Two regulations will turn the beautiful dream of the European Union into a nightmare.

Sir, Ignazio Angeloni writing that “The ECB houses hundreds of experienced, dedicated [bank] supervisor” blames “fundamental weakness in the underlying laws and the “resolution” framework for dealing with ailing banks” for many of EU’s bank troubles. “A common thread runs through diverse EU financial misfortunes” September 13.

The lack of a good resolution framework is a problem when trying to solve difficulties but much worse is that which causes the problems, in this case two regulations that are endangering Europe and the euro. Seemingly none of EC’s experts were capable of doing anything about it.

First, something that also affects most other economies, the Basel Committee’s risk weighted bank capital requirements. These seriously distort the allocation of credit, and, to top it up, are stupidly based on that what’s ex ante perceived as risky is more dangerous ex post to our bank systems than what’s perceived as safe. 

And second, in this case only a homemade EU concoction, the lunacy of all times of having assigned a 0% risk weight to all Eurozone sovereigns’ debts, even though all that debt is not denominated in  their local/printable/fiat currency.

@PerKurowski

With respect to Eurozone sovereign debts, European banks were officially allowed to ignore credit ratings.

Sir, Rachel Sanderson writes, “Data from the Bank of Italy on holdings of Italian government debt, usually the prime conduit of contagion, suggests any Italian crisis now will be more contained than in the 2011-12 European debt and banking crisis, argue analysts at Citi” “Rome political climate is uncomfortable even for seasoned Italy Inc.” August 22.

“But Citi [also] warns of sovereign downgrades. Italy is now closer to the subinvestment grade rating threshold compared with 2011, according to all three main rating agencies.”

But the European authorities, European Commission, ECB all, for purposes of Basel Committee’s risk weighted bank capital requirements, officially still consider Italy’s debt AAA to AA rated, as they still assign it a 0% risk weight.

So in fact all the about €400bn of Italian government debt Italian banks hold, and all what the European financial institutions hold of about €460bn of Italian sovereign debt, most of it, are held against none or extremely little bank capital. Had EU followed Basel regulations they would have at least 4% in capital against these holding, certainly way too little. Lending to any private sector Italian would with such ratings would require 8% in capital… the difference is explained by the pro-state bias of the Basel Committee. 

And that is a political reality that must also be extremely uncomfortable for the not sufficiently seasoned European Union Inc.

Sir, what will the rest of Europe say when they realize that it was not all Italy’s fault, as it was not all Greece’s fault?

@PerKurowski

If ECB’s original QEs stimuli had not been distorted by credit risk weighted bank capital requirements, there would be much less need for additional QEs.

Sir, Claire Jones writes: “EU treaties prevent the ECB from financing member governments by buying their debt, a tactic known as monetary financing. This rule aims to protect the central bank from political pressure and avoid stoking inflation. QE involves the central banks of eurozone states buying huge amounts of government bonds, financed by the ECB”… [Is QE legal?] “ECB argues that QE does not amount to monetary financing as it is only buying the bonds in secondary markets from other investors, rather than purchasing the debt directly from governments”, “Easing German constitutional court to rule on ECB bond buying” July 31.

Sir, as clearly the intent of ECB is to help financing member governments, and “stoking inflation” a publicized goal, I must say that sounds like a real weak defense.

But be that as it may, the question is also whether QE really helps the recovery in a sustainable way? ECB’s still so large outstanding ECB holdings of European sovereign debt suggest it does not. 

The main explanation for that is to be found in the many dangerous distortions in the allocation of bank credit that the risk weighted bank capital requirements produce.

Just an example, currently all Eurozone sovereigns, courtesy of EU authorities, have been assigned a Sovereign Debt Privilege of a 0% risk weight, and this even though not of them take on debt denominated in a currency that is their own printable one.

The sum of QEs, plus that regulatory favoring, basically premised upon the notion that European government bureaucrats know better what to do with money they are not personally responsible for than for instance European entrepreneurs is drowning Europe in way too much statism.

