Basel Committee’s bank regulations have empowered populist demagogues everywhere.

The world needs to understand how Basel Committee’s bank regulations have empowered populist demagogues of all shape, color or form, everywhere.

Sir, I refer to Martin Wolf’s “The hard task of exiting the populist trap” Financial Times, October 22, 2025.

Mr. Wolf writes: “We live in an age of populist dem­agogues. This is not a new phe­nomenon. Plato used the word “dem­agogue” in his cri­tique of democracy in The Repub­lic. He was cor­rect that demagogy is the Achilles heel of demo­cracy… How damaging is illus­trated by the fate of Argen­tina, a coun­try that has been plagued by populism since the rule of Hipólito Irigoyen in 1916.”

Sir, if the Basel Committee’s “We know enough about risks and so to make your banks safe, we give you our risk weighted bank capital/equity requirements”, is not a pure example of populist demagoguery, what is?

And with it, 1988, they de facto decreed that the populists/bureaucrats governing know better what to do with public debt, for which repayment they’re not personally responsible for, than the farmers, small businesses and entrepreneurs do with their bank loans.

Wouldn't Argentina’s Juan Domingo Peron have loved it? Of course, he would.

Sir, I ask, is that not a trap into which most of the world has fallen into? Anyone truly wanting to help Milei should look at it as a mutual problem and not one of which Argentina is supposed to climb out from on their own.

FT could be helpful if it begins to explain, without fear and without favour, how much Basel regulations distort the allocation of bank credit and with it, de facto, central banks’ monetary policies. 

Is it not a good time for that? Look at what is happening to all other economies, UK included. 

@PerKurowski

We most need to seek local solu­tions to local issues

Sir, I refer to Dani Rodrik’s “We should seek local solu­tions to global issues” FT October 16, 2025. He favors “Instead of top-down reg­u­la­tion and con­ven­tional sub­sidies, rely on open-ended col­lab­or­a­tion between pub­lic agen­cies and private act­ors.”

I fully agree with what's first mentioned, but I’m not so convinced about the what-to-do part; the documented track record of such collaborations is, except for some interested private actors, not that marvelous. Much more needed is to allow local non-governmental market solu­tions to local issues.

I had studied high school and university in Sweden so, after getting my MBA at IESA in 1974, I decided to travel around Venezuela for a full year, harvesting rice, sorghum and sunflowers. That in order to get to know my country better and, truth be told, to try to salvage an investment going sour.

That year left many indelible impressions and, among these, of the importance of banks in small cities and communities e.g., Calabozo. The presence of a local bank or of a branch loan officer from one of the larger banks, allowed local bankers to identify and respond directly to the needs of local farmers, small businesses and entrepreneurs.

Over the years little by little that all started to disappear before my eyes when many local banks, much to please the status seeking of its shareholders and directors, began to consolidate with the Big, or established their main office in the capital.

1988, with the Basel Committee’s risk weighted bank capital requirements, if colloquialisms are allowed, shit hit the fan.

By decreeing risk weighted bank capital requirements (insanely) based on that what’s perceived as risky is more dangerous to bank systems than what’s perceived or decreed) as safe, banks had to hold much more capital/equity against e.g., loans to small town businesses.

Out went the loan officers (like your George Banks who went to fly a kite) and in came the dangerously creative bank financial engineers... capable of expulsing the risks into the shadows. 

As I was not from the public sector, had in fact been quite critical of it, even before Hugo Chavez, strange circumstances and coincidences had me end up as an Executive Director at the World Bank, 2003/04. There I did what I could to voice my concerns, especially during the discussions of Basel II.

Not much luck in having these echoed… not there… not with Academia and not with the many NGOs purporting they defend the interests of developing countries. 

Why? I guess there is not too much interest and consultancy profit in banks of Calabozo and alikes

Fast forward to August 29, 2025. That day I asked both Grok and ChatGPT; “What is the impact on small cities of the risk weighted bank capital requirements?”

https://subprimeregulations.blogspot.com/2025/08/ai-grok-what-is-impact-on-small-cities.html

https://subprimeregulations.blogspot.com/2025/08/ai-chatgpt-what-is-impact-on-small.html

Sir, do you think the regulators will read and acknowledge AI’s answers?

PS. Here The document that I presented at the High-level Dialogue on Financing for Developing at the United Nations 2007.

@PerKurowski

What the world needs is to introduce true diversity in its financial architecture.

Sir, I refer to “The world needs a new fin­an­cial archi­tec­ture” by Michael Krake, the exec­ut­ive dir­ector for Ger­many at the World Bank.

