Risk weighted bank capital requirements are anathema to neoliberalism

Sir, Rana Foroohar writes “we have spent decades of living in the old reality — the post-Bretton Woods, neoliberal one.” "Markets are adjusting to a turbulent world" August 19.

There are many definitions of neoliberal policies out there but they always include a large role for the hands of the free market and the reduction in government spending in order to increase the role of the private sector in the economy.

In 1988, for the banking sector, one of the most important economic agents, credit risk capital requirements were introduced by means of the Basel Accord. It gave incentives that distorted the allocation of bank credit to the real economy. For instance lower risk weights for the sovereign (0%) and for residential mortgages (35%) signifies subsidizing the sovereign and the safer present, by taxing the access to credit for the riskier future, like to entrepreneurs (100%). So I do not know what neoliberalism Ms. Foroohar refers to.

Ms. Foroohar, speculating on the possible “impact of an Elizabeth Warren or Bernie Sanders victory in the US primaries?” mentions a 13D Global Strategy and Research note that holds that such event would “fit perfectly into the cycle from wealth accumulation to wealth distribution”, something that Foroohar also believes “will be the biggest economic shift of our lifetimes.”

Sir, at the very moment income, through the purchase of assets, is transformed into accumulated wealth; there cannot be any significant redistribution of it, which means having to sell many of those same assets, without any significant destruction of wealth. If you’re scared of a deep recession, as we all should indeed be, then the last think you’d want to do is to deepen it with a wealth redistribution cycle.

So we cannot redistribute? Yes, we can, but that’s best done getting hold of the income before it is converted into assets, and then, preferably, sharing it out equally to all, by means of an unconditional universal basic income.

@PerKurowski

America, warning, industrial policy fertilizes crony statism

Sir, Rana Foroohar argues that America has chosen “to support a debt-driven, two-speed economy rather than one that prioritises income and industry” “Plans for a worker-led economy straddle America’s political divides” June 9.

“Debt-driven” indeed, but that has mostly been by prioritizing the safety of banks and the financing of the government.

In 1988 the Land of the Free and the Home of the Brave signed up to a statist and risk adverse bank regulation system. The Basel Accord favors “the safer present”, for instance lending to the sovereign and financing the purchase of houses, over that of “the riskier future’, like lending to entrepreneurs. 

In 1988 when a 0% risk weight was assigned to it, the US debt was $2.6Tn. Now it is $22Tn, and still has a 0% risk weight. And just look at how houses have morphed from being homes into being investment assets.

There’s no doubt the report issued by Marco Rubio, as the chair of the Senate small business committee, is correct in that “the US capital markets had become too self-serving and were no longer helping non-financial business... and that public policy could play a role in directing capital to more productive places — away from Wall Street, and towards Main Street.”

But that does not mean the US, in order to “successfully compete with state-run capitalism” like China, has now to turn to industrial policy and thereby risk being captured by even more crony statism.

Regulators assigned a 20% risk weight to what, because it has an AAA rating could really create dangerous levels of bank exposures, and one or 150% to what is below BB- rated, and which banks do usually not want to touch with a ten feet pole. So why should we believe that governments who appoint such regulators, have better ideas than the market on how to funnel capital to the most productive places, connecting the dots between job creators and education.

Therefore the public policy most urgently needed is that of freeing America (and the rest of the world) from that public policy distortion of the allocation of bank credit, that which builds up dangers to the bank system, and weakens the real economy.

PS. Germany has benefitted immensely from so many eurozone nations helping to keep the euro much more competitive for it than what a Deutsche Mark would be. Therefore it is not really correct to bring up the “success” of Germany as an argument in favor of more state intervention.

http://subprimeregulations.blogspot.com/2019/03/my-letter-to-financial-stability-board.html

@PerKurowski

If you want to fight short-termism, you have a better chance doing so by appointing teenagers instead of workers to the boards.

Sir, Prof Louis Brennan welcomes Senator Elizabeth Warren’s Accountable Capitalism Act proposal that “requires companies with more than £1bn in annual revenues” that which would require the largest corporations to allow workers to choose 40 percent of their board seats … “a welcome counterforce to the inherent logic in shareholder value that necessarily results in short-term decision-making”, “Humans will do things for which they are rewarded”, August 31.

In that respect I don’t understand why workers would be lesser humans and not so only do things for which they are rewarded. If you want to have a better chance for adding some long term views why not appoint some savvy teenagers to the board. They are the ones who have to live the longest with their decisions, and they are who probably are by means of social media those most held accountable to their peers.