For the European Union to be saved financial power has to be taken away from its sovereigns (and Brussels) and devolved to its citizens.

http://teawithft.blogspot.com/2019/06/the-still-ticking-0-risk-weight.html

@PerKurowski

How does the European Commission propose Eurozone’s sovereigns get out of that corner into which many of them have been painted by 0% risk weights?

Sir, Mehreen Khan reports that the European Commission’s Spring forecast warned last week that: “The geographical make-up of the euro area’s fiscal stance does not reflect the adjustment needs in the high-debt member states” “The eurozone’s fight for stimulus” May 15.

If so, for how long will the European Commission back those 0% risk weights that for the purpose of bank capital requirements have been assigned to all eurozone sovereigns, even when these de facto are indebted in a currency that is not their own domestic printable one?

That risk weight translates into signaling lower interest rates for the eurozone sovereigns that what would have been the case without these distortions.

That has caused many of the eurozone sovereigns to be painted into a corner. How does the European Commission propose they get out of it? 

The euro's and thereby the EU's future depends on it

@PerKurowski

The 0% risk weight assigned by Eurozone authorities to Greece’s sovereign debt helped put that nation’s weaknesses on steroids.

Sir, Tony Barber quotes Roderick Beaton’s Greece: Biography of a Nation, with a Greek former government minister saying in 2017 that the homegrown causes included “poor governance, clientelism, weak institutions [and] lack of competitiveness”. For his part, Beaton observes: “Systemic problems . . . combined in a toxic way with structural weaknesses in the European project, particularly the systems devised to oversee the single currency without a single fiscal authority for the eurozone.” “Greece’s eternal conflict”, March 23.

I have not read the book but, if a former government minister can describe Greece as he does it should be absolutely clear that such sovereign does not merit a 0% risk weight, much less so when it is taking in debt denominated in a currency that de facto is not it domestic (printable) one. 

But yet the Eurozone authorities did so, which of course only could help to feed “poor governance, clientelism, weak institutions [and] lack of competitiveness”

The sad part is that those authorities have refused to recognize their mistake, and so Greece has been forced to take the full blame for its crisis. EU, what a Banana Union! 

@PerKurowski

Capital requirements for banks that favor the financing of the safer present like houses and sovereigns, over the riskier future like entrepreneurs doom the world to secular stagnation.

Sir, Martin Wolf writes: “the financial mechanisms used to manage secular stagnation exacerbate it. We need more policy instruments. The obvious one is fiscal policy. If private demand is structurally weak, the government needs to fill the gap. Fortunately, low interest rates make deficits more sustainable.” “Monetary policy has run its course” March 13.

No! Secular stagnation is guaranteed by capital requirements for banks that favor the financing of the safer present like houses and sovereigns, over the riskier future like entrepreneurs. The subsidies implicit in having assigned a 0% risk weight to public debt translate into artificial low market rates. Weigh the sovereigns equal to citizens, at 100% and you will immediately see those rates shoot up.

Of course kicking the can further down with more fiscal spending based on more public debt will give our economies a breather, but for what purpose? Had central bankers and regulators accepted in that loony 62.5 times allowed bank leverages for anything rated as AAA, and insane 0% risk weight assigned to Greece that caused the crises; and gotten rid of their risk weighting based on ex ante perceptions and not on ex post possibilities, our economies would be in a much better shape. But no, their huge liquidity injections seem to have mostly been put in place in order to cover up for their mistakes. And statist journalists backed them up by solely blaming banks, credit rating agencies and markets. 

Déjà vu😡 https://teawithft.blogspot.com/search/label/secular%20stagnation

@PerKurowski

Venezuela poses a unique opportunity, for all citizens of the world, to clearly define what should be considered as odious credits, and how these should be treated.

Sir, Colby Smith and Robin Wigglesworth quote a holder of Venezuelan debt with: “The ultimate objective is to reach a point where [Venezuela] regains market access at market-determined terms without the risk of renewed default”,“Venezuela debt fight pits veterans against hot-headed newcomers” March 13.

