It behooves EU technocrats to find out what Europeans want and do not want to come out of Brexit.

Sir, Karin Kneissl, even by daring to explain some historical reasons for why Britain might not really belong in EU, makes a firm and clear call, to all the parties directly involved in the Brexit negotiations, to come back to their common senses. “A pragmatic approach to Brexit will pay off for both sides” August 10.

Hopefully it will give those many in Britain (including some in FT) who seem to want Brexit to fail, big, so that they can say their “We told you so”, some reason to recapacitate. Of course many of them, just like many Trump enemies in the US, are beyond the point where they would be able to do so.

If Karin Kneissl wants to help even more she should give Mr. Negotiator Barnier a call, and remind him that it behooves him, and all other EU technocrats, to find out what Europeans want and do not want to come out of Brexit. That this has not been done is sincerely amazing and only points to way too much besserwisser arrogance playing a role.

And Sir, if Brexit fails big, it is not certain at all that the loudest protesters would be British. Among Europeans, Britain counts with much more sympathy than what all commissioners, whose egos were hurt with Brexit, think it has. A French finding it harder to visit London is just as likely to be upset than a Brit finding it harder to visit Paris… perhaps even more “Mon Dieu, que dirait de Gaulle?”

@PerKurowski

Bank regulators violated the holy intergenerational social contract that Edmund Burke spoke about.

Sir, Philip Stephens writes: “Nostalgia has always had its place in politics. Respect for tradition is at the heart of Burkean conservatism. The deep irony about the now mythologised postwar decades, however, is that these were times when citizens looked unambiguously to the future.” “Nostalgia has stolen the future” July 27.

I am from 1950, and I do feel nostalgic whenever I think of all those savvy credit officers who were now substituted by equity minimization financial engineers.

When regulators, in order to make our banking system safe, ludicrously decided that what was perceived as risky was more dangerous to bank systems than what was perceived as safe, they distorted the allocation of bank credit in favor of the “safer” present so much that they de facto sacrificed that risk taking the “riskier” future needs. That is an egregious violation of that holy intergenerational social contract that Edmund Burke spoke about.

Those regulators are autocratic besserwisser populists who concoct their ideas, in a groupthink séance, in their Basel Committee mutual admiration club!

“Populists”? “We will safeguard your bank systems with our risk weighted capital requirements for banks” As if they knew what those risks were. Sir, can you think of something more populist than that?

@PerKurowski

Current risk weighted capital requirements for banks are a stand out example of “garbage in garbage out”

Sir, when discussing artificial intelligence and “how much power should be ceded to the machines” you mention: First. “the need to overcome limitations in machine learning techniques”; Second. “garbage in, garbage out…the need for better quality control”; and Third. “the need to develop a clear and transparent governance structure for AI”, “The paradox in ceding powers of decision to AI” December 30.

Sir, human intelligence is quite often in need of all that too.

When bank regulators used intrinsic risks of bank assets as inputs for developing their risk weighted capital requirement, they could not produce anything but garbage out. What they should have used is unexpected events or the risk those assets could pose to our bank system, namely the risk that bankers would not be able to adequately manage perceived risks.

And little evidences the need for a transparent governance structure for human intelligence too, as current regulators refusal to answer the very basic questions: “Why do you require banks to hold more capital against assets made innocous by being perceived as risky than against assets becoming dangerous by being perceived as safe?”.

Humans must also also overcome some technical limitations: An Explanatory Note by the Basel Committee on the Basel II IRB (internal ratings-based) Risk Weight Functions” expresses: “The model [is] portfolio invariant and so the capital required for any given loan does only depend on the risk of that loan and must not depend on the portfolio it is added to.”

And the explicit reason for that mindboggling simplification is: “This characteristic has been deemed vital in order to make the new IRB framework applicable to a wider range of countries and institutions. Taking into account the actual portfolio composition when determining capital for each loan - as is done in more advanced credit portfolio models - would have been a too complex task for most banks and supervisors alike.”

Sir, finally, I would add a fourth requirement, namely to make sure artificial intelligence is kept free from that excessive hubris and besserwisserism that too often affect humans. Like that which kept regulators from even having to define the purpose or banks before regulating these,

@PerKurowski

Risk weighted capital requirements for banks expresses a venomous lack of confidence in the future

Sir, Martin Wolf writes “the financial crises that destroyed globalisation in the 1930s and damaged it after 2008 led to poverty, insecurity and anger. Such feelings are not conducive to the trust necessary for a healthy democracy. At the very least, democracy requires confidence that winners will not use their temporary power to destroy the losers. If trust disappears, politics becomes poisonous” “Capitalism and democracy are the odd couple” September 20.

No! Free flowing not encumbered by crony statism capitalism is about as democratic it can be.

But one of the pillars of current bank regulations is that when banks lend to or invest in something perceived as safe they are allowed to leverage more their equity than if that is done with something perceived as more risky. That means banks can obtain much higher risk adjