March 24, 2021

If our pied-à-terre falls into the hands of a Climate Stability Board, we’re toast.

Climate change dangers require:
Spending fighting it, trying to hinder it 
Spending adapting to it, to avoid its worst consequences
Saving, in order to be able to mitigate its worst effects
How should we budget for that to best avoid ending up toast?

Sir, let me begin with a very brief take on the last three decades of bank regulations.

A ship in harbor is safe, but that is not what ships are for” John A. Shedd. 

And neither are the banks, but that was ignored.

Before Basel Committee’s risk weighted bank capital requirements, everyone, whether perceived as a risky or as a safe credit, paid risk adjusted interest rates. After these were introduced, bank credit is allocated based on risk adjusted returns on equity.

The “safe”, meaning e.g., governments (bureaucrats/politicians), assets with high credit ratings and residential mortgages, pay relatively lower rates, because banks can leverage their capital/equity many times more with the net margin they provide. The “risky”, meaning e.g., small businesses and entrepreneurs, must pay comparatively higher rates, in order to compensate for the fact that banks must leverage less capital/equity with their net margins.

That has caused banks to overpopulate the safe harbors of the past and present, and to explore the riskier oceans much less than the future of our children and grandchildren needed.

Of course, all for nothing, since those excessive exposures that can become dangerous to our bank systems, are always built up with assets perceived as safe, never ever with assets perceived as risky.

And since current bank capital requirements are mostly based on expected credit risks banks should clear on their own; not on misperceived credit risks, 2008’s AAA MBS, or the unexpected, COVID-19, banks now stand there naked, though few dares to call out the Emperor on that.

So, how did we end up with all this? There are many reasons but, if I must pick one, that would be, “mutual admiration clubs”.

Sir, in November 2004 you published a letter in which I wrote: “The Basel Committee is just a mutual admiration club of firefighters seeking to avoid bank crisis at any cost - even at the cost of growth. Unwittingly it controls the capital flows in the world, and I wonder when will it realize the damage they’re doing, by favoring so much bank lending to the public sector.”

In “A new dawn for globalization” FT, Life & Arts, March 20, Mark Carney is allowed to write: “As chairs of the Financial Stability Board, Mario Draghi and I were at the forefront of efforts to reform the global financial system. Our aim was a system that once again valued the future, financed innovation and was prepared to take action in the event of failure. As its performance during the Covid-19 crisis has demonstrated, although far from perfect, the financial system is now safer, simpler and fairer”

If that’s not spoken as a member of a club that will not call him out on anything, what is?

And now Carney wants “a set of networks that can turn the existential threat of climate change into the greatest commercial opportunity of our time… and the Institute of International Finance’s Taskforce on Scaling Voluntary Carbon Markets is developing a large-scale, high-integrity carbon offset market.”

A new powerful mutual admiration club, backed enthusiastically by all climate-change fight profiteers. Scary indeed!

PS. As I read it, Pope Francis, when nailing his “Encyclical Letter LAUDATO SI’” to the web, denounced carbon credits to be just like the indulgences Martin Luther protested, when he nailed his “95 Thesis” to the church door.

PS. Why do you not ask Mark Carney to comment on Chris Watling’s “Now is the time to devise a new monetary order”, FT, March 19.

@PerKurowski

March 23, 2021

A new monetary order requires the old regulatory order.

I refer to Chris Watling’s “Now is the time to devise a new monetary order” March 19.

Sir, it is hard for me to understand how Watling, correctly pointing out so many distortions in the allocation credit and liquidity, can do so without specifically referencing the role of the risk weighted bank capital requirements.

For “the world economy [to] move closer to a cleaner capitalist model where financial markets return to their primary role of price discovery and capital allocation is based on perceived fundamentals”, getting rid of Basel Committee’s regulations is a must.

For such thing to happen, discussing and understanding how distorted these are, is where it must start.

E.g., Paul Volcker, in his 2018 “Keeping at it” penned together with Christine Harper valiantly confessed: “The assets assigned the lowest risk, for which bank capital requirements were therefore low or nonexistent, were those that had the most political support: sovereign credits and home mortgages”.

Sir, why is that opinion of Volcker rarely or perhaps even never quoted? Could it be because in a mutual admiration club it’s not comme-il-faut for a member to remark “We’re not wearing any clothes?

Volcker mentions “The US practice had been to assess capital adequacy by using a simple ‘leverage ratio’- capital available to absorb losses on the bank’s total assets”

Going back there, would return banks to loan officers; and send all those dangerously capital minimizing/leverage maximizing creative financial engineers packing.

@PerKurowski

 

March 08, 2021

Has Thatcherism run its course, or has Thatcherism been run off its course?

Sir, Martin Wolf asks “once we accept that Thatcherism has run its course, what follows?” “Sunak takes an axe to Thatcher’s low-tax ideology” FT, March 8.

Sir, to keep it brief, let me just ask three questions:

What would Margaret Thatcher have said about risk weighted bank capital requirements that de facto imply Britain’s bureaucrats/politicians know better what to do with credit for which repayment they’re not personally responsible for, than e.g. Britain’s small businesses and entrepreneurs?

What would Margaret Thatcher have said about risk weighted bank capital requirements that de facto imply the financing of residential mortgages is more important to Britain’s economy than the financing of its small businesses and entrepreneurs?

What would Margaret Thatcher have said about risk weighted bank capital requirements that de facto imply that what’s correctly perceived as risky, is more dangerous to Britain’s bank systems than what’s perceived as safe?

Sir, can you dare your Mr. Wolf to answer those questions?


@PerKurowski

March 03, 2021

Before aiming at any target, central banks must cure their shortsightedness

Sir, I refer to Martin Wolf’s “What central banks ought to target” FT, March 3.

With risk weighted bank capital requirements, the regulators are targeting what’s perceived as risky, thereby de facto fostering the creation of the excessive exposures to what’s perceived as safe, but that could end up being risky, which is precisely what all major bank crises are made off. In other words, they are putting future Minsky moments on steroids.

And if to the distortions in the allocation of credit to the economy that produces, you add the QEs, then you end up with such a mish-mash of monetary policy that no one, not even Mr. Wolf, should be able to make heads and tails out of it.

Wolf writes, “Central banking is art, not science… it must be coupled to deep awareness of uncertainty”. Sir, I ask, can you think of anything that evidences such lack of awareness of uncertainty than the risk weighted bank capital requirements?

So, before discussing what else to target, it is essential that central banks and regulators get their shortsightedness corrected.

Of course, “the central bank [should] set a rate that is consistent with a macroeconomic equilibrium” but, what would those rates be if banks needed to hold as much money when lending to the sovereign (the King) than when lending to citizens?

And when Wolf reports that “the New Zealand government has told its central bank to target house prices”, that makes me ask: Is anyone aware of the implications of having a central banks placed in the middle of that real, though not named, class war between those who have houses as investment assets and those who just want affordable homes?

Finally, as so many do, Wolf also signs up on that: “If people want less wealth inequality, they should argue for wealth and inheritance taxes”. But just as most do, he does so without explaining what assets, and to whom, the wealthy should sell, in order to reacquire that cash/purchase power needed to pay the tax that they handed over to the economy when they bought these. Not doing so, leaves one quite often a sort of populist aftertaste.


@PerKurowski