What if, keeping the UN, World Bank and IMF, we instead reform these institutions? As is, these are managed and governed by bureaucracy autocracies. 

November 2004, at the end of my short two-year term as an executive director in the World Bank, FT published a letter in which I wrote: “Our bank supervisors in Basel are unwittingly controlling the capital flows in the world. How many Basel propositions will it take before they start realizing the damage they are doing by favoring so much bank lending to the public sector (sovereigns)? In some developing countries, access to credit for the private sector is all but gone, and the banks are up to the hilt in public credits.”

I had often expressed this at the World Bank Board but, those colleagues who understood what I referred to, and nodded in agreement, could do nothing. How could they, they were nominated by governments and most expected, and needed, to return to the government. What did not exist was real diversity. Not diversity based on gender or race, but diversity based on interests, life experiences and needs. 

Then I often suggested substituting some on the current executive directors with e.g., a plumber or a nurse; or at least to give a place at the board to that migrant community that, by means of its remittances, provided development countries with much more financial assistance than the multilateral financial entities could ever dream to do.

Now 2024, if I had the blessing to again be at that board of directors, I would drive my fellow directors to despair by, over and over again mentioning: “Give me ten seconds, I want to see what my friend ChatGPT opines on this.”

Would, “Without Fear and Without Favour” FT, be willing to publish a letter on what ChatGPT thinks?

http://voiceandnoise.blogspot.com/2006/05/world-bank-needs-to-go-truly-global.html

http://subprimeregulations.blogspot.com/2004/11/some-of-my-early-public-opinions-on.html

@PerKurowski 

If we want public debt to protect citizens today and tomorrow, it behooves us to make sure it cannot be too easily contracted.

Sir, I refer to John Plender’s “The virtues of public debt to protect citizens” FT February 7, 2022.

Sir, as a grandfather I do fear debt burdens we might impose on future generations, but I’m absolutely not an austerity moralist. I know public debt is of great use if used right but also that the capacity to borrow it a reasonable interest rates (or the seigniorage when printing money), is a very valuable strategic sovereign asset, especially when dangers like war or a pandemic appear, and which should therefore not be irresponsibly squandered away.

In 2004, when I just finished my two-year term as an Executive Director of the World Bank, you published a letter in which I wrote “Our bank supervisors in Basel are unwittingly controlling the capital flows in the world. How many Basel propositions will it take before they start realizing the damage, they are doing by favoring so much bank lending to the public sector?”

1988 Basel I’s risk weighted bank capital requirements decreed weights of 0% the government and 100% citizens. It translates into banks being allowed to hold much less capital - being able to leverage much more, with loans to the government than with other assets.

Of course, governments, when their debts are denominated in the currency they issue, are, at least in the short-term and medium term, and in real terms before inflation might kick in, less risky credits. But de facto that also implies bureaucrats/ politicians/apparatchiks know better how to use taxpayer’s credit for which repayment they are not personally responsible for than e.g., small businesses and entrepreneurs. And Sir, that I do not believe, and I hope neither you nor John Plender do that.

Such pro-government biased bank regulations, especially when going hand in hand with generous central bank QE liquidity injections, subsidizes the “risk-free” rate, hiding the real costs of public debt. In crude-truth terms, the difference between the interest rates sovereigns would have to pay on their debts in absence of all above mentioned favors, and the current ultra-low or even negative interests they pay is, de facto, a well camouflaged tax, retained before the holders of those debts could earn it.

But of course, they are beneficiaries of all this distortion, and therefore many are enthusiastically hanging on to MMT’s type Love Potion Number Nine promises.

@PerKurowski

A governance code that forces regulators to clearly define the purpose of banks is much needed.

Sir you write, “From January 1, a revised corporate governance code will apply to UK-listed companies, for instance. It now states that the board’s duty is to ‘establish the company’s purpose, values and strategy, and satisfy itself that these and its culture are aligned’”. “Taking the measure of good corporate culture” December 27.

Sir, if only such code had existed and been applied by bank regulators.

As is the risk weighted capital requirements for banks which so dangerously distorts the allocation of credit to the real economy, were developed without any consideration to what is the purpose of banks, that is unless you think that being a safe mattress into which to stash away cash, is all that banking is about.

If “What are banks for?” had been asked, the Basel Committee would not have allowed banks to leverage much more with “safe” residential mortgages than with “risky” loans to entrepreneurs, those who could perhaps help to create more of the jobs needed in order to be able to service the mortgage and pay utilities.

You also write: “The Banking Standards Board, set up in 2015 to help the UK sector regain trust, runs an annual assessment of members, monitoring areas from honesty to accountability with a staff survey, focus groups and interviews.”

