August 28, 2019

How can Eurozone’s sovereigns’ debts, not denominated in their own national/printable fiat currency, be considered 100% safe?

Sir, Laurence Fletcher in Tail Risk of August 28, writes: “Yields on German Bunds and other major government bonds have been moving steadily lower, as prices rise. That has burnished their credentials… as a safe haven in uncertain times”

Sir, how can Eurozone’s sovereigns’ debts, which are not denominated in their own national/printable fiat currency, be considered safe? 

The reasons the interest rates on that debt is low is the direct result of regulatory statism.

Risk weighted bank capital requirements that much favor the access to bank credit of the sovereign over that of the citizens.

That the European Commission assigned a Sovereign Debt Privilege of a 0% risk weight to all Eurozone sovereigns, even when these de facto do not take on debt in a national printable currency.

That ECB’s, with its QEs, have bought up huge amounts of Eurozone sovereign debts.


@PerKurowski

August 22, 2019

With respect to Eurozone sovereign debts, European banks were officially allowed to ignore credit ratings.

Sir, Rachel Sanderson writes, “Data from the Bank of Italy on holdings of Italian government debt, usually the prime conduit of contagion, suggests any Italian crisis now will be more contained than in the 2011-12 European debt and banking crisis, argue analysts at Citi” “Rome political climate is uncomfortable even for seasoned Italy Inc.” August 22.

“But Citi [also] warns of sovereign downgrades. Italy is now closer to the subinvestment grade rating threshold compared with 2011, according to all three main rating agencies.”

But the European authorities, European Commission, ECB all, for purposes of Basel Committee’s risk weighted bank capital requirements, officially still consider Italy’s debt AAA to AA rated, as they still assign it a 0% risk weight.

So in fact all the about €400bn of Italian government debt Italian banks hold, and all what the European financial institutions hold of about €460bn of Italian sovereign debt, most of it, are held against none or extremely little bank capital. Had EU followed Basel regulations they would have at least 4% in capital against these holding, certainly way too little. Lending to any private sector Italian would with such ratings would require 8% in capital… the difference is explained by the pro-state bias of the Basel Committee. 

And that is a political reality that must also be extremely uncomfortable for the not sufficiently seasoned European Union Inc.


@PerKurowski

August 19, 2019

Risk weighted bank capital requirements are anathema to neoliberalism

Sir, Rana Foroohar writes “we have spent decades of living in the old reality — the post-Bretton Woods, neoliberal one.” "Markets are adjusting to a turbulent world" August 19.

There are many definitions of neoliberal policies out there but they always include a large role for the hands of the free market and the reduction in government spending in order to increase the role of the private sector in the economy.

In 1988, for the banking sector, one of the most important economic agents, credit risk capital requirements were introduced by means of the Basel Accord. It gave incentives that distorted the allocation of bank credit to the real economy. For instance lower risk weights for the sovereign (0%) and for residential mortgages (35%) signifies subsidizing the sovereign and the safer present, by taxing the access to credit for the riskier future, like to entrepreneurs (100%). So I do not know what neoliberalism Ms. Foroohar refers to.

Ms. Foroohar, speculating on the possible “impact of an Elizabeth Warren or Bernie Sanders victory in the US primaries?” mentions a 13D Global Strategy and Research note that holds that such event would “fit perfectly into the cycle from wealth accumulation to wealth distribution”, something that Foroohar also believes “will be the biggest economic shift of our lifetimes.”

Sir, at the very moment income, through the purchase of assets, is transformed into accumulated wealth; there cannot be any significant redistribution of it, which means having to sell many of those same assets, without any significant destruction of wealth. If you’re scared of a deep recession, as we all should indeed be, then the last think you’d want to do is to deepen it with a wealth redistribution cycle.

So we cannot redistribute? Yes, we can, but that’s best done getting hold of the income before it is converted into assets, and then, preferably, sharing it out equally to all, by means of an unconditional universal basic income.

@PerKurowski

August 15, 2019

Regulators forced banks into what’s perceived safe, thereby forcing the usually most risk adverse into what’s perceived risky.

Sir, Robin Wigglesworth writes “Many investors such as pension funds and insurers [are] pushed towards the only other option: venturing into the riskier corners of the bond market, such as fragile countries, heavily indebted companies and exotic, financially engineered instruments. These are securities they would normally shun — or at least demand a much higher return to buy.” “Negative yields force investors to snap up riskier debt” August 16.

As an example he mentions “Victoria a UK-based company that issued a €330m five-year bond that drew more than €1bn of orders [because] the relatively high 5.25 per cent yield it offered, helped investors swallow misgivings over its leverage.”

Clearly liquidity injections, like central banks’ huge QEs, has helped to move interest rates much lower everywhere, but, as I see it, much, or perhaps most of what Wigglesworth refers to is the direct consequence of the risk weighted capital requirements for banks.