If Senator Warren is really serious about fighting short termism, and is not only engaging in some redistribution profiteering, then she should be up in arms against the regulators’ risk weighted capital requirements for banks. These subsidize the access to bank credit of the safer present, and impose tariffs on the riskier future.

@PerKurowski

Elizabeth Warren, as a member of United States Senate Committee on Banking, might not perform entirely her own duties

Sir, Barney Jopson reports that Senator Elizabeth Warren is requesting the replacement of Mary Jo White as Chair of the Security and Exchange Commission “Warren wants SEC head fired for ‘undermining’ administration” October 15.

I have no opinion on how Mary Jo White has been performing her duties at the SEC but, the United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, of which Ms Warren is a standing member, is lacking carrying out in its own responsibilities.

I hold that since to this date I have not seen any effort on part of that committee to ascertain if, and if so how much, the risk weighted capital requirements distort the allocation of bank credit.

This is not a minor issue. For a starter it could ask bank regulators for a full explanation of the risk weights of 0% when financing the sovereign (the King), 20% the AAArisktocracy, 35% housing and 100% “We the People” like SMEs and entrepreneurs, those with the best chances of generating the future jobs our grandchildren need. That regulatory credit risk aversion, layered on top of whatever risk aversion the bankers’ themselves can harbor, sounds as anathema as can be to the whole notion of the Land of the Free and the Home of the Brave.

Besides, the discrimination in access to bank credit that those risk weights produce, violates directly the spirit of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (Regulation B). In that respect the committee should also ask the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, CFPB, what it is doing about this.

With regulations, to favor banks lending to the “safer” past and present, over lending to the “riskier” future, is a clear violation of that holy social inter-generational bond that Edmund Burke spoke about.

To top it up, those risk weighted capital requirements do not serve one iota for making the banking system safer. All major bank crises result either from unexpected events or from excessive exposures to something erroneously perceived as safe, never ever because of excessive exposures to something ex ante perceived as risky.

PS. Elizabeth Warren, in as much as she classifies herself as a progressive, could also be interested in how these regulations decree inequality.

@PerKurowski ©

US, when will senators, like Elizabeth Warren, grill bank regulators with the same gusto they grill ban​k​sters?

Sir, I refer to Barney Jopson and Alistair Grays report on how John Stumpf was grilled in the Congress Wells Fargo clear misbehavior “Wells chief savaged in Congress over fake accounts” September 21.

Democratic senator Elizabeth Warren told Mr Stumpf: “Your definition of accountable is to push the blame to your low-level employees who don’t have the money for a fancy PR firm to defend themselves. It’s gutless leadership. The only way that Wall Street will change is if executives face jail time when they preside over massive frauds.”

Is senator Warren wrong? Absolutely not, but the grilling, if it does not also include a serious grilling of the bank regulators, is just another pushing all the blame on banks, in order to score cheap populist victories attacking “banksters”.

Here follows just few of the questions the US Senate's Banking Commission should pose regulators.

With your risk weighted capital requirements you allow banks to leverage more their equity, and the support we the society give them, with what is perceived as safe than with what is perceived as risky.

Do you not understand that favoring in this way The Sovereign, The Safe, The Past, The Rich, The Houses and The AAArisktocracy, impedes the fair access to bank credit of We the People, The Risky, The Future, The Poor, The Jobs and The Unrated? Who gave you the right to distort the allocation of bank credit to the real economy this way? Don't you understand with that you have de facto decreed inequality?

In all your regulations where have you defined the purpose of our banks? Does not John A Shedd saying: “A ship in harbor is safe, but that is not what ships are for” also apply to banks? Or is it really that you felt you did not need to do that in order to regulate banks?

Finally, for this first round of questions: Where did you get that funny idea behind all this that what is ex ante perceived as risky, is riskier to the banking system than what is perceived as safe, and that is therefore much likely to cause dangerous excessive bank exposures? Have you never heard of Voltaire’s “May God defend me from my friends [AAA rated]: I can defend myself from my enemies [BB- rated]”?

Don’t you see how these regulations helped to cause the crisis? Don’t you see how making it harder than usual for SMEs and entrepreneurs to access bank credit dooms us to stagnation?

By the way, before you go, where do you think we would we be if the credit rating agencies had, so luckily, not fouled up so fast?