Sir, with respect to accountability, has that Board ever asked regulators why they think that what bankers perceive risky is more dangerous to our bank systems than what they perceive as save?

@PerKurowski

I trust banks and markets much more when regulators keep their hands off.

Sir, I refer to John Authers’ “In nothing we trust” Spectrum, October 6.

Let me give you brief one page version of my story:

1998, in an Op-Ed (in Venezuela I wrote) “In many cases even trying to regulate banks runs the risk of giving the impression that by means of strict regulations, the risks have disappeared…History is full of examples of where the State, by meddling to avoid damages, caused infinite larger damages”

1999 in another Op-Ed “What scares me the most, is what could happen the day those genius bank regulators in Basel, playing Gods, manage to introduce a systemic error in the financial system, which will cause its collapse”

January 2003, in a letter published by FT I wrote: “Everyone knows that, sooner or later, the ratings issued by the credit agencies are just a new breed of systemic errors, about to be propagated at modern speeds”

April 2003, as an Executive Director of the World Bank, in a formal statement, I repeated that warning: "Nowadays, when information is just too voluminous and fast to handle, market or authorities have decided to delegate the evaluation of it into the hands of much fewer players such as the credit rating agencies. This will, almost by definition, introduce systemic risks in the market"

June 2004, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision issued Basel II. By means of their standardized risk weights, they allowed banks to leverage a mind-blowing 62.5 times their capital if only an asset carried an AAA to AA rating issued by a human fallible credit rating agencies.

October 2004, in one of my last formal written statements as an ED at the Board of the World Bank I held: “We believe that much of the world’s financial markets are currently being dangerously overstretched, through an exaggerated reliance on intrinsically weak financial models, based on very short series of statistical evidence and very doubtful volatility assumptions”

After reading an incomprehensible explanation provided in June 2005 by the Basel Committee I have, in hundreds of conferences tried to get the regulators to answer the very straightforward question of: “Why do you want banks to hold much more capital against what, by being perceived as risky, becomes less risky to our bank systems, than against what perceived as safe poses so many more dangers?” I have yet to receive answer.

So we have regulators who still, after a crisis caused exclusively by assets perceived as safe and that therefore banks could be held against less capital, allow especially large bank exposures, to what’s perceived as especially safe, against especially little capital. 

Sir, that dooms our bank system to especially severe crises. Why on earth should I or you trust them?

Sir, in hundreds, if not thousands of letters to you over the last decade, I have also tried to enlist FT in helping me ask that question (one that seemingly shall not be made) and to insist on receiving a comprehensible answer. I’ve had no luck with that either, so, respectfully, why should I trust your motto “Without fear and without favour”?

PS. Here is an aide memoire on the mistakes in the risk weighted capital requirements for banks.

PS. And this letter does not refer to the horrendous introduction of full fledged statism that happened when with Basel I in 1988 the regulators assigned a risk weight of 0% to the sovereign and one of 100% to the unrated citizen.

@PerKurowski

A world obsessed with Best Practices may calcify its structure and break with any small wind.

Sir, Nicholas Dorn in his letter “Drive for global banking conformity increases systemic risk” of September 18, refers to your leader article, “Waning co-operation will make the next financial crisis worse”, and MEP Molly Scott Cato’s letter “Global finance can work if rulemakers co-operate”, September 14. Dorn writes:

“Converging international financial regulation encourages similar business models and greater homogeneity of finance, raising systemic risk”.

“No one knows where the next crisis is going to come from. The more useful question is how the propagation of crises through the system can be minimised”

“The plain implication is the need for greater variation in finance, so that such risks as do arise cannot so easily ripple through the global ensemble. What is desperately needed, therefore, is not bland global conformity but more variation between important regulatory regimes.”

I could not agree more. In April 2003, as an Executive Director of the World Bank, I made the following formal statements at the Board, which relate directly to those fundamental points Dorn raises.

"A mixture of thousand solutions, many of them inadequate, may lead to a flexible world that can bend with the storms. A world obsessed with Best Practices may calcify its structure and break with any small wind.”

“Nowadays, when information is just too voluminous and fast to handle, market or authorities have decided to delegate the evaluation of it into the hands of much fewer players such as the credit rating agencies. This will, almost by definition, introduce systemic risks in the market and we are already able to discern some of the victims, although they are just the tip of an iceberg.”

