With bank regulations biased against risk taking, the oxygen of development, emerging has been made so much more difficult for nations

Sir, I refer to Jonathan Wheatley’s report on emerging markets “Falling further behind” July 17. 

Banks used to apportion their credit between those perceived as risky, and those perceived as safe, based on their own portfolio considerations and risk adjusted interest rates. But that was before the Basel Committee’s risk weighted capital requirements.

Now banks apportion credit between those perceived as risky, and those perceived as safe, based on their own portfolio considerations, the risk adjusted interest rates, and the times bank equity can be leveraged with those risk adjusted interest rates, so as to be able to earn higher risk adjusted returns on equity.

That has leveraged whatever natural discrimination in access to bank credit there is in favor of the “safer present” against that of the riskier future. Since risk taking is the oxygen of any development, what might this have done to the emerging markets?

PS. Here is the document I presented in October 2007 at the High-level Dialogue on Financing for Developing at the United Nations, New York.

@PerKurowski

The developed world, with their statist bank regulators, has no right to preach market reforms to developing countries.

Sir, Jonathan Wheatley writes that in Mexico: “López Obrador — the old-school leftist has pushed ahead with proposals that… have caused alarm among investors, who worry that overspending will call into question the country’s investment-grade credit ratings.”“Delays to reform threaten prospects of emerging economies” March 26.

Sir, López Obrador is not the only leftist in town… in Basel, there are plenty of them.

Basel II assigns a standardized risk weight of 50% to a sovereign rated like Mexico BBB+. This means that the Basel II capital requirement for holding debt of Mexico is 4% (50%*8%). The Basel II standardized capital requirements for lending to any Mexican entrepreneur rated the same BBB+, is 8%. And so, according to the Basel Committee banks are allowed to leverage their capital 25 times their when lending to Mr López Obrador’s government, than when lending to a BBB+ or an unrated Mexican entrepreneur.

So please, do not come and preach us about internal market reforms in developing nations when external global regulators impose such statist and distorting regulations on them.

In 2007, at the High-level Dialogue on Financing for Developing at the United Nations, I presented a document titled “Are the Basel bank regulations good for development?”. My answer was a clearly argued “No!” But, of course, my chances to be heard by a U.N. Commission on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System chaired by Professor Joseph Stiglitz were none.

@PerKurowski

Why is it good for all to allocate their risk premiums adjusted investments according to the needs of their portfolio… except for banks?

Sir, Jonathan Wheatley writes:“Here’s a mystery: if emerging market debt as an asset class has had such a torrid time this year, why has it not suffered more outflows?” And to answer it he quotes Paul Greer, portfolio manager at Fidelity International: “People will look at what they are getting in the rest of the world, and they’ll say you know what? We’re getting paid for the risks.” “EM bonds resilient as investors are well rewarded for risks” November 2.

That which sounds so perfectly logical, is not what the banks can do, since the risk weighted capital requirements take no consideration whatsoever of the risk premiums banks can obtain. 

To top it up, these weights are formally portfolio invariant. Since you might think that because I am obsessively against that regulation I will give a biased version of it, let me extract verbatim the following from the horse's mouth, “An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB (internal ratings-based) Risk Weight Functions” 

“The model [is] portfolio invariant and so the capital required for any given loan does only depend on the risk of that loan and must not depend on the portfolio it is added to.”

And the reason given for that mindboggling simplification is: “This characteristic has been deemed vital in order to make the new IRB framework applicable to a wider range of countries and institutions. Taking into account the actual portfolio composition when determining capital for each loan - as is done in more advanced credit portfolio models - would have been a too complex task for most banks and supervisors alike.”

Besides the disastrous effect in our economy the distortion in the allocation of credit, credit risk-weighted capital requirements produce, is to guarantee especially large exposures, to what’s perceived as especially safe, against especially little capital, which dooms or bank system to especially severe crises, like that in 2008.

And this has been going on during 30 years and no one is allowed to ask regulators: Why do you believe that what’s perceived as risky is more dangerous to our bank system than what’s perceived as safe?

Clearly that is seemingly one of those questions that shall not be asked.

@PerKurowski

Venezuela faces a restructuring between odious creditors and odious debtors, so it behooves us ordinary Venezuelans citizens to intervene and block any odious deals.

Sir, Jonathan Wheatley and Robin Wigglesworth when reporting on the surreal sort of restructuring of Venezuela’s debt by the equally surreal Maduro government write: “Venezuela is already a serial defaulter. It has defaulted on miners, oil companies and other enterprises whose assets it has seized without compensation. It has defaulted on unpaid suppliers to PDVSA, the national oil company. Most seriously, it has defaulted on its people, denying them access to basic foods and medicines, causing an epidemic of weight loss and turning injury or illness into a mortal danger.” “Venezuela bond repayments: dead and alive” November 28.