@PerKurowski ©

Senator Elizabeth Warren, what about the staggering bad bank regulations that came out of the Basel Committee?

Sir, Patrick Jenkins writes: “Today, Mr Stumpf will face an inquisition at the Senate banking committee. It promises to be a hostile experience — no-nonsense committee member Elizabeth Warren is not known for her love of the banking sector and has already talked of Wells’ “staggering fraud”. “Wells Fargo chief ’s high noon is Senate committee grilling” September 20.

I’ve got no problem with any “grilling” of bankers, give it to them! But, Senator Warren, in all fairness, do not turn it all into another simpleton Bank-Bashing fair, We the People need it to be much more. If anything, look at how the bank regulators set up all the incentives for bankers to do wrong.

Why on earth should we expect bankers to be saints and resist the temptations? Aren’t they supposed to maximize their risk adjusted returns on equity?

What am I talking about? THIS

http://subprimeregulations.blogspot.com/2016/09/if-ever-allowed-following-would-be-my.html

PS. And Senator Warren, why would you agree with those who decreed inequality?

http://subprimeregulations.blogspot.com/2016/03/decreed-inequality.htm

@PerKurowski ©

This would be my brief testimony about what caused the 2008 bank crisis… if ever allowed

Sir, John Authers writes: “This week, Senator Elizabeth Warren, said the next president should reopen investigations into senior bankers who avoided prosecution, and that the FBI should release its notes on its investigations. The failure to punish any senior bankers over the scandal angers the populist left and right, the world over.”, “We are still groping for truth about the financialcrisis” September 17.

The following, if I am ever allowed to give it, as so many would not like to hear it, would be my brief testimony on what caused the 2008 bank crisis

Sir, as I have learned to understand it, the 2008 crisis resulted from a combination of 3 factors.

The first were some very minimal capital requirements for some assets that had been approved starting in 1988 for sovereigns and the financing of residential housing; and made extensive in Basel II of 2004 to private sectors assets with good credit ratings.

These allowed banks then to earn much higher expected risk adjusted returns on equity on some assets than on other, which introduced a serious distortion. After Basel II the allowed bank equity leverages were almost limitless when lending to “sound” (or friendly) sovereigns; 36 times to 1 when financing residential housing; and over 60 to 1 with private sector assets rated AAA to AA. Just the signature, on some type of guarantee by an AAA rated, like AIG, also allowed an operation to become leveraged over 60 times to 1.

The second was Basel II’ extensive conditioning of the capital requirements for banks to the decisions of some very few (3) human fallible credit rating agencies. As I so many times warned about (in a letter published in FT January 2003 and even clearer in a written statement delivered at the World Bank), this introduced a very serious systemic risk.

The third factor is a malignant element present in the otherwise beneficial process of securitization. The profits of that process are a function of how much implied and perceived risk-reduction takes place. To securitize something safe to something safer does not yield great returns for the securitization process. Neither does to securitize something risky into something less risky.

What produces BIG profits is to securitize something really risky, and sell it off as something really safe. Like awarding really lousy subprime mortgages and packaging them in securities that could achieve an AAA rating. A 11%, 30 years, $300.000 mortgage, packaged into a security rated AAA and sold at a 6 percent yield, can be sold for $510.000, and provide those involved in the process an instantaneous profit of $210.000 

With those facts it should be easy to understand the explosiveness of mixing the temptations of limitless , 36, and more than 60 to 1 allowed bank equity leverages; with subjecting it too much to the criteria of few; with the profit margins when securitizing something risky into something “safe”. Here follows some indicative consequences:

As far as I have been able to gather, over a period of about 2 years, over a trillion dollars of the much larger production of subprime mortgages dressed up in AAA-AA ratings, ended up only in Europe. Add to that all the American investment banks’ holdings of this shady product.

To that we should also add Europe’s own problems with mortgages, like those in Spain derived in much by an excessive use of “teaser interest rates”, low the first years and then shooting up with vengeance.

And sovereigns like Greece, would never have been able to take on so much debt if banks (especially those in the Eurozone) would not have been able to leverage their equity so much with these loans.

Without those consequences there would have been no 2008 crisis, and that is an absolute fact.

The problem though with this explanation is that many, especially bank regulators, especially bank bashers, especially low equity loving bankers, do not like this explanation, so it is not even discussed.

The real question though is: Who is the guiltiest party, those who fell for the temptations, or those who allowed the creation of the temptations?