What else can I say? Well perhaps that that statement also included:

“Basel dictates norms for the banking industry that might be of extreme importance for the world’s economic development. In Basel’s drive to impose more supervision and reduce vulnerabilities, there is a clear need for an external observer of stature to assure that there is an adequate equilibrium between risk-avoidance and the risk-taking needed to sustain growth”

Sadly Sir, as I have written to you umpteenth times, a different purpose for banks than just being a safe place where to stash away cash (and implicit to help fund the sovereign) is nowhere to be found in all the voluminous official writings about bank regulation.

Was I able to get my message thru? No! I guess the attraction of that with risk weighted capital requirements the regulators would be able to make our banks safer, was such that not even FT was (is) able to resist the songs of Basel Committee’s sirens. 

@PerKurowski

The US 2008 financial crisis was born April 28, 2004 – and different bank capital for different assets are worse than too little or too much bank capital.

Sir, I must refer to Janan Ganesh’s “Political distemper preceded the financial crisis” August 30, in order to make the following two comments:

1. “A financial crisis that was experienced as a fragmented chain of events is being commemorated as just one: the fall of Lehman Brothers, 10 years ago next month.”

That is only because the truth shall not be named. In the case of the United States, that crisis started on April 28, 2004 when the SEC decided that the supervised investment bank holding company ("SIBHC"), like Lehman Brothers, “would be required periodically to provide the Commission with consolidated computations of allowable capital and risk allowances (or other capital assessment) consistent with the Basel Standards." 

When the Basel standards approved in June 2004 included allowing banks to leverage a mind-boggling 62.5 times with any asset that have been assigned by human fallible credit rating agencies an AAA to AA rating, or had been guaranteed by an AAA rated corporation like AIG, the crisis began its construction. That in the European Union the authorities also included allowing banks to lend to sovereigns like Greece against no capital at all would only worsen the explosion.

Oops! The following part had nothing to do with Janan Ganesh, but all with Lex's "Bank capital: silly old buffer"

2. “Debates over bank capital resemble tennis rallies… On one side of the net you have the big global banks. They say they have plenty of capital and that forcing them to operate with more is a restraint on trade. Pow! On the other side are the regulators, who say more capital is better because you never know what losses you may have to absorb. Thwack!”

But there are some few, like me, who argue that much worse than there being much or little capital, is that there are different capital requirements for banks, based on the perceived risk of assets. Riskier, more capital – safer, less capital. In tennis terms it would be like judges allowing those highest ranked to be able to play with the best tennis rackets, and the last ranked to play with ping-pong rackets. And of course that distorted the allocation of bank credit.

Populism? What’s more populist than, “We will make your bank systems safer with our risk-weighted capital requirements for banks”? 

PS. Here is somewhat more extensive aide memoire on the mistakes in the risk weighted capital requirements for banks.

@PerKurowski

What if there had been a plumber and a nurse in the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision? Would the 2007-08 crisis have happened?

Sir, I refer to Andy Haldane’s “Diversity versus merit is a false trade-off for recruiters” July 23.

After just a couple of months as an Executive Director of the World Bank, I told my colleagues that since most of us seemed to have quite similar backgrounds (although I came from the private sector), if by lottery we dismissed two of us, and instead appointed a plumber and a nurse, we would have a better and much wiser Board. That of course as long as the plumber and the nurse had sufficient character to opine and ask, and not be silenced by any technocratic mumbo jumbo. 

For example what if when the Basel Committee for Basel II in 2004 set their standardized risk weights for the AAA rated at 20% and for the below BB- at 150%, a plumber or a nurse had been present to ask the following three questions:

1. Has that credit risk not already been very much considered by the banker when deciding on the size of their exposures and the risk premiums they need to charge?

2. My daddy always told me of that banker that lends you the umbrella when the sun shines and wants it back when it looks like it might rain. So, therefore, is it not that what's perceived as safe, is what could create those really large exposures that could turn out really dangerous, if at the end that "safe" ends up being risky?

3. And is credit risk all there is about banking? What if that below BB- rated has a plan on what to do with a credit that could mean a lot for the world, if it by chance turns out right? Are you with these risk weights also not sort of implying that the AAA rated is more worthy of credit?"

Those very simple questions could have changed the course of history as the banks would not have ended up with some especially large exposures to what was perceived (houses) decreed (sovereigns) or concocted (AAA rated securities) as safe, against especially little capital (equity), dooming the world to an especially serious crisis.

Sir, how do we get some nurses and plumbers, meaning real diversification, not just gender or race diversification, into the Bank of England and the Basel Committee? These mutual admiration club types of institutions, with their groupthink séances, urgently need it 

https://teawithft.blogspot.com/2004/11/basel-is-just-mutual-admiration-club.html

https://subprimeregulations.blogspot.com/2018/05/if-only-these-four-simple-questions-had.html

@PerKurowski

If you want accurate data on bank risks, you have to start by removing all the incentives for banks to misrepresent their data

Charles Taylor, a former chair of the supervision and implementation group of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision writes: “big banks should always be able to paint an up-to-date, comprehensive picture of the risks they face… [But] management often seem not to care” “Banks’ approach to risk data is deeply inadequate” July 16.