Sir, the creditors, if they had carried out any minimum due diligence, would have been perfectly aware their financing would not be put to any good use, so for me, all their loans, given only because of juicy risk-premiums or other profit motives, are just odious credits.

And the borrowers, knowing very well they were contracting that debt for no good purposes at all, defines all these borrowings to be odious debts.

So here we are Venezuelans citizens, with children, parents and grandparents dying for lack of food and medicines. Are we now just supposed to sit down and allow this restructuring to happen on whatever odious terms the creditors and the debtors agree on in a petit committee?

No way! As a minimum, for a starter, our General National Assembly not yet in exile needs to authorize our Supreme Court of Justice in exile, to take charge so as to at least determine what could be deemed to be bona fide, dubious, or outright odious credits.

https://teawithft.blogspot.com/search?q=odious+credit

@PerKurowski

A former Executive Director of the World Bank, for Venezuela (2002-2004)

What would you as a bare minimum call creditors knowingly financing a government that in itself constitutes a brutal violation of human rights? Odious?

Sir, John Paul Rathbone, Robin Wigglesworth and Jonathan Wheatley, with respect to the surrealistic debt-restructuring initial steps in Venezuela quote Hans Humes of Greylock Capital, who is forming an investor committee with “Ultimately, there is going to be more money made in Venezuela than even in Argentina”. But the authors also rightly conclude in “The geopolitical and humanitarian consequences are likely to be larger still”, “Caracas plays its last cards” November 22.

Sir, “Food is in short supply” does not even begin to describe the tragedy.

Look at Venezuela as a prison. The food and medicines supplies it receives should be more than enough to keep all inmates healthy, but, since the guards have stolen so much of it, many prisoners, many children among them, are dying. And, in order to be able to steal more, the guards also took on huge debts in the name of the prison. And now the original creditors, or those who bought in at a later stage, and who all had all the possibilities of knowing very well what was going on, but that turned a blind eye to it when the interest rates offered by the guards were so irresistibly juicy, they want to be repaid. Will the guards do so? Will the prisoners allow that?

I have for decades called for Venezuela’s oil revenues, lately around 97% of all Venezuela’s exports, to be shared out to all its citizens, as the only way to guard against any odious or just plain dumb exercises of centralized statist power.

So what would happen if now the Venezuelans agree, in a referendum, on doing just that and then proceed to carry out the necessary changes in its constitution; and asks the IMF or the World Bank, with the assistance of other banks, to set up an oil revenue distribution system that keeps all oil exports invoiced in the name of Venezuela’s 30 and so million citizens? I am no lawyer but would a judge in New York approve the embargo of Simoncito’s part of oil, that if received would help to feed and keep Simoncito healthy?

Desperate times calls for desperate solutions, but perhaps some desperate solutions carry the potential of turning into magical solutions. For an oil cursed nation like Venezuela, that might just be what opens up its future to a much better tomorrow.

But the rest of the world could also benefit immensely. We quite frequently hear about the need for a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, SDRM. If such mechanism started by clearly establishing the fact that most odious debts have its origins in odious credits. There often is prohibition against usury, but even more important for all us citizens all around the world, and especially for those generations of citizens coming after us, to have some sort of mechanism that disincentive the award of odious credits to governments.

In reference to that I am begging Venezuela’s National Assembly to request that Venezuela’s Supreme Court of Justice in exile initiates a process destined to carefully revise the origin of all Venezuela’s credits to see if they can be deemed legitimate or not.

https://perkurowski.blogspot.com/2014/05/risk-premiums-and-ethic-ratings.html

@PerKurowski

Do not odious debts derive directly from odious credits or odious borrowings?

I refer to Jonathan Wheatley’s, Andres Schipani’s and Robin Wigglesworth’s FT: Big Read on the finances of Venezuela “A nation in bondage” November 11. I am taken aback by its distant coolness to what are life and death issues. “revenue-to-payments ratio”?

Sir, I have often asked, and not only in reference to Venezuela: does not what is being financed have anything to do with financing… is it only a matter of risk premiums being right? Let me go extreme to make my case. Should a bond issue that financed some extermination chambers be repaid? And should it then matter whether those chamber use Zyklon B, or the lack of food or medicines. Of course, whether those responsible for any deaths did it with intent, or only because of sheer ineptitude, matters a lot. But for informed financiers? How much “We didn’t know” can you really claim these days?

Sir, the world would be well served by having a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism but, for such a SDRM to also serve We the People well, and not only governments and their financiers, it would have to start to identify very clearly what should be considered odious debt derived from odious credits and odious borrowings.

And it should also define very clearly how much financiers could aspire to have their cake and eat it too. The article quotes Siobhan Morden, a Latin American strategist at Nomura saying “Investors who this year bought a PDVSA bond maturing in April 2017, for example, have made a 70 per cent profit, thanks to coupon payments and a price rise of 50 cents on the dollar as the bond approaches maturity” 

Two questions stand out: The first: should these bondholders be repaid the same as those who purchased the issue originally and held on to it? Perhaps yes, perhaps no. 