It is absolutely clear Venezuela needs much financing to reconstruct its entire run down basic infrastructure but, as a citizen, having seen how much public indebtedness goes hand in hand with corruption and waste, and how it so often makes it harder for the private sector to finance its needs, I would not mind Venezuela not reaching that “ultimate objective” for a long-long time, especially not as long as the government already receives directly all oil revenues.

Our Constitution clearly establishes that all “Mineral and hydrocarbon deposits of any nature that exist within the territory of the nation… are of public domain, and therefore inalienable and not transferable” and yet 99% of the debt it contracts is implicitly based on its creditors having access to the revenues produced by extracting Venezuela’s non-renewable natural resources, mainly oil. 

So now, the least our legitimate creditors could do, is to help us extract oil; and to that effect the following is a message I have been tweeting for about two years: “For Venezuelans to be able to eat quickly, starts by quickly handing over PDVSA’s junk to its and Venezuela’s creditors, so that they quickly put it to work, to see if they are able to quickly collect something, so to pay us citizens, not bandits, some oil royalties quickly”

But, that said, what is most important is to classify all Venezuela’s debts. Many of these were not duly approved; others had a large ingredient of corruption and lack of transparency and so all these must be scrutinized in order to establish their legitimacy.

For example, when Goldman Sachs in May 2017 handed over $800 million cash in exchange for $2.8billion Venezuelan bonds paying a 12.75% interest rate, to a notoriously corrupt and inept regime that was committing crimes against humanity. Especially since Lloyd Blankfein cannot argue an “I did not know”, that to me is as odious as odious credits come.

Sir, it behooves all citizens of the world to use this opportunity to set up an adequate defense against governments anywhere, mortgaging their future with odious credit/odious debts.

That also includes stopping statist regulators from distorting with a 0% risk weight the allocation of bank credit in favor of the sovereign, against the 100% risk weighted citizens. 

@PerKurowski

Should we prohibit divergent perceptions of credit risk? No and yes!

Sir, Martin Wolf writes: “In a recent paper, Marcello Minenna of Con-sob (Italy’s securities regulator) argues that divergent perceptions of credit risk across member states reinforce divergent competitiveness in goods and services. This puts businesses in peripheral countries at a persistent disadvantage, which becomes worse in times of stress.” “The ECB must reconsider its plan to tighten” March 6.

So should we prohibit divergent perceptions of credit risk? No and Yes!

Absolutely no! The existence of divergent perceptions of credit risk is crucial for an effective allocation of credit.

Absolutely yes! Bank capital requirements based on divergent perceptions of credit risk guarantees an inefficient allocation of credit.

The truth is that businesses in peripheral countries are less at disadvantage for their countries being perceived risky, than for the regulators, or other authorities, considering that there are others much safer. The risk weight for the Italian sovereign, courtesy of the EU authorities is 0%, while the risk weight of an Italian unrated entrepreneur is 100%. Need I say more?

Wolf opines, “The painful truth is that the eurozone is very close to the danger zone [as] the spectres of sovereign default and ‘redenomination risk’ — that is, a break-up of the eurozone — may re-emerge”. Indeed, and the prime explanation for that is precisely the 0% risk weights assigned to its sovereigns, those de facto indebted in a currency that is not denominated in a domestic (printable) currency.

We’ve just celebrated the 20thanniversary of the Euro. The challenges its adoption posed were well known. What has EU done to really help confront those challenges? Very little to nothing! In truth, with its Sovereign Debt Privileges, they have managed to make it all so much only worse. Sir, considering that, for someone who truly wanted and wants the EU to succeed, it is truly nauseating to see the daily self-promoting tweets from the European Commission.

@PerKurowski

More than between left and right, the division is between tax paying citizens and witting or unwitting possible redistribution profiteers

Sir, Wolfgang Münchau writes, “Liberal democracy is in decline for a reason. Liberal regimes have proved incapable, of solving problems that arose directly from liberal policies like tax cuts, fiscal consolidation and deregulation: persistent financial instability and its economic consequences” “The future belongs to the left, not the right” February 25.

The risk weighted capital requirements placed on top of any natural risk aversion distorts the allocation of bank credit in favor of what is perceived as safe and against what’s perceived as risky, has nothing to do with liberal policies. The risk weights of 0% the sovereign and 100% the citizens, just puts crony statism on steroids.

Münchau also “The euro, too, was a liberal fair-weather construction.” That could be but when EU authorities assigned a 0% risk weight to all public debt of eurozone sovereigns, denominated in a currency that is not their domestic (printable) one no one could call that a liberal construction. It was idiotically dooming the euro to failure.

Sir, I feel left or right labels do not really define what we citizen are up against. Our real adversaries are those I have come to call redistribution profiteers. In my home land Venezuela, where the central governments some years has received 97% of all export revenues, that is easy to see. But even in the rest of the world that is happening, unfortunately without being sufficiently understood. Much of it is the result of citizens lacking the most basic societal information, namely how much their central and local government receive in income, from all taxes, per citizen. 

Of course taxes are needed but such per citizen data, published regularly, would also put pressure on improving the day-to-day quality of government bureaucracy. I mean we want our taxes to be spent well. Don’t we?

PS. As a self declared radical of the middle, or extremist of the center, I feel the best hope we now have to improve our societies is by means of an unconditional universal basic income. That UBI should be 100% paid for, be large enough to help all reach up to jobs in the real economy and be small enough so as not allow anyone to stay in bed.

@PerKurowski

If Germany’s euro debt gets to be redenominated in Deutsche Marks, what would happen to its commercial surplus?

Sir, Kate Allen writes: “German bonds, or Bunds… are the eurozone’s safe asset… the spread against equivalent Italian bond yields to about 2.9 per cent.” “Tail Risk” February 19.

So if Bunds is the Eurozone’s safe asset, how come EU authorities assign it a risk weight that is just the same as all other Eurozone sovereigns’ debts, namely 0%? And this even when they all are indebted in a currency that is not really their own domestic (printable) one.

That 0% risk weight translates into that European banks do not have to hold any capital against debts of the Eurozone sovereigns… a clear subsidy... especially to those sovereigns most remote from earning that 0%.

So, had that not been the spreads of many eurozone sovereigns against Bunds would have been much larger, and in such case many of those sovereigns, like Greece, like Italy, like Spain, like Portugal would have had to borrow less, and would therefore have had to reduce their commercial deficits, reducing by that Germany’s commercial surplus.

Allen opines: “Investors need to put their money somewhere and [if there are not enough Bunds they are forced into substitutes which then rapidly become overloaded and suffer price bubbles.”

Indeed but when we consider that much of that investment money was supplied by ECB buying European sovereign debt, including Bunds, perhaps we should start by looking there before we might add fuel to a dangerous fire.

PS. Brexit,  the 0% risk weight and the EU

@PerKurowski

The world’s banking systems are dangerously fragile, courtesy of inept and statist regulators.

Sir, Martin Wolf writes: “Should we be concerned about the state of the world economy? Yes: it always makes sense to be concerned. That does not mean something is sure to go badly wrong in the near future… It is the political and policy instability, combined with the exhaustion of safe options for credit expansion, that would make handling even a limited and natural short-term slowdown potentially so tricky.” “Why the world economy feels so fragile” January 9.

Sir, as you know because of the thousands of letter I have obsessively written to you on this subject, which you have equally obsessively ignored, I am absolutely sure something has been going very badly for a long time, and will explode… perhaps the sooner the better.

In April 2003, as an Executive Director of the World Bank, in a board meeting I said, "A mixture of thousand solutions, many of them inadequate, may lead to a flexible world that can bend with the storms. A world obsessed with Best Practices may calcify its structure and break with any small wind."

Likewise, a world obsessed with allowing banks to leverage their capital immensely only because something is perceived or decreed as safe, is doomed to overload what’s “safe” way too much with debt, while, relative to that, financing what’s “risky” way too little. That will sure exhaust, sooner or later, any "safe options for credit expansion". That makes for a hell of a fragile bank system. 

Wolf writes, “The long-term credit cycle reached its denouement in the disastrous financial crisis of 2007-08.” 