Sir, if a big bank reported an increase risk in a category of assets, what would the regulators most likely response be? To “either restrict banks’ activities or boost their capital requirements”… even Charles Taylor dixit.

While, especially the large banks are more in the business of obtaining their highest risk adjusted returns on equity, not by traditional lending but by minimizing capital requirements, that will simply not happen. And to believe it could, is just further proof of how naïve the current bank regulators are.

Taylor writes: “One of the lessons of the 2008 financial crisis was that watchdogs need timely information for the system as a whole.” Nonsense! The prime lesson from that crisis is that the watchdogs have no idea about what they’re up to. Imagine, just for a starter, their risk weighted capital requirements are based on such crazy theorem that holds that what is perceived as risky is more dangerous to the bank system than what is perceived as safe.

Sir, just as an example, we are talking of a “watchdog” that thought it was ok for banks to leverage 62.5 times if only a human fallible credit rating agency had assigned an assets and AAA to AA rating.

The “watchdog” seems to invest a lot of hope in “the Legal Entity Identifier [will] make it easier to track specific buyers and sellers” Ok, but what are they supposed to do with that? Make the risk weighted capital requirements for banks portfolio variant? Good luck with that! But please remember, bankers can screw up the portfolio of their bank, while regulators could do the same with all banks, simultaneously.

Taylor writes: “By 2017, only three of the 30 “global systemically important banks” were up to snuff” And so the question that has t be made is, could those three not be the most able to game it all? Like Volkswagen gamed carbon emission tests?

What to do? Although the road there is full of dangers, the final destination must be one single capital requirement (10%-15%) against all assets. No more distortions! 

Sir, again, I am amazed on how FT can, at this late stage of the game, still buy in so much into what the so utterly inept Basel Committee regulators try to sell. 

@PerKurowski

Ex post dangers are inversely correlated to ex ante perceptions of risk.

Sir, Stephen King writes: “One of the main “costs” of global economic success… is excessive risk taking. Put simply, the good times don’t tend to last because we start to do stupid things that bring them to an end. Until the equity market wobbles in early February, most investors appeared to be as complacent about potential risk as they had been ahead of the crisis.” “Global good times make the world act stupidly” March 9.

Is that really excessive risk taking, or is not more a belief that there is little risk?

It is surprising how much ex post dangers get to be confounded with ex ante perceptions of risk.

The most dramatic example of that are the bank regulators who, in Basel II, assigned a risk weight of 150% to the below BB- rated, that which everyone knows is risky, and only of 20% to the AAA rated, that which everyone can so dangerously believe is very safe?

That our banks have landed in the hands of such mentally feeble minds as those of the Basel Committee, is indeed a tragedy.

http://perkurowski.blogspot.com/2016/04/here-are-17-reasons-for-why-i-believe.html

Per Kurowski

Where are the occupational licensing requirements when they are really needed, like in bank regulations?

Sir, Simon Samuels writes: “A manufacturing company would not be expected to operate without knowing its cost of production. Not knowing how much capital is needed to lend money is the banking equivalent” “Confusion over bank capital requirements fails us all” February 23.

So there is a banking consultant at Veritum Partners, clearly stating (confessing) that the production cost of credit depends on the capital requirement. Of course, less capital equals lower credit production cost, higher capital higher production cost.

And so again I ask, for the umpteenth time, why on earth should regulators, with their risk weighted capital requirements favor those ex ante perceived as safe with lower cost produced credit, than those ex ante perceived as risky? Do they not understand that dangerously distorts the allocation of bank credit? Do they not know that guarantees, sooner or later dangerously overpopulating a safe haven… against especially little capital?

I have recently read that in forty-one US states license for makeup artists is required and in thirteen states you need a license to be a bartender. So tell me, when are the occupational licensing requirements when we really need them, like for that extremely delicate function of regulating banks? The lack of it has saddled us with regulators who believe that what’s perceived as risky is more dangerous to our bank system that what’s perceived, decreed or concocted as safe! Unbelievable eh?

@PerKurowski

Free our economies from risk weighted bank capital requirements; foremost from the 0% risk-weighting of sovereigns

Sir, you write about the “US Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank, facing the relatively pleasant task of withdrawing stimulus after years of good economic growth.” “The Fed ponders the fractious politics of debt” August 25.