I mean how far can you go blaming the children from eating some of that deliciously looking chocolate cake you left on the table, at their reach?

Sir, John Authers, tell me if you believe I at least have a point, should that not merit a discussion?

@PerKurowski ©

The gig and the no jobs economy need a Universal Basic Income. It also helps to keep redistribution profiteers at bay.

Sir, you discuss Senator Elizabeth Warren’s framework to “rethink the basic bargain for workers” “The gig economy needs a new bargain for workers” May 24.

I think we need to think equally, simultaneously, of those not working, as there is little doubt there could be a severe lack of all type of jobs.

In 2012 in an Op-Ed I wrote that the society also had to prepare itself to handle a growing number of unemployed, not cyclical but structural, that is, those who never ever in their life will have a chance to get an economically productive job, “We need worthy and decent unemployments”.

I argued there: “The power of a nation, and the productivity of its economy, which so far has depended primarily on the quality of its employees may, will in the future, also depend on the quality of its unemployed, as a minimum in the sense of these not interrupting those working.”

And one of the first things that should be put in place for that is a Universal Basic Income floor, one that is completely independent of the having or not having a job. That, which should be the result of a social contract among citizens, and not the result of governments bringing gifts, will help to redistribute in the most cost effective and least socially diminishing way.

And if that income floor exists, then, contrary to what Senator Warren holds, in order to get more jobs and better salaries, I would call on all capitalists to exploit any low salaries, for as much as they can. 

PS. Should not companies also be part of the gig economy, so as not to waste resources trying to hang on? 

@PerKurowski ©

There are social leftwing reformers and statist leftwing reformers. In banking currently only the latter exist.

Sir, John Dizard, referring to Senator Bernie Sanders and Senator Elizabeth Warren writes “The US financial industry should listen to leftwing reformers” December 7.

Frankly, if by leftwing he refers to someone defending the small and poor, then I do not know of any real leftwing reformer. John Kenneth Galbraith in his “Money: Whence it came where it went” 1975 wrote: “The function of credit in a simple society is, in fact, remarkably egalitarian. It allows the man with energy and no money to participate in the economy more or less on a par with the man who has capital of his own. And the more casual the conditions under which credit is granted and hence the more impecunious those accommodated, the more egalitarian credit is… Bad banks, unlike good, loaned to the poor risk, which is another name for the poor man.”

And current credit risk weighted capital requirements, to which I have heard none from the supposedly left raise objections, hinders precisely “the man with energy and no money to participate in the economy more or less on a par with the man who has capital of his own.”

And, it is only going to get worse. That “Fed’s total loss-absorbing capacity… will require an estimated additional $120bn in equity and debt” Dizard refers to, that one is also based on credit risk weighted assets.

But of course, if it is leftwing reformer as in being statists, then they must be plentiful of them, as very few have raised objections to that in 1988, with the Basel Accord, the risk weight of sovereign (government) was set at zero percent, while the risk weight for the private sector was defined as 100 percent.

No Sir, whether leftwing or rightwing, I would not like to have anyone who fails to state in very clear terms what he believes to be the purpose of the banks, and I agree with that purpose, to have anything to do with regulating banks.

@PerKurowski ©

Why are regulators only concerned with banks not dying and not with banks living well?

Sir, Barney Jopson writes about Barney Frank discussing the impact of the Dodd-Frank Act and the future of regulation. “Architect of banking reforms says walls will not make the system safer”.

Frank, with respect of having joined the board of Signature Bank, and the resulting references to “the ‘revolving door’ between public office and the private sector” says:

“I reject this snarky premise that . . . I have somehow betrayed my principles by facilitating the operation of a bank that does what banks are supposed to do, which is financial intermediation”

Why is it only now Frank Dodd mentions: “what banks are supposed to do, which is financial intermediation”… in the Dodd-Frank Act there is not a word about that.

The stated purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act is: “To promote the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail’, to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes”

Had that Act started out by making clear that the number one priority of a bank is to allocate bank credit efficiently to the real economy, and that this is best achieved by minimizing regulatory distortions, we would most certainly have a much better Dodd-Frank Act.

By the way, “Elizabeth Warren and her band of progressive Democrats” have shown no interest in that either. The fact that banks need to hold much more capital when lending to American unrated SMEs and entrepreneurs, than for instance when lending to some AAA rated sovereigns, has been of no concern to them… or to most other involved with regulations.