That crisis was solely caused by excessive exposures to what was perceived as safe, mortgages to residences and AAA rated securities, against which investment banks in the US and all banks in Europe had to hold little capital. Did regulators wake up and change their risk weighted capital requirements, which are so idiotically based on the idea that what’s perceive as risky is more dangerous to our banking system than what’s perceived as safe? No! No real denouement there.

And then Greece exploded in 2009, and the fact that statist EU authorities had assigned all Eurozone sovereigns a risk weight of 0%, which allowed EU banks to lend to Greece against no capital requirement at all, which clearly doomed the not so well managed Greece to excessive indebtedness, does not even appear listed among the causes for its tragedy. No denouement there either. EU sovereigns are still risk-weighted 0%.

Sir, just look at houses. Easy financing made available by very low capital requirements turned what used to be homes into investment assets. All this while entrepreneurs, those who could create the jobs so that house owners can afford to service their mortgages and pay the utilities, were denied credit or charged higher interest rates, because of higher bank capital requirements. Just you wait till that easy financing stream stops and too many house owners wish to convert their houses into main-street-purchase capacity again. It's going to be hell.

@PerKurowski

European banks that leveraged more than 40 (25) times were (are) not banks; only scary betting propositions.

Sir, Stephen Morris, summarizing the state of European banks writes, “Poor profitability, outdated business models, negative rates and little cause for optimism have driven investors away”“Europe’s banks languish in a climate of gloom”, December 28.

As I see it, something leveraged way over 40 times, as many European banks were before the 2008 crisis, should hardly be called bank. When regulators went along with some bankers’ plea to reduce the capital the banks needed to hold, perhaps for bankers to be able to pay themselves larger bonuses, they simply destroyed the bank system that was. 

If I was a regulator, and wanted my banks to grow stronger than their competitors, the last thing I would do, is to allow them to hold little capital.

The regulators, with Basel II in 2004, showed they believe banks could leverage 62.5 times with assets that have obtained an AAA to AA rating. The market initially believed their risk-weighing capacity and valued banks accordingly. The markets, after 2008, no longer believe such nonsense; “There is better risk-reward elsewhere,” one fund manager is here quoted to have said.

The European Commission assigned a sovereign debt privilege of a 0% risk weighting, meaning no bank capital requirement, to all those sovereigns within the Eurozone that take on debt denominated in a currency that de facto is not their domestic (printable) one. The market had blamed Greece for its excessive public debt and is only now beginning to wake up to that statist horror.

Morris writes: “One activist is trying to force it to exit large swaths of the business, arguing it absorbs too much capital for too little return”. That does not mean capital is unavailable for banks.

Do you want bank investors to return? Then offer them to invest in well-capitalized banks with well-diversified portfolios. To invest in banks that values the highest first class loan officers, not some bright equity minimizing financial engineers.

PS. Seeing “Mary Poppins return” reminded me of why good old George Banks went to fly a kite.

@PerKurowski

If there’s a re-vote on Brexit, what will the Remainers suggest Britain remains in?

Sir, Jeff Colegrave makes a well reasoned case of why, if there is a new vote on Brexit, it is on the Remainers’ shoulders to make very clear what they are supporting to remain in. “Remainers risk hubris without a positive case for the union” December 17.

The three outstanding problems Colegrave wants to have a clear definition on are:

How the Eurozone can avoid that a generation of youth becomes again sacrificed, on the altar of the common currency.

How the EU can avoid manifestly failing to adequately address the issue of migration. 

And “the lack of democratic political architecture within the European project, [which] cannot lightly be dismissed as some kind of arcane irrelevance. 

I could not agree more. I would be a committed Remainer, only if EU shows clear intentions to stop being such a Banana Union. You do not build a real United European States with a bureaucracy such as that currently present in Brussels.

Let me be clearer yet. If a Remain wins, the last thing British citizen, or all of their other EU citizens colleagues need, is for that to be presented as a triumph or an endorsement of Brussels.

