For inflation, where the money supply goes, matters a lot too

Sir, I refer to Martin Wolf’s “The monetarist dog is having its day”, FT February 23.

Yes, the money supply impacts inflation, no doubts but, when it comes to how much, that also depends on where that money supply goes.

If central banks inject liquidity through a system where, because of risk weighted capital requirements, banks can leverage more, meaning easier obtain higher risk adjusted returns on equity with Treasuries and residential mortgages, than with loans to small businesses and entrepreneurs, does that not favor demand over supply?

It does, and you should not have to be a Milton Friedman to understand that sooner or later that can only help inflate any inflation.

Wolf holds that “Central banks must be humble and prudent” Yes, and that goes for bank regulators too.

“Humble” in accepting there are huge limits to their knowing what the real risks in an uncertain world are; and “prudent” as in knowing bank capital requirements are mainly needed as a buffer against the certainty of misperceived credit risks and unexpected events, and not like now, mostly based on the certainty of perceived credit risks.

@PerKurowski

Prudence is ok. But prudence on top of prudence is very dangerous too!

Sir, William Rhodes holds that “Without prudence as a value we are all at risk” August 8. Absolutely, that is only as long as we are prudent when being prudent. Let me give you the mother of examples about what I mean.

Bankers already looked at credit risks when deciding interest rates, amounts of exposure and other terms of their financial assets. And they did so in a quite risk adverse way; if we remember Mark Twain’s saying “A banker lends you the umbrella when the sun shines and wants it back when it looks like it is going to rain”.

But then came the regulators and, in the name of their prudence, set also the capital requirements for banks based on the same perceived credit risks… something which suddenly allowed banks to earn much higher risk-adjusted returns on equity when lending to “The Infallible” than when lending to “The Risky”… and which of course resulted in distorting the allocation of bank credit in the real economy.

And so if we begin loading prudence on top of prudence, especially on top of the same prudence, that is when we enter into that Roosevelt territory of having nothing to fear as much as fear itself.

These nanny regulators from Basel, who basically force bankers to eat broccoli when they eat spinach and reward them with ice cream when eating chocolate cake, have now turned our economies into obese monsters, with none of the muscles provided by credits to the risky medium and small businesses entrepreneurs and start ups.

How should then bank regulators be paid?

Sir, I fully agree with the wisdom of deferring the payment of bonuses to bankers in order to establish that the reasons for earning them were real and not purely a mirage “Paying bankers to be prudent” January 24.

That said the title seems to indicate you believe that the bankers, as a group, were imprudent. That fits poorly with the fact that what caused the current crisis was not excessive lending or investments in what was perceived as risky but excessive lending and investments in what was perceived as not risky.

If you really want to talk about imprudence then take a look at the financial regulators who indulging in the mother of all regulatory hubris assumed the role of risk-managers of the world, and if a triple-A rating was involved in the operation authorized the banks to leverage 62.5 to 1. The outrageous bank bonuses that we have seen are mostly the result of the outrageous profits resulting from these outrageously authorized bank leverages. I ask, how should then regulators be paid?

But it is also high time to stop rewarding perceived prudence.

Sir John Plender is very right in that “It is time to stop punishing prudence” by treating equity more fair when comparing to how debt is rewarded by the tax deductibility of interests, March 25.

But equally we also need refrain from rewarding perceived prudence, which happens when bank regulators, on top of all those benefits that already accrues to what is perceived as having lower risk, generously (and stupidly) layer on some minuscule capital requirements for banks any time they are involved with anything that can display a good credit rating.

As we have seen, and should have known, that undermines stability even more.