Would adequate SIFIs’ designations have helped to avert the last crisis? Of course not!

Sir, I refer to Patrick Jenkin’s “MetLife ruling poses threat to drive towards global financial stability” April 5.

Jenkin sounds very much upset: “This is absurd. The FSOC — with its expert mandate and responsibility for “identifying risks and responding to emerging threats to financial stability” — is being torpedoed by an inexpert judge.”

Sir, you know I hold that the regulator, the Basel Committee and friends, was the real responsible for the crisis that errupted in 2007-08. Its risk weighted capital requirements for banks distorted the allocation of bank credit to the real economy, and allowed banks to leverage absurdly much on assets deemed, decreed or concocted as safe… and all this when history clearly shows that “safe” assets is precisely the stuff that big bank crises are made of.

Had the oversized exposures to AAA rated securities and sovereigns to Greece anything to do with what the regulators now tries to catch with their SIFI methodology? No is the simple answer.

In fact working on how to manage SIFI’s, keeps regulators from working on mending their own mistakes. And frankly I see no reason for Jenkins to deposit so much naïve faith in the expertise of FSOC or FSB or any other member of the regulatory logia.

He writes “The time may have come for the G20 to give the FSB proper statutory powers to ensure shortsighted political interests do not put the world on the road to financial ruin once more”

He should know that there is nothing as shortsighted as the risk weighted capital requirements. These have stopped the banks from financing the risky future and have them only refinancing the, for the very short term, safer past.

If anything Sir, I would wish for that “inexpert judge” to also look into whether the unauthorized discrimination against the access to bank credit of the “risky”, which is imbedded in that regulation, should really be allowed in the Home of the Brave.

It is high time the world starts to reflect on whether it really wants to allow an Ultra Important Regulator to introduce, as it wishes and thinks fit, dangerous systemic risks into the banking system.

The absolute minimum we must ask for is for the regulator to first give us its working definition of what is the purpose of our banks, so to see if we agree.

“A ship in harbor is safe, but that is not what ships are for.” John Augustus Shedd, 1850-1926

@PerKurowski ©

Rules that make all banks behave the same can pose greater systemic risks than all SIFIs put together.

Sir, I refer to Brooke Masters article on “systemically important financial institution whose failure could destabilise the economy” “MetLife’s court win means US regulators should redraft rules” Saturday 2.

Before regulating or redrafting anything, regulators should at least come to understand that their own rules might be the source of the most dangerous systemic risks.

In 2001, in an OpEd I wrote the following onbank regulations:

“The regulatory risk: Before there were many countries and many ways of how to regulate banks. Today, with Basel proudly issuing rules that should apply worldwide, the effects of any mistake could be truly explosive. 

Excessive similarity: Encouraging banks to adopt common rules and standards, is to ignore the differences between economies, so some countries end up with inadequate banking systems not tailored to their needs. Certainly, regulations whose main objective appears to be only to preserve bank capital, conflict directly with other banking functions, such as promoting economic growth, and democratize access to capital. 

Low diversity of criteria: A smaller number of participants, less diversity of opinion and, with it, increased risk of misconceptions prevailing. Whoever doubts that, should read the dimensional analysis that ratings agencies publish. 

Backlash: The development of decision-making processes has benefits but also risks. Thus we see that the speed of information itself, which promotes quick and immediate response, can exacerbate problems. Before, those who took the problem home to study it, and those who simply found out late, provided the market a damper, which often might have saved it from hurried and ill-conceived reactions.”

And already in 1999 in another OpEd I had written: “The possible Big Bang that scares me the most is the one that could happen the day those genius bank regulators in Basel, playing Gods, manage to introduce a systemic error in the financial system, which will cause its collapse”

And then Basel II’s 20 percent risk weight for AAA rated securities, caused the financial crisis 2007-08; while Basel I’s zero riskweight assigned to sovereigns, doomed sovereigns like Greece.

Of course there is a need to think about the systemic risk of SIFIs, but even more important, is looking to minimize the systemic risks of bank regulations… or at least to recognize their existence.

A million of individual small banks can easily be turned into a very dangerous Systemic Overall Important Banking System, by just some rules drafted by some members of that mutual admiration club known as the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision.

@PerKurowski ©