Sir, may I ask you, do you really think the economic growth we have seen could be qualified as good considering the immense stimulus given through QEs and low interests? If the growth had really been consistent with the amount of stimulus given we wouldn’t have these qualms about reducing central banks’ “swollen balance sheets”, would we?

And then you favour Janet Yellen and Mario Draghi with, “ECB and the Fed are fortunate in being headed by two competent policymakers”. I do not agree with your assessment. Both of them, when it comes to regulating banks, which is something they do, are simply clueless.

First: Basel II, for the purpose of capital requirements for banks, assigned a risk weight of 20% to what is rated AAA and one of 150% to what is rated below BB-. That clearly assumes that the ex ante perceptions about risks are not cleared for in any way, and that these would therefore be indicative of the ex post risks. That is plain stupid and those unable to understand that are not qualified to regulate our banks.

Second: Sovereign debts have been zero risk weighted while unrated citizens have been assigned a risk weight of 100%. That is unauthorized regulatory back door statism that subsidizes governments’ access to credit, and which is paid for by taxing, for instance SMEs and entrepreneurs, with in relative terms much less and much more expensive access to bank credit.

Third: Those who cannot understand that the risk-weighted capital requirements hinders the efficient allocation of credit to the real economy; and therefore its distortions wastes much if not all of any stimulus, should not have anything to do with QEs.

Fourth: Those who to the “swollen balance sheet built up by quantitative easing”, refuse to add the sovereign debt and the reserves held in central banks that are a direct function of preferential risk weighting, do not understand the magnitude of the difficulties we are facing.

Sir, day by day our banks, thanks to regulators, are dangerously overpopulating more and more whatever perceived, decreed or concocted safe havens there are. Equally dangerous for our real economies, they keep on underexploring the risky bays that could contain the real factors that could help us to a better future, or at least not a much worse one.

Sir, your steadfast silence on these regulatory failures seems to evidence complicity.

@PerKurowski

More than from corporate governance failures Britain, and the Western World, suffer a hubristic regulatory failure.

Sir, Martin Wolf, on the issue of: “why [UK] productivity growth is so pervasively low” writes: “One reason could be the exceptionally weak investment, by international standards. This would be another corporate governance failure. Rectifying this disaster is the UK’s most important policy challenge, far more so than Brexit. The government should finance a high-level effort aimed at working out what has gone wrong, why and what (if anything) to do about it. The country’s very future is at stake.” “Britain’s dismal productivity is its biggest policy challenge” April 7.

What corporate governance failure? Most of the responsibility for weak productivity growth can be traced directly to the risk–weighted capital requirements for banks concocted by Andy Haldane and his regulatory buddies at the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision.

Anyone who has walked on main-street and seen first hand how difficult it has always been for “risky” SMEs and entrepreneurs, without bankable collateral, to access bank credit, should have understood that to burden these even more by the fact they would also generate higher capital requirements for the banks than what “the safe” borrowers do, would affect productivity and economic growth.

Getting rid of these regulations that have effectively hindered millions of SMEs and entrepreneurs to access bank loan opportunities they would otherwise have been able to access, must of curse be the number one priority, not only in Britain but in the whole western world.

There will be much written in the future about how on earth regulators could come up with such daft regulations and how little the so much informed and so much connected world, questioned these.

On April 3, in FT, Anjana Ahuja, in reference to Robert Hare’s 1993 “Without Conscience: The Disturbing World of the Psychopaths Among Us,” wrote: “Uncertainty is unsettling and certainty is alluring. Beware anyone who offers the latter with charisma, especially at this jittery juncture. Arm yourself against the charlatans…not only criminal psychopaths but the white-collar kind — who overstate their abilities, denigrate subordinates, have a tenuous grip on truth and seek greater power with shrinking oversight.”

That convinced me that we should subject those technocrats taking decisions on such vital aspects as bank regulations, to a full psychological assessment before we allow them to proceed. We do mandate such tests for airplane pilots, even if they are engaged in much less dangerous activities for the world.

Frankly we can’t afford the luxury of having regulators so dumb that they set the capital banks should have in order to meet unexpected events, like ex ante perceived as very safe borrowers turning out ex post being very risky, based on the expected credit risks bankers already clear for.

And its not like I have not said it before. Here for instance on Martin Wolf's Economist Forum in 2009

@PerKurowski

Draghi, the more confidence we have in risk weighted capital requirements for banks, the dumber and more fooled we are

Sir, Caroline Binham and Emma Dunkley quote Michael Lever, head of prudential regulation at AFME, which represents the biggest banks and other markets participants, with: “It is important to take the time to create a framework that is capable of accurately measuring the risks that banks are assuming” “Banks win Basel reforms reprieve” January 4.