PS: With respect to the sacrifices on the altar of the common currency, I have sent you many letters, in which I have blamed EU authorities for the tragic over-indebtedness of many euro sovereigns, when assigning to the public debt contracted in a currency that de facto is not their domestic (printable) currency, for purposes of bank capital requirements, a 0% risk weight. But of course these letters are ignored, because Per Kurowski suffers just an obsession about current bank regulations. 

@PerKurowski

Only a very dependent statist central bank would assign its sovereign a 0% risk weight.

Sir, Lord Skidelsky writes, “The failure of central banks to prevent — or even foresee — the 2008 financial crash stems directly from their acceptance of Eugene Fama’s efficient market theory, which implied that commercial banks needed only light regulation.” “Central banks should not set economic policy” December 13.

NO!

The risk weighted capital requirements for banks, by which banks, according to Basel II, could leverage limitless with sovereigns, 62.5 times with AAA to AA rated, and only 12.5 times with risky entrepreneurs and SMEs is anything but light regulation. It is a very heavy handed intervention.

Lord Skidelsky rightly says: “Most of the money pumped into the economy by quantitative easing leaked out into the financial and real estate sectors rather than stimulating the real economy”. Yes, but that was primarily so because some inept besserwisser regulators were/are convinced that what bankers perceive as risky, is more dangerous to our bank system than what bankers perceive as safe; and those having assets are usually perceived to be safer, something which ain’t necessarily so. 

Sir, also, let me be clearer yet; a central bank that agrees with a 0% risk weight of the sovereign is far from independent; it is a very dependent statist central bank.

@PerKurowski

An ESM European bond insurance scheme would make Eurozone sovereign debt crises bigger and more likely

Sir, Michael Heise, chief economist at Allianz writes: “An idea that might be capable of preventing or at least mitigating bond market dislocations is a European bond insurance scheme [operated by the European Stability Mechanism]… It avoids the heavy political burden of debt mutualisation and austerity regimes, actively encourages private sector lending and reduces contagion between sovereign debtors.” “Insurance tackles danger of sovereign bond shockwaves” December 4.

Heise explains:“A critical issue would be the setting of the premiums… A simple formula could apply: the triple A refinancing costs of the ESM, plus a risk premium that reflects both the rating of the country and any progress it has made on its public finances.”

It all sounds very rational, and such an insurance scheme would obviously be very useful for some in the case of a sovereign debt emergency. The harder and more important question though would be whether the existence of such scheme makes a sovereign debt crisis more likely or not.

For the purpose of the risk weighted bank capital requirements EU authorities assigned a 0% risk weight to all those sovereigns within the Eurozone, even though these de facto do not have their public debt denominated in a local domestic (printable) currency, the euro.

That stopped the markets from sending the correct signals and helped caused for instance Greece to contract public debt way in excess of what it should have done. 

Heise correctly states: “Set the insurance premiums too low and it degenerates into a disguised eurobond, a bond whose liability is jointly shared by eurozone countries.”

Sir, there is no doubt in my mind that those insurance premiums would be set way too low by any Eurocrats, and so in fact an ESM European bond insurance scheme would act as another non-transparent sovereign debt pusher, and thereby make any crises likelier and bigger. And that’s not the way to go about solving the challenges posed by the Euro twenty years ago.

@PerKurowski

When EU authorities assigned Greece a 0% credit risk they doomed that nation, inexorable, to suffer a real life Greek tragedy.

Sir, Lord Aldington, defending a Remain writes: “Greek tragedies seldom have a happy ending; they are about inexorable fate. There is nothing inexorable about being wilfully blind to our situation. Integration works on the basis of partnership.” “Enter the tragic Chorus, tearing at their clothes and screaming” November 30.

Indeed, Hear, hear, but let us also not forget that the partnership Lord Aldington supports, caused a real life Greek tragedy. When the European Commission assigned Greece a 0% credit risk, it doomed it, inexorably, to tragically excessive debts, which to top it up, are denominated in euros, de facto not Greece’s domestic (printable) currency.

If they do not get rid of the statist, distortive and dangerous risk weighted capital requirements for banks; there will be many more similar Greek tragedies in EU, and around the world.

https://teawithft.blogspot.com/2018/09/in-case-of-greece-eu-violated.html

@PerKurowski

Worse than Italy “sleepwalking into instability” is the European Commission pushing the Eurozone into it fully awake.