What would the Founding Fathers say about these regulations with risk weights: 0% Federal Government and 100% We the People

@PerKurowski

In finance the structurally discriminated are those perceived as “risky”, the SMEs and entrepreneurs

Sir, Gillian Tett refers to an almost all female conference on economic and finance to ask: “whether it is time to organize an all-black or all-Hispanic financial policy-making event of this sort?” “The power of role models” May 9.

And referencing Simon Kuper’s article “How to tackle structural racism” she reflects: “And, if that occurred, would it help to combat that structural discrimination”.

That is off target. In matters of banking, financial reforms and the future of global finance and economics, the truly structurally discriminated, the “all-black or all-Hispanics”, are those perceived as “risky”, like SMEs and entrepreneurs, while the structurally favored, the “all white males”, are “the safe”, like sovereigns and AAArisktocrats.

So we need more a conference with large representation of those perceives as risky. It would be so interesting if Senator Elizabeth Warren who has exposed “constant criticism of Wall Street and of America’s wealthy elite” were also present there. Can you imagine a small entrepreneur asking Senator Warren the following?

“From a credit point of view I am perceived as risky. I therefore face many difficulties to borrow that umbrella from bankers they only want to lend out when the sun shines. I accept that as a natural fact of life. But why must the regulators make it even harder for me to access bank credit, by allowing banks to have much less equity when lending to “the infallible” than when lending to me?

That results in that banks can leverage their equity, and the implicit or explicit support taxpayers give them, much more with the risk-adjusted net margin dollars paid by “the infallible” than when those same dollars are paid by me.

We the “risky” entrepreneurs and SMEs, we hear we are good for the economy, that we generate growth and jobs and, as far as I know, lending to us has never detonated a major bank crisis… so Senator Warren, can you explain to me why is there such an odious regulatory discrimination against us?

There exists an Equal Credit Opportunity Act (Regulation B) and so I must also ask: Senator Warren why does its benefits not extend to us?

@PerKurowski

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To begin ending the too-big-to-fail banks, start by taking away the bowl of growth hormones.

Sir, I refer to your “Misbehaving banks must have their day in court” April 21

In November 1999 in an Op-Ed I wrote: “Currently market forces favors the larger the entity is, be it banks, law firms, auditing firms, brokers, etc. Perhaps one of the things that the authorities could do, in order to diversify risks, is to create a tax on size.”

And in May 2003, in a workshop for regulators at the World Bank, while Basel II was being discussed, I opined: “A regulation that regulates less, but is more active and trigger-happy, and treats a bank failure as something normal, as it should be, could be a much more effective regulation. The avoidance of a crisis, by any means, might strangely lead us to the one and only bank, therefore setting us up for the mother of all moral hazards—just to proceed later to the mother of all bank crises. Knowing that “the larger they are, the harder they fall,” if I were regulator, I would be thinking about a progressive tax on size.

And so I guess I have been on the forefront of fighting the TBTF banks.

But, during that fight I have become convinced that the most important tool would be to take away from the banks that bowl of growth hormones that minimum equity requirement against assets perceived as safe signify.

And, talking about “a day in court”, I would also haul regulators in front of a judge in order to ask them: “Who gave you the right to discriminate against those perceived as risky, those who, precisely because of that perception, are already naturally discriminated against by banks?

@PerKurowski

Are not living wills for banks’ just a nonsensical show to show off that something is being done?

Sir, Gina Chon and Tom Braithwaite report that Fed and FDIC demand better unwinding plans and are split over possible penalties “US rejects bank’s living wills” August 6.

And FT defines on its site those living wills as “Detailed plans that would enable banks to stipulate in advance how they would raise funds in a crisis and how their operations could be dismantled after a collapse”.

Frankly is not the whole concept of living wills for banks’ designed by the bankers themselves after a collapse just a show to show that the regulators are doing something?

I mean if I was a regulator, and wanted to go down that route, I would at least have a third party to look into what could be done in the case a bank passed away, and now and again confront the managers of the bank with those plans, in order to hear their opinions.

For instance there is a world of difference between a living will where the dead are going to be the own executors of the will, and one in which the dead will be dead and others will take care of the embalming.

And talking about that is it not the Fed or the FDIC that should state what contingent plan they really want… one where the bank is placed on artificial survival mode, and for how long, or one where it is sold in one piece, by pieces or even cremated?

To me it would seem that the Fed and FDIC need to give much clearer instructions about what they want those bankers currently working under the premise the bank will live on forever to do… as I can very much understand them being utterly confused.