Hold it there! The problem is not only in measuring risks. The problem is also in assigning the relative importance to the risks measured.

The current capital requirements for banks are based on ex ante perceived risks that should be cleared for by bankers, by means of interest rates and size of exposures. The result is that ex ante perceived risks are excessively considered. Therefore that causes a wrong allocation of bank credit; and this even if the perceived risks are perfectly accurately measured.

This regulation now causes that what is perceived as “safe”, like AAA rated or Sovereigns, get too much credit at too low rates, which is dangerous for the banks; and that what is perceived as “risky”, like SMEs and entrepreneurs, receive too little or too expensive credit, which is very dangerous for the real economy

Mario Draghi, president of the European Central Bank, who chairs the Basel committee supervisory board, is here quoted with: “Completing Basel III is an important step towards restoring confidence in banks’ risk-weighted capital ratios, and we remain committed to that goal.”

To that my only one answer, for the umpteenth time, is “No!” The more confidence in something that is so rotten to its core the worse.

PS. FT, why do you not do all of us a favor and dare ask bank regulators some very basic questions

@PerKurowski

What’s wrong with deregulating lousy regulations? Get rid of risk-weighted capital requirements for banks… but gently

Sir, Patrick Jenkins speculates on what Trump will do to bank regulations and regulators and how the latter would respond in America and in Europe. “Trump’s agenda on deregulation is as vital as his Nato policy” November 15.

I just know that with statist and distorting regulations, like the current risk weighted capital requirements, deregulation and getting rid of regulators, would be a good thing. But of course, that needs to be done with utter care, since you could otherwise easily make the cure worse than the disease.

The basic principle with respect to any changes in the capital requirements should be grandfathering, so that these only operate on the margin of the new, without shaking up the average of the old. Of course grandfathering should not be a tradable feature. If a European bank carries a low capital requirements mortgage on its book, and holds it that way until it runs out that is ok, but it should not be able to profit by selling low capital requirement’s mortgages to other more "needy" banks.

@PerKurowski

For regulators to impose risk weights is antithetical to the American principle of treating all citizens equally.

Sir, Judy Shelton writes: “The Fed has adopted monetary policy decisions that channel low-cost funding to wealthy investors and corporate borrowers at the expense of people with ordinary bank savings accounts and retirees on fixed-income pensions. That is not only inherently political — it is antithetical to the American principle of treating all citizens equally.” “Trump is right to take aim at the ‘political’ Fed”. September 29.

That might be political or not, but let us not forget that the current financial mess derives from something not really political but simply dumb; the senseless distortion of the allocation of credit to the real economy caused by regulators imposing risk weighted capital requirements for banks. That began in 1988 with Basel I and really took off in 2004 with Basel II, and Basel III is in many ways worsening it.

Just looking at the risk weights of: 0% for the sovereign, 20% for the AAArisktocracy, 35% for residential houses, 100% for We the (unrated) People and 150% for the below BB-rated outcasts; and considering that credit risk is already cleared for by banks with interest rates and the size of exposure, should say it all. And if that’s not antithetical to the American principle of treating all citizens equally what is.

But since Judy Shelton is a member of the Trump economic advisory council, and Donald Trump has often been involved with casinos, let me explain it all in terms of betting. The underlying principle of any casino is that all bets have the same expected financial outcome, a small loss, which represents the profit of the house. But what would happen if regulators manipulated the whole betting process and declared that the winnings of the house would depend on how risky each bet was, with risk being determined by the odds?

For instance if any safe bet, like on color, or on a pair or an impair number, gave the casino a much higher expected profit than a bet on a “risky” single number, that casino would make huge profits, until those betting there found out, and then it would go out of business.

And that is what regulators are doing when allowing banks to leverage their equity, and the support they receive from society, differently depending on the perceived credit risk. Worse yet, when it comes to the big banks, those who were deemed able to run their own capital risk models, the regulators authorized the casino owners to do their own manipulations.

And that means that The Risky, like SMEs and entrepreneurs, have their access to bank credit much more severely curtailed than usual. And stagnation results.

Worse yet, all that distortion for nothing, because bank crisis never result from excessive exposures to something ex ante perceived as risky, these always result from unexpected events or excessive exposures to something erroneously perceived as very safe.

And to add salt to injury, these failed and risk adverse bank regulations that affect banks in The Home of the Brave, emanate from a Basel Committee and a Financial Stability Board dominated mostly by European bureaucrats.