Sir, Jim Brunsden and Miles Johnson writes the European Commission stepped up action on Italy’s rule-busting 2019 budget, warning that its plans to stimulate the economy through increased borrowing, risks “sleepwalking into instability”. “Brussels warns Italy’s budget threatens ‘instability’” November 22.

Of course, as Pierre Moscovici, EU economy commissioner, says: “this budget carries risks for Italy’s economy, for its companies, for its savers and its taxpayers”.

The sad fact though is that reaching an acceptable agreement on the budget issue would still be like papering over Italy’s and EU’s real underlying problems, not solving much.

The European Commission must/should know: 

1. About the challenges the Euro imposed on Eurozone members and that it has, for soon twenty years now, done nothing to resolve. 

2. That, for purposes of bank capital requirements, assigning a 0% risk to all sovereign borrowers within the Eurozone, those who de facto have their debt not denominated in a domestic (printable) currency, is a regulatory subsidy that impedes markets to signal the real costs of sovereign debt; which will necessarily cause many of its members to incur in dangerous excessive levels of public debt.

Before EC face up to these issues and does something real and sustainable about it, though much mightier, it has still not earned much right to lecture Italy.

Just like all regulators and central bankers, believing that what bankers perceive as risky is more dangerous to our bank systems than what bankers perceive as safe, have no right to lecture us on risk management.

EU can’t keep forcing its members to walk the plank, as it did with Greece, and still remain a viable union. Anyone against a Brexit and for a Remain should be very aware of that… that is unless his position has nothing to do with EU and all to do with local politicking.

@PerKurowski

Should not a “State of the European Union” analysis be an indispensable document, when searching for a solution to the Brexit vs. Remain quantum entanglement?

George Parker and Alex Barker discussing the “brutal reception in cabinet and in parliament the Brexit withdrawal agreement received mention one cabinet minister saying: “The people who are criticising the deal don’t have any alternative, that was true before the Chequers meeting, it was true before this week’s cabinet meeting and it’s still true now. People can suck their teeth and say it’s a betrayal and talk about vassalage, but they don’t seem to have given any thought to what the alternative might be.” “May heads for a hard sell” November 17.

In terms of Brexit mechanism that might be true, but there is of course also the alternative of holding another referendum, which might provide a Remain instead. 

What I sorely miss in the whole Brexit vs. Remain heated discussions is a “State of the European Union” analysis that would help to bring some perspective on it all, and that could also be useful to all Europeans, independent from what happens down the line.

I say that because I sincerely think the EU is not doing well, and that there are huge problems brewing there, which sometimes, like yesterday, have me thinking that though Brexit is an absolutely awful solution, a Remain could be even worse.

Sir, could you imagine the national embarrassment for Britain to change its mind and go for a Remain, and then finding EU gone? 

PS. Quantum entanglement is a physical phenomenon which occurs when pairs or groups of particles are generated, interact, or share spatial proximity in ways such that the quantum state of each particle cannot be described independently of the state of the other(s), even when the particles are separated by a large distance—instead, a quantum state must be described for the system as a whole.

@PerKurowski

Stress tests for banks, performed by mighty regulators, signify dangerous systemic risks, as well as useless predictors

Sir, Caroline Binham reports on how “Andrea Enria, the outgoing head of the European Banking Authority, who is set to become the Eurozone’s top banking regulator, has questioned the value of its stress tests of lenders’ balance sheets, arguing that elements of them are no longer ‘tenable’ and need a redesign” “European regulator questions value of stress tests” November 16.

I could not agree more for two reasons:

First: Stress tests introduce a systemic risk. The fact that banker know their banks will be the object of stress tests causes them to distract their attention from what they might think to be more dangerous, in order to concentrate more on what they think regulators might think more dangerous.

