sovereign debtor who is in problems for causes mostly of his own making, should include clear mechanisms which at least shows an intention of that not happening again. By the way, that is most often an integral part of any private sector debt rescheduling, for instance maximum debt levels, minimum cash reserves and so on. 

A sovereign creditor who just plays out the card of “take your hit and leave me alone” might very well merit some bad vulture holdouts, I mean for the benefit of us tax paying citizens.

PS. Beside sovereign credit risk ratings, should we not also have sovereign governability and ethic ratings?

PS. And, in all these matters, let us never forget that what might appear as a benefit to some, might very well reappear somewhere down the line as a cost to another.

Is Iceland´s debtor´s prison different from Argentina´s?

Sir Jóhanna Sigurdadóttir’s “Iceland are angry but will make sacrifices” August 14, writes about the problem of trying to make good “hundreds of thousands of UK and Dutch savers” who lost their money when attracted by high interest rates they place their money in a private bank in Iceland. 

I can’t help to think about the hundreds of thousands of probably much less sophisticated small Italian savers that lost their savings in Argentina… and I wonder are there some standards for responsible behaviour? 

There is no debtor´s prison for individuals but is there a debtor´s prison for countries even when given home for jail? Would the world be better off with some global standards that apply to all countries? 

And what about all those who lost their money because they followed the advice of the credit rating agencies, those appointed as the official risk sentries by the financial regulator in Basel?

How will the fines from Siemens be distributed?

Sir Daniel Schäfer reports on December 16 that Siemens has to pay $1.4bn in fines to US and German authorities in order to settle bribery inquiries in the United States and Germany related to Venezuela, Argentina, Iraq, Israel, Russia and Bangladesh. How much of these fines will the real victims, the citizens of those countries that were the object of the bribery receive and how will these be distributed?

A corruption of a third kind?

So that Argentina will not have to cry, again

Sir, If Argentina, in a sovereign way, would just offer to include in the current restructure a little clause that states that if they were ever to take on new foreign public sector debt, all of it’s outstanding foreign debt would come due, then the future of that great country would truly shine bright.

As is, the recipients of any new exchange bonds will worry that the debt alleviation given will again tempt foreign investment banks to build up new short term exposure; as is, the argentine citizens will only have to brace themselves for history to repeat itself. Today more important for Argentina (and many other) than to solve its current debt overhang is to make sure it does not happen again. Doing so will open up investment flows to the private sector, Basel [Committee] willing, the only sector where these flows should always have gone to.

Sent to FT on November 24, 2004