Beware when issues, no matter how important, like climate change, become mostly discussed because of their distraction value

Sir, Martin Wolf, after taking on a history tour argues: “A positive-sum vision of relations between the west, China and the rest has to become dominant if we are to manage the economic, security and environmental challenges we face”. That said Wolf frets our chances our small “given the quality of western leadership, authoritarianism in China and rising tide of mutual suspicion”, “Unsettling precedents for today’s world”, November 27.

Indeed, use history to illuminate the present, but never allow it to hide it. In the same vein let’s also include the caveat of not using any of those challenges to distract us from other just as important issues, like the very delicate state of our financial system.

Consider the following facts: 

1. As a response to the 2008 (AAA securities) and the 2011 (Greece) crises, by means of QEs and similar, there were/are huge injections of liquidity. 

2. Since the distortions produced by the risk weighted capital requirements were not eliminated, our banks have dangerously overcrowded all “safe” harbors, like sovereigns and residential mortgages.

3. As a result the rest of market participants had to take to the risky oceans like highly leveraged corporates debts and lending to emerging countries.

4. To top it up plenty of other high debt exposures abound, e.g. student and credit card debts.

5. Finally there are huge unfunded social security and pension plans all around the world.

And I refer to ”distraction” because everywhere we turn, we find regulators and central banks frantically looking for excuses to talk about other things, so as not have to answer some basic questions like:

Why do you believe that what bankers perceive as risky, is more dangerous to our bank system than what bankers perceive as safe?

Do you understand that allowing banks to leverage differently different assets distorts the allocation of credit to the real economy?

Do you understand that the other side of the coin of decreeing a zero risk to sovereigns, just because they can print the money to repay, is that it implies bureaucrats know better what to do with bank credit they are not responsible for, than for instance entrepreneurs?

EU you assigned a zero risk to all eurozone sovereigns’ debts even though none of these can print euros. What do you think would have happened to the USA’s union, if it had done the same with its 50 states, even though none of these can print US$ on their own?

Sir, when an architect takes on a project, he usually signs a contract by which he assumes personal responsibility “for the facility and its systems' ability to function and perform in the manner and to the extent intended” Should not bank regulators sign similar contracts?

http://perkurowski.blogspot.com/2016/04/here-are-17-reasons-for-why-i-believe.html

https://www.stimmel-law.com/en/articles/architect-responsibilities-and-disputes

@PerKurowski

Bank regulators need Business Education… perhaps Finance professors too… if not, they sure need History Education

Sir I refer to your special magazine “FT: Business Education”, September 11, 2017.

If you were a banker, of that type that until 1988 (Basel I) existed for about 600 years, you would, in order to obtain the highest risk adjusted return on equity, and while keeping a close eye on your whole portfolio, lend money to whoever offered you the highest risk adjusted interest rate… of course as long as all your other costs were covered.

If for instance you had to hold 10% capital, perhaps so that your depositors or regulators felt safe, then your expected return of equity would be the average of those net risk adjusted interest rates times 10 (100%/10%)… this before taxes of course.

If an SME or an entrepreneur offered the bank a perceived risk adjusted net margin of 1.25% while an AAA rated only offered 0.75%, the banker would in that case naturally prefer giving the riskier borrower the loan... though probably it would be a much smaller loan.

Sir, do you agree with that? No? Why?

Because when bank regulators introduced risk adjusted equity requirements, they completely changed banking. Since then the risk adjusted net margins borrowers offered, have to be multiplied, by the times these margins can be leveraged on equity.

For instance Basel II, 2004, with a basic 8% bank capital requirement, assigned a risk weight of 20% to any private sector exposure rated AAA, which meant banks needed to hold 1.6% (8%*20%) against these exposures, which meant they could leverage equity 62.5 times (100%/1.6%).

That same Basel II assigned to for instance an unrated SME or entrepreneur, a risk weight of 100%, meaning a capital requirement of 8%, meaning banks could leverage only 12.5 times their equity with this type of loans.

So now what happened? The AAA’s 0.75% net risk adjusted margin offer would become almost a 47% expected risk adjusted return on equity, while the riskier’s 1.25% would only represent about a 16% expected risk adjusted return on equity. Therefore the bank would now by much prefer the AAA rated… Bye-bye SMEs and entrepreneurs.

To earn the highest perceived risk adjusted ROE on the safest, must clearly be a wet dream come true for most bankers; well topped up by the fact that requiring so little capital from their shareholders when lending to the “safe”, left much more profits over for their bonuses.

Did not regulators know their risk weighted capital requirements would distort in this way the allocation of bank credit to the real economy? Seemingly not and that is why I suggest they should go and get some basic business education… after the professors who did not see this have also gone back to the most basic basics.

That because, if regulators did know about the distortion they would cause, then they have no idea of history… or worse, they are financial terrorists. That because no major bank crisis have never ever resulted from excessive exposures to what is ex ante perceived as risky; these have always, no exceptions, resulted from excessive exposures to what was ex ante perceived, and never ever from what was ex ante perceived as risky.

Sir, come to think of it you and most of your collaborators, perhaps all, should also go back to a business education 101.

@PerKurowski

FT’s future history exam draft, leaves out questions that could question some who are not to be questioned now

Sir, Gideon Rachman tries to imagine the questions future historians will ask about today’s political events drafts a history exam for students graduating in 2066, “An exam paper from the future” September 6 

I can certainly imagine a couple of other interesting questions, the problem though is that including these, would question some who are currently active and would not like to be questioned, like perhaps the exam-drafter himself

For instance:

How come regulators, with risk weighted capital requirements, decided without any empirical analysis, that what is perceived as risky is riskier for the banking system than what is perceived as safe?

How come regulators, by allowing banks to leverage equity differently with different assets, did not understand they would be distorting the allocation of bank credit to the real economy?

How come leading financial newspapers, and its journalists, mostly ignored the thousand of letters sent to them by a reader and that were related to those two previous questions?

@PerKurowski ©

A “Council of Historical Advisers” should advice the Council of Economic Advisers, on the origins of bank crises

Sir, Gillian Tett discussing Afghanistan’ Gandamak writes about the importance of knowing where you come from to know where you would want to go. “History lessons would be good for the White House” September 3.

Indeed, and I sure hope the “Council of Historical Advisers” comes to fruition, since the Council of Economic Advisers, and the Basel Committee, sure need some history lessons about the origins of bank crises.

Currently the pillar of bank regulations, is the risk weighted capital requirements for banks; more perceived risk more capital – less risk less capital.

And there is absolutely nothing in history that points to a banking crisis ever having resulted from what was, ex ante, when incorporated in their balance sheets, perceived as risky.

These have only resulted from unexpected events, or from the accumulation of excessive financial exposures to something erroneously perceived as safe. In fact the safer something is perceived, the worse the unexpected consequences that could result. Motorcycles are correctly viewed as much riskier than cars… and therefore much more people die in car accidents than in motorcycle accidents.

To sum it up, the risk weighted capital requirements for banks, dangerously distort the allocation of bank credit to the real economy, for no good reason at all. 

@PerKurowski ©