@PerKurowski ©

Martin Wolf, bank regulators ordered trust to crumble, so the west is already falling. Your silence is complicit

Sir, Martin Wolf lashes out at the possibilities of Donald Trump being elected president of US and on its consequences. I agree though I would not go to such extreme as arguing that “It would, for example, end efforts to manage the threat of climate change, possibly forever”. "If trust crumbles, the west is lost" September 28. 

But I also believe that the possibilities of the US, among democrats, republicans and We the People, to put a stop to most potential Trump lunacy is very big… almost a certainty.

But in my firm opinion the west is already crumbling thanks to those statist and risk adverse regulations that were introduced in 1988 with Basel I and that really exploded in 2004 with Basel II.

The credit risk weighted capital requirements with their risk weights of 0% for the sovereign, 20% for the AAArisktocracy, 35% for residential houses, 100% for We the (unrated) People and 150% for the below BB-rated outcasts, has completely distorted the allocation of bank credit to the real economy. The west was not built with such regulations but the west is certainly doomed to gloom with it.

Unfortunately, the world of top experts, renowned academicians and famed journalists, which includes Martin Wolf, have not been able to even bring up Basel’s distortion of bank credit into discussions. And the testers of bank stress keep on looking only at what is on the balance sheets and without caring a iota about what does not, like sufficient loans to SMEs and entrepreneurs.

If the west had to choose between Donald Trump and the Basel Committee, I know who I would vote for, again of course counting on a lot of support to reign in his worst excesses.

PS. Here are two questions that if a moderator of the US candidates for president debate I would ask:

Donald Trump, how much damage would the republicans and democrats allow Hillary Clinton to do if she is elected president?

Hillary Clinton, how much damage would the democrats and republicans allow Donald Trump to do if he is elected president?

@PerKurowski ©

Wolfgang Münchau, what has risk weighted capital requirements have to do with the primary functions of banks?

Sir, Wolfgang Münchau writes: “Monetary policies, like the ECB’s quantitative easing program, filter into the real economy through various channels.” “The European Central Bank has lost the plot on inflation” March 14.

That is correct but again, so stubbornly, Münchau refuses to mention the not so unimportant fact that credit risk weighted capital requirements for banks, especially when regulatory compliant bank capital is scarce, seriously distorts the allocation of bank credit to the real economy.

Münchau also refers to ECB’s “targeted longer-term refinancing operations” in somewhat skeptical terms, arguing that there is no evidence of ample demand for loans. But there again I would ask if the lack of demand for bank loans is not a reflection of SMEs and entreprenuers having seen their loan applications so much rejected? And again those rejections are much the result of that kind of “risky” lending generating the highest capital requirements for banks.

Helicopter droppings? Yes but why not eliminate the regulatory distortions that serve no purpose first?

I was recently made aware of a paper written by Hyman P Minsky in October 1994, titled “Financial Instability and the Decline (?) of Banking: Public policy considerations”

In it Minsky describes the two primary functions of banking as supplying the means of payments; and channeling resources into the capital development of the economy.

And so Münchau, unless you disagree with Minsky, let me ask, for the umpteenth time, what has the pillar of current bank regulations, the risk weighted capital requirements, to do with banks fulfilling efficiently those two primary functions?

“A ship in harbor is safe, but that is not what ships are for.” John Augustus Shedd, 1850-1926

@PerKurowski ©

Central banks, when are you going to lift that dangerous capital control the Basel Commitee concocted? Its urgent!

Sir, Donal O’Mahony speaks out loud and clear. We do have many reasons to question whether central bankers have a good idea about what they are doing, or only making it worse with their "we invent as we go along" creativity. “Experimental policies of central banks pose threat to confidence” March 10.

O’Mahony refers primarily to QEs and zero or even negative interest measures. I personally concern myself much more with their much more insidous and so very dangerous distortion of bank credit allocation to the real economy.

Their credit risk weighted capital requirements for banks, are in all essence a strict capital control. It tells banks “Lend to ‘the safe’, the sovereigns and members of the AAArisktocracy, and stay away from ‘the risky’, the SMEs and entrepreneurs”

That capital control must be lifted, urgently, if we are ever going to have a chance of a sturdy economy able to generate those jobs our kids need.

Sir, you know I have mentioned it before but again, between you and me, perhaps we should seriously consider firing all central bankers. They are just too dangerous for our health.

Already in 1995, in “The Confidence Game” Steven Solomon wrote of “how central bankers have shaped the course of economic and political events in the past fifteen years, why their influence relative to elected political leaders has reached a historical zenith, and how it reveals one of the greatest pressing dangers facing free democracy.”

@PerKurowski ©