Second: The stress tests are useless since they avoid stress testing many real stresses. In 2003 the United States General Accounting Office (GAO), in its study of the IMF’s capacity to predict crisis concluded, among other things, that of 134 recessions occurring between 1991 and 2001, IMF was able to forecast correctly only 11 percent of them. Moreover, when using their Early Warning Systems Models (EWS), in 80 percent of the cases where a crisis over the next 24 months was predicted by IMF no crisis occurred. Furthermore, in about 9 percent of the cases where no crisis was predicted, there was a crisis.

Much of that has to be a consequence of that if IMF forecasts a crisis; it could quite possibly be blamed for detonating that crisis. Similarly, regulators will avoid to stress test the risks they might be blamed for having produced. For instance when will they stress test the banks on the possibility that their risk weight of 0% to sovereign would have to be increased, and the market reactions to that news. Never! They have painted themselves into a corner.

Sir, when it comes to banks, and their regulations, worry much more about what might be perceived as safe than about what is perceived as risky. In that respect, if I were to perform stress tests on banks, I would look to stress test the risks that seemingly would least need to be stress tested.

@PerKurowski

Brexit is sure a bad idea, but how can you be sure Remain is not even a worse one?

Sir, Alex Barker and Jim Brunsden quote Catherine Barnard, a professor of EU law at Cambridge university: “Never before has a treaty been constructed of this kind,” “The EU is a unique organization. What the Brexit process has revealed is just how deep the integration is in reality.” “Accord leaves Britain bound to Brussels” November 16.

On the first, indeed, to for instance adopt a Euro in order to push forward a union instead of letting a union produce a common currency, is a truly strange way to construct a union.

But, on the second “how deep the integration is in reality” I beg to differ. Having a member like Greece walk the plank, especially as EU authorities were most to blame for its problems, is not the doings of a real deep union.

Sir, let me refer to a speech delivered by Mario Draghi, President of the ECB, at the Frankfurt European Banking Congress, given today, “The outlook for the euro area economy”. 

It concluded with: “I want to emphasize how completing Economic and Monetary Union has become more urgent over time not less urgent – and not only for the economic reasoning that has always underpinned my remarks, but also to preserve our European construction.”

I agree, because as is, Italy will not walk the plank as Greece did, and that could bring on the end of the euro, as we now know it, which could bring an end to the European Union, as we know now it, or, clearer yet, as we perhaps really don’t know it.

Sir, whether Brexit or Remain supporters, does not Britain (and all other UE members) have the right to know what “completing Economic and Monetary Union” to “preserve EU our European construction”, which Draghi urges really entails?

Draghi also mentioned “as urgent as the first steps were in euro area crisis management seven years ago”, “The completion of the banking union in all its dimensions, including risk reduction, and the start of the capital markets union through implementing all ongoing initiatives by 2019”

Sir, does not Britain, a nation where banking means so much, have the right to know exactly what that entails so that it banks are not castrated in the process?It is not just me a foreigner asking. Let me remind you that seven years ago, Alex Barker in [Mr. Brexit Negotiator] “Barnier vs. the Brits” wrote about the fears of Sir Mervin King that Brussels reforms would reshape a vital British industry, banking, to the benefit of eurozone rivals.

Draghi also said: “Household net worth remains at solid levels on the back of rising house prices and is adding to continued consumption growth.” 

That is an untrue statement. A much truer one would be: “Household net worth remains very fragile since it rides almost exclusively on rising house prices, as a consequence of the distortion produced by too much and too favorable financing being offered for the purchase of houses. A distortion that helped to anticipate much of the consumption we have seen, but that will come back and hurt house owners, whether by house prices falling, or hurt everyone, by inflation eroding our real consumption power.

Sir, when that happens, and the crisis needs to be managed so as to impede the destruction of all social cohesion, would you prefer to do that on a national level, instead of on the level of a union in which very few know how to sing its anthem?

Sir, I’m no one to give a recommendation but, should not the Brexit vs. Remain discussions refer more fundamentally to the future of Britain and of EU, instead of being turned into another profitable venture for some opportunistic polarization profiteers?

Should not FT inform its readers, in a much more balanced way, of all challenges that lay ahead, not only those of a Brexit but also those of a Remain?

A long time friend and admirer of Britain 

@PerKurowski