That regulations allowed banks to leverage much more their capital with what’s perceived (decreed or concocted) as safe, than with what’s perceived as risky, which meant that banks can more easily obtain higher risk adjusted returns on equity with the safe than with the risky… and those incentives were as effective as ordering the banks what to do. That made banks substitute their savvy loan officers, precisely those who would be evaluating and lending to a Victoria, with equity minimizing financial engineers.

As a result the interest rates charged to the safe… little by little forced those who did not posses savvy loan officers to take up the role of banks.

Will it stop there? Not necessarily. Banks, and their regulators, are now slowly waking up to the fact that the margins that the regulation benefited “safes” offer, are not enough for banks to survive as banks. 

But how to get out of that mess will not be easy. Solely as an example, when in 1988 bank regulators assigned America’s public debt a 0.00% risk weight, its debt was about $2.6 trillion, now it is around $22 trillion and still has a 0.00% risk weight. How do you believe markets would react if it increased to 0.01%? 

@PerKurowski

In 1988 one year before the Berlin Wall fell another wall was constructed, one which separated sovereign and private bank borrowings.

Sir, I refer to Ben Hall’s “State ownership back in vogue 30 years after fall of Berlin Wall” August 15.

The only real competitive advantage those in favor of SOEs can argue, is that governments usually have cheaper access to credit, so why put it in the hands of private investors who need to expect higher returns. 

But in 1988 by means of the Basel Accord 1988 the risk weighted bank capital requirements were adopted. With these banks were allowed to hold sovereign debt against much less, sometimes even zero capital, than what these had to hold against loans to the private sector. As a result the interest rate differences between private and public debt started to grow and with it, the SOE’s competitive advantage, and so we should not be too surprised about these being “back in vogue”. 

To illustrate my point just let me ask: Sir, where would the interest rates now be for the 0% risk weighted sovereign Italy, this even though it takes on debt not denominated in a domestic printable currency be, if Italian banks needed to hold as much capital against these as what they must hold against loans to Italian entrepreneurs?


@PerKurowski

August 12, 2019

Venezuela needs to extract its oil much more than what it needs Citgo.

Sir, Colby Smith and Gideon Long report that “Venezuela has long been fearful of missing a payment on Citgo’s debt — the country’s only bond not yet in default — since it could mean losing control of Citgo the jewel in the crown of PDVSA’s foreign assets” “Venezuela sanctions leave refiner’s future in doubt” August 13.

Let us be clear, in terms of helping Venezuelan’s being able to eat and buy medicines, which is what they most need right now, it is not Citgo that is worth the most, it is what it can extract in oil and sell in the markets, because that’s where the real money is. Moreover, if creditors would lay their hands on Citgo, they would most certainly love to continue refining Venezuelan oil.

Sir, what’s the worth of Citgo if Venezuela does not sell to it its oil in very favorable conditions? If I was a creditor that had my possibilities to collect based on Citgo, I would be very nervous about hearing a “Hear it is, take it!” 

And that might be why they so anxiously try to convince Juan Guaidó that he can´t afford to lose it. Personally I would, as I have many times said say “good riddance”. 

Why on earth are government bureaucrats running a normally very low margin’s refinery operation?

Sir, in 2000 I ended an interview in the Daily Journal in Caracas with: “I still can't understand the economic reasons for having bought and kept Citgo. There is evidence in the reports that it's being subsidized by PDVSA. And, for those who argue so much in favor of privatizing PDVSA, I challenge them to first make an IPO for Citgo, subject to their obligation to purchase oil products at market prices."

So, legitimate President Guaidó, don’t ever think of paying $913, in late October, to holders of a bond maturing in 2020 issued by PDVSA, which is backed by a majority stake in Citgo.

@PerKurowski

Any new IMF managing director should at least know, as a minimum minimorum, that two current important financial policies are more than dumb.

Sir, I refer to John Taylor’s “Choice of new IMF head must not be dictated by the old EU order” August 12.

I have no problems whatsoever with all what Taylor argues and neither with IMF changing its bylaws to allow someone over 65 years to take up the post of managing director.

But I do have two very firm ideas about what the next managing director should know.

First, that the risk weighted capital requirements for banks, based on that what’s perceived as risky, like loans to entrepreneurs and SMEs, is more dangerous to the bank system than what’s perceived as safe, like residential mortgages, is more than dumb. These only guarantee a weakening of the real economy and especially large bank crises, caused by especially large exposures to something perceived, decreed or concocted as especially safe, which turns into being especially risky, while held against especially little capital.

Second, that to assign a 0% risk weight, as that which has been assigned by EU authorities to all eurozone sovereigns, and this even though these take on debt that de facto is not denominated in their own domestic printable currency, something which could bring down the Euro and the EU with it, is also more than dumb. 

Sir, I wonder if anyone of the G20 Eminent Persons Group, international worthies and the names Taylor mention understand and know this. And if they do, why are they silent on it?

