I trust banks and markets much more when regulators keep their hands off.

Sir, I refer to John Authers’ “In nothing we trust” Spectrum, October 6.

Let me give you brief one page version of my story:

1998, in an Op-Ed (in Venezuela I wrote) “In many cases even trying to regulate banks runs the risk of giving the impression that by means of strict regulations, the risks have disappeared…History is full of examples of where the State, by meddling to avoid damages, caused infinite larger damages”

1999 in another Op-Ed “What scares me the most, is what could happen the day those genius bank regulators in Basel, playing Gods, manage to introduce a systemic error in the financial system, which will cause its collapse”

January 2003, in a letter published by FT I wrote: “Everyone knows that, sooner or later, the ratings issued by the credit agencies are just a new breed of systemic errors, about to be propagated at modern speeds”

April 2003, as an Executive Director of the World Bank, in a formal statement, I repeated that warning: "Nowadays, when information is just too voluminous and fast to handle, market or authorities have decided to delegate the evaluation of it into the hands of much fewer players such as the credit rating agencies. This will, almost by definition, introduce systemic risks in the market"

June 2004, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision issued Basel II. By means of their standardized risk weights, they allowed banks to leverage a mind-blowing 62.5 times their capital if only an asset carried an AAA to AA rating issued by a human fallible credit rating agencies.

October 2004, in one of my last formal written statements as an ED at the Board of the World Bank I held: “We believe that much of the world’s financial markets are currently being dangerously overstretched, through an exaggerated reliance on intrinsically weak financial models, based on very short series of statistical evidence and very doubtful volatility assumptions”

After reading an incomprehensible explanation provided in June 2005 by the Basel Committee I have, in hundreds of conferences tried to get the regulators to answer the very straightforward question of: “Why do you want banks to hold much more capital against what, by being perceived as risky, becomes less risky to our bank systems, than against what perceived as safe poses so many more dangers?” I have yet to receive answer.

So we have regulators who still, after a crisis caused exclusively by assets perceived as safe and that therefore banks could be held against less capital, allow especially large bank exposures, to what’s perceived as especially safe, against especially little capital. 

Sir, that dooms our bank system to especially severe crises. Why on earth should I or you trust them?

Sir, in hundreds, if not thousands of letters to you over the last decade, I have also tried to enlist FT in helping me ask that question (one that seemingly shall not be made) and to insist on receiving a comprehensible answer. I’ve had no luck with that either, so, respectfully, why should I trust your motto “Without fear and without favour”?

PS. Here is an aide memoire on the mistakes in the risk weighted capital requirements for banks.

PS. And this letter does not refer to the horrendous introduction of full fledged statism that happened when with Basel I in 1988 the regulators assigned a risk weight of 0% to the sovereign and one of 100% to the unrated citizen.

@PerKurowski

Ms. Janet Yellen, like other recent bank regulators who have just faded away, will leave the Fed without answering THE QUESTION

Sir, you write: “The Federal Reserve can take some blame for failing to see risks building up in the years preceding the global financial crisis. But perhaps more than any other major policymaking institution in the world, the Fed has acquitted itself well in the decade since”, “The unfortunate exit of an exemplary Fed chair”, November 29.

As you might suspect, I profoundly disagree. The Federal Reserve has yet not understood (or has been willing to acknowledge it) the fact that the “risks building up in the years preceding the global financial crisis” were a direct consequence of the distortions introduced by bank regulations, primarily Basel II, 2004.

If you allow banks to leverage almost limitless when lending to sovereigns, (like European banks lending to Greece); when financing residential housing; and over 60 times to one just because a human fallible rating agency has issued an AAA rating, that crisis, just had to happen.

And since capital requirements for banks have remained higher for what is perceived as risky than for what is perceived, decreed or concocted as safe, that odious distortion wasted most of the stimulus quantitative easing and low interest could have provided.

Over the last decade, how many SMEs and entrepreneurs have not gained access to that life changing opportunity of a bank credit, only because of these odiously discriminating regulations? Who can believe that America would have been able to develop as it did, if these regulations had been in place since the time of the pilgrims?

And now Janet Yellen, like other regulators have done in the recent past, will leave the Fed without answering us why banks should hold the most of capital against what is perceived as risky, when it is when something perceived very safe turns out very risky, that one would really like banks to have the most of it.

http://perkurowski.blogspot.com/2016/04/here-are-17-reasons-for-why-i-believe.html

Sir, thanks for all the help you have given me over the last decade, forwarding that question without fear and without favour.

@PerKurowski

Current “pre-existing conditions” would mean nothing when complete genomic sequences enter the health insurance world

Sir, Gillian Tett writes “most consumers have not fully considered the consequences of genetic profiling: is it a good idea, say, to discover through a genetic profile a vulnerability to Alzheimer’s? What will that mean for life insurance policies and data privacy?”, “The importance of socks in the genomic revolution” March 17.

Indeed, imagine if a full genomic sequence is obtainable at a really low price, what stops then insurance companies from offering two plans, one for those who want to present their full DNA result, and one for those who prefer to keep these confidential? What would the differences in premiums be?

In 2000, in the now extinct Daily Journal of Caracas, I wrote an Op-Ed titled “Human genetics made inhuman”. In it I tackled some of the problems to which Ms. Tett refers.

I ended that article with: “suggesting that all insurance companies design a plan which obligates them to issue policies for all of those who undertake a genetic examination. This policy should cover the negative impact and consequence that could arise from anyone getting access to such information.”

Would that suffice? Clearly not, but just the existence of such an insurance, and seeing the premiums charged, could be a smart way for us to allow the market indicate us what kind of social troubles we are getting into. This because clearly what we currently refer to the problems in health insurance with “pre-existing conditions”, would all be baby talk when compared to the societal impacts of genomic sequencing.

I worried about this in 2000, as others must have been worrying earlier, and here Gillian Tett brings it up in 2017. What has happened in this respect during that interval? Has someone somewhere been thinking on how to tackle this formidable societal challenge? Probably not! If so, why? Or is this just another question of those that should not be asked?

PS. In 2015, in a letter to FT, I asked: “What would Gillian Tett say if one of her health record entrepreneurs, by means of an innocent mistake, entered a data that for instance hindered one of her children to enter a university that had decided that the expected longevity of students was good for its funding drives?