The second: Anyone out there thinks this 70% profit over a short period was just a result of a strict financial analysis, or did it contain some inside information that could affect its legal validity.

FT, yes I am Venezuelan, and so I might very well be too much on the crying side on this issue, but what would you in FT say if UK fell into the hands of a totally inept government and this one is kept in place by financiers out for a quick buck?

Sir should only a non-payment cause a default of sovereign bonds? Are there not implicit moral negative covenants that could be called on by the world, such as not letting your people starve only to serve the debt?

PS. Just to make my arguments clearer and therefore hopefully stronger in Venezuela I have been on this issue long before the Chavez/Maduro times.

@PerKurowski

Should it be required for a sovereign to be placed on a “The Bad” list, for its financiers to be morally concerned?

Sir, Jonathan Wheatley and Eric Platt write: “Just how much room for manoeuvre does cash-strapped Petróleos de Venezuela have? It is the question that has dogged investors, economists and the South American country’s own people as the government of Nicolás Maduro struggles to manage a crippling debt burden and cling to power” “Debt swap respite for Venezuela state oil group” October 25.

No! I can assure you Sir that most Venezuelan’s, are much more concerned with where they will get food or medicines for today, and about whether they should dare to walk out on the street, than with PDVSA’s debt.

And that should also concern PDVSA’s creditors, because it is truly a shame if they are totally uninterested in what human right violations they might be financing.

For instance, petrol (gas) is still being sold at about US$ 1 cent per liter, only so that government partners can make a killing smuggling it over the borders.

Really, it surprises me that these type of issues seem so irrelevant to FT. 

@PerKurowski ©

Is there no moral issue in Venezuela bondholders being paid as a result of people being denied food or medicines?

Sir, Jonathan Wheatley writes: “In a broad sense, Caracas is already a serial defaulter. It has defaulted on its people by denying them access to the dollars they need for essential imports…” “Only one of Venezuela’s creditors is being paid without fail, on the button, every time: its international bondholders” “Venezuela clutches at straws in desperation to avoid bond default” September 28.

Let me ask: What would be a correct description of he who collects from a debtor knowing that he is being paid by a government because it denies food and medicines to its people? Or is that a moral irrelevance?

And what if the international bondholder’s would all just turn up to be close affiliates to the current government? I mean “A PDVSA bond maturing in 2017, on which a $2.3bn payment is due on November 2, is trading at about 80 per cent of par — hardly a sign of panic” could be indicative of it. Would it then just be another case of corruption? Insider trading?

The world needs a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) but, for that to be of any service or at least not a disservice to We the People, it needs to start with clearly defining what should be considered as odious credits or odious borrowings. As a minimum all bonds should not be bearer bonds, as we citizens should always have the right to clearly be able to identify who are financing our governments, and in what conditions, so that if we are not able to hold our governments accountable, like in Venezuela, we are at least able to hold its (our) creditors accountable.

@PerKurowski ©

What flight to quality? To dangerously overpopulated safe havens?

Jonathan Wheatley quotes Stuart Oakley, global head of EM foreign exchange trading at Nomura: “The point of QE is to inflate the real economy. But instead of driving growth it is creating asset bubbles”, “Emerging bubble”, February 16.

How could it be otherwise? The growth of the real economy depends much on allowing the real economies’ “risky” risk-takers, like SMEs and entrepreneurs, to do their job. And that has been blocked by capital requirements for banks that force equity scarce banks to hold more equity when lending to the “risky” than when lending to the “safe”.

And the article speaks about “Flight to quality”. What quality? The usually safe havens, those usually used by widows and orphans, are now being dangerously overpopulated by banks following the instructions imparted by regulators.

Wheatley also refers to “while the yield on the benchmark US Treasury bond has fallen from 6 per cent in 2000 to less than 2 per cent today, the returns sought by many US public pension funds have barely changed at about 8 per cent.” And Sir, if you consider that “less than 2 per cent”, in light of a by the Fed declared inflation target of 2 per cent, then buying those bonds would amount to a sort of prepaid pre-accepted haircut, which could be something prohibited for pension funds to do.

Serious intentions or just a one night stand?

Sir Jonathan Wheatley and Alan Beattie in “Brazil taxes foreign portfolio flows in bid to stem exchange rate rise”, October 21, make a reference to the Chilean capital controls, and it is important to understand that these were of quite different nature than Brazil’s tax.

Chile’s capital controls, intelligently, wanted to make certain that the foreign investments flows wanting to go in into Chile, as pretenders, had serious long term intentions, and were not just looking for any one night affairs. It was therefore based primarily on freezing the use of funds for one year, so as to assure a proper courting.

Compared to that, Brazil’s 2 percent tax, just raises the price of having an affair in Brazil. And what is 2 percent in these days of hedge-funds fees if the signorina is beautiful?