@PerKurowski

August 09, 2019

Before ECB does one iota more, we must get rid of the loony portfolio invariant credit risk weighted bank capital requirements.

Sir, Rick Rieder writes, “A thoughtful consideration of where and how capital is being applied could have a positive influence that lasts decades. The status quo cannot be satisfactory for anyone hoping to see the eurozone continue as a global economic force in the century ahead” “ECB’s conventional tools will not solve eurozone woes” August 9.

Absolutely but, before having ECB by buying equities entering further into crony statism terrain, what should be done, sine qua none, is to get rid of those risk weighted bank capital requirements that so dangerously, both for the bank system and for the economy, distorts the allocation of credit. 

Precisely because banks need to hold more capital when lending to the riskier future than when lending to the sovereign, and safer present “the return on debt is not matching the risk. So potential lenders have retreated, leaving more expensive equity financing as the sole source of funding. That increases the overall cost of project financing. As a result, growth-enhancing projects never get off the ground, exacerbating today’s negative economic velocity.”

Precisely for the same reason, we are not getting enough of “What is needed is to improved productivity, which comes from innovation and technology.”

Sir, if that immense source of distortion is not eliminated then whatever ECB does will only kick the can further down the road from which one day it will roll back with vengeance on all of us.


@PerKurowski

August 07, 2019

Central banks and regulators are wittingly or unwittingly imposing communism by stealth, at least in Japan.

Sir, you refer to that Bank of Japan’s holdings of government bonds are already at more than 40 per cent of the outstanding stock… and to “massive equity purchases” [by means of buying into the ETF market], and to“the government is the biggest beneficiary of the BoJ’s low interest rate policy” “BoJ risks falling out of sync on global easing” August 7.

Add to that the lower capital requirements for banks when lending to the government than when lending to citizens, and it all adds up to a huge gamble on that government bureaucrats know better what to do with credit/money than private enterprises. It sure sounds too much like communism by stealth for my liking. 

In 1988 the Basel Accord assigned 0% risk weight to sovereigns and 100% to citizens and we all believed that when in 1989 the Berlin Wall fell we had gotten rid of communism for good. How can the world have been so naïve? It will of course end badly.

@PerKurowski

August 05, 2019

The battle between capital and labour may be surpassed by the battle between the working class and the not working class.

Rana Foroohar announces, “The age of wealth distribution is coming and will have major investment consequences”, “The age of wealth accumulation is over” August 5.

Indeed, but two questions stand out. 

First, for wealth to be redistributed some assets of the wealthy must be sold and, since precisely because of that there might be less interest among other to acquire those assets, the value of these could fall… with unexpected consequences. Here’s an example, what is best for New York City keeping property taxes and property values at current values, or increasing the taxes running the risk that property values fall and wealthy property owners run away somewhere else?

The second question is who is going to redistribute? Will a mechanism like an unconditional universal basic income be used, or will the usual redistribution profiteers be in charge of it?

Foroohar also announces, “Another battle will be between capital and labour.” That battle will always be present but, in these times when robots and AI seem to threaten jobs, the real battle could end up being between the working class and the not working class.


@PerKurowski

Don’t keep adding bank regulations for what is ex ante perceived risky. It is what is ex ante perceived as very safe that should concern us the most.

Sir, I refer to Sheila Bair discussion of how much banks are to set aside in order to cover for loan losses. “Congress should stay out of new bank rules for loan losses” August 5.

Bair mentions, “that FASB wants to switch to a new rule, known by the name of “current expected credit losses” or “CECL.” That rule “says that banks should set aside enough to cover expected losses throughout the life of a loan, taking into account a wide variety of factors, including historic loss rates, market conditions, and the maturity of the economic cycle.”

Bair argues the new rule has two key benefits. “First, banks will start putting aside money on day one of each loan so when trouble hits — as it did in 2008 — they will not be trying to play catch-up with their reserves.” 

Really, what money would they have had to put aside for the AAA rated securities gone bad? What money would they have had to put aside for loans with a default guarantee issued by an AAA rated entity like AIG?

Then “Second, it should make bankers a little more cautious in their lending decisions, as they will have to account for likely losses when the loan is made, not kick the can down the road until the borrower is actually in arrears.”

That all has me concerned with that we might be adding a new layer of discrimination against the access to credit of the risky.

Those perceived ex ante as risky already get less credit and pay higher risk premiums. Those perceived ex ante as risky already cause banks to have to hold more equity against loans to them. 

If those perceived ex ante as risky must now also require banks to set aside reserves earlier than what is required for those perceived as safe, banks might stop altogether lending to the risky, like to entrepreneurs, and that will absolutely hurt the economy.

And Sir, it would all be for nothing, because major bank crises are never caused by excessive exposures to what was ex ante perceived as risky when placed on banks’ balance sheets. 


@PerKurowski