If I were Puerto Rican I would be on my knees thanking President Trump. I wish he did the same for Venezuela.

Sir, with respect to President Trump informing the markets they should wave “goodbye” to Puerto Rico’s outstanding $74bn bonds, Gillian Tett writes: “it is hard to argue that the foreign investors deserve much sympathy: they bought Puerto Rico debt precisely because this offered sky-high yields to compensate for equally high risks.” "Puerto Rico’s recovery depends on debt forgiveness” October 6.

Precisely, the creditors should not be able to eat the cake and have it too.

I have often argued that in any restructuring process one would not want lenders who lent to the sovereign at low rates, or acquired sovereign debt when no repayment problems were envisaged, bona fide lenders, to receive the same treatment as those lenders who lending at high speculative rates, perhaps even helped to create the crisis that demands a debt resolution.

And, nothing discloses the frontiers between bona fide and speculative debts better than the expected risk premiums when debts are negotiated. Perhaps any sovereign debt that reflects a risk premium that exceeds for instance by 4 percent the lowest interest rate paid for similar debt to other sovereigns, the speculative threshold rate, STR, should be classified as speculative sovereign debt, SSD.

And in the case of a restructuring of a sovereign debt, any creditor who entered in possession of his credit in conditions that would deem it to be a SSD, should have all interest received in excess of the allowed STR, automatically deducted from the principal.”

Would that work? I have no idea but at least it could help restrain creditors from financing sovereigns that have not earned the right to be financed.

PS. I wish President Trump would send a similar “goodbye” message to Goldman Sachs for financing the Venezuelan regime.

@PerKurowski

Ordinary holders of bank shares had little idea that their investment was leveraged a speculative 50 to 1.

Sir, Daniel Davies, with respect to the lower returns on equity that result from higher capital requirements, holds that bank executives should tell investors: “You loved this business when it had equity-to-asset ratios of 2 per cent and a 16 per cent RoE. Why do you hate it now that it has 5 per cent equity to assets and a 9 per cent RoE?”, “Banks should not fixate on double-digit returns” January 13.

Let us be clear of that 2 percent equity to asset ratio signifies 50 to 1 equity leverage, and one of 5 percent, 20 to 1.

Does he really think shareholders loved the 16 percent RoE had they been truly aware that the bank management was leveraging his investment a mindboggling speculative 50 to 1… and taking home great bonuses because of that?

Does he really think shareholders would be satisfied with a 9 percent RoE if they really internalize the significance of banks now leveraging their investments 20 to 1, in times when any official assistance operations requires shareholders and creditors to first sustain important losses… in order for the management to keep taking home great bonuses?

Shareholders, like many other, were and are still misled by all those low leverages reported as a result of not using gross assets but using risk weighted assets instead.

Go back some years and you will, even in FT, find that the great majority of articles mention 10 to 1, or even lower leverages, quite often even ignoring to mention the risk weighing of assets, that which so much diminished the asset on which the leverages were calculated.

Would I be satisfied with a 9 percent RoE? Yes, perhaps for a bank leveraged 10 to 1… and with the bonuses to be paid to the managers decided by us, the shareholders. 

@PerKurowski ©

What would an old days’ bank failure look like with current deposit guarantees and capital requirements for banks?

Sir, John Kay writes about the topic of “other people´s money and one’s own”, and about the power that is “acquired with the savings of the… public” in order to speculate, “Boom, bust and broke trust mark the ages of finance” September 9.

Yes but he ignores those many who manage the relations between “other people´s money and one’s own”, like bank regulators.

Had not regulators allowed banks to leverage their equity and the support given implicitly by taxpayers 60 times or more when lending to sovereigns or the AAArisktocracy, the relations between other people’s money and bank’s own money would have been totally different. For instance when have one seen a hedge fund been able to leverage more than 10 to 1?

Try to imagine the size of an Overend Gurney bank failure in 1866, with current deposit guarantees, and current portfolio-invariant-credit-risk capital requirements for banks? Holy moly!

@PerKurowski

Why the British may be more careful falling in love with the euro.

Sir Wolfgang Münchau in “Why the British may decide to love the euro” November 17, makes some curious assumptions, first and foremost placing an equal sign between the dollar and the euro. The dollar is the currency of an already established country, with already established rules in how to handle the printing machines when in a crisis while Europe, whether we like it or not, is still a work in progress with little design on how to go about and print out Euros in order to fund European bail-outs.

Of course, a more accepted and wider used currency should in normal circumstances “offer more protection from speculative attack” than “a free floating offshore currency unit” (what a belittling way of referring to the historic pound sterling) but the fact is that current circumstances have very little to do with speculation and much to do with harsh realities.

Since Münchau in this context also brings up Iceland perhaps he could explain to us how much better off Iceland would have been had they used Euros instead of their Krona. As I see it Iceland would just have been able to run up quite a bit more leveraged debt, before all hell broke lose. Is that good?

At this junction one Pound Sterling gives a claim on a weakened but defined England while one Euro places a not completely defined claim on a not completely political Germany-and-Italy averaged Europe; and which of them might look stronger to the markets down the line, is yet to be seen.