FT… how come?
Sir I refer to your Special Report World Economy 2008 published with occasion of the meetings of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in Washington this week.
In it Paul J Davies in "High noon chimes for collateral with no name" says "A system that simply trusts in collateral without regards to its particulars is one that fosters the creation of ever more hideously complex problem". Since the principal reason for the current turmoil is not that the system trusted too much the collateral but that it trusted too much others to do their job of analyzing it, I would have worded it instead as "A system where participants are led to believe so much in the opinions of some few credit rating agencies…"
Also Norma Cohen in “Race against the storm” mentions that “The infection in the credit markets, by all accounts, began with mortgages, specifically those to borrowers with poor and patchy credit” but this completely ignores the fact that most of the market did not lend to borrowers with “poor and patchy credits”, most of the market bought AAA rated securities.
UNCTAD for instance is perfectly clear about what has happened and in their policy brief titled "The Crisis of the Century", released on October 6 they state "There are a few quick regulatory fixes that can be taken at both the national and international levels. The first is to reassess the role of credit rating agencies. These agencies, which should solve information problems and increase transparency, seem to have played the opposite role and made the market even more opaque."
Now in your 12 page special report, surprisingly, the credit rating agencies are referenced only once, and that is when you have to report on the opinions of Christine Lagarde, France’s finance minister.
How come? What strange and dark silencing forces are in action at the Financial Times? They seem to be much present at the World Bank and IMF meetings too.
I have saved a copy of this Special Report by the Financial Times as evidence… though I do not know of what, yet.
In it Paul J Davies in "High noon chimes for collateral with no name" says "A system that simply trusts in collateral without regards to its particulars is one that fosters the creation of ever more hideously complex problem". Since the principal reason for the current turmoil is not that the system trusted too much the collateral but that it trusted too much others to do their job of analyzing it, I would have worded it instead as "A system where participants are led to believe so much in the opinions of some few credit rating agencies…"
Also Norma Cohen in “Race against the storm” mentions that “The infection in the credit markets, by all accounts, began with mortgages, specifically those to borrowers with poor and patchy credit” but this completely ignores the fact that most of the market did not lend to borrowers with “poor and patchy credits”, most of the market bought AAA rated securities.
UNCTAD for instance is perfectly clear about what has happened and in their policy brief titled "The Crisis of the Century", released on October 6 they state "There are a few quick regulatory fixes that can be taken at both the national and international levels. The first is to reassess the role of credit rating agencies. These agencies, which should solve information problems and increase transparency, seem to have played the opposite role and made the market even more opaque."
Now in your 12 page special report, surprisingly, the credit rating agencies are referenced only once, and that is when you have to report on the opinions of Christine Lagarde, France’s finance minister.
How come? What strange and dark silencing forces are in action at the Financial Times? They seem to be much present at the World Bank and IMF meetings too.
I have saved a copy of this Special Report by the Financial Times as evidence… though I do not know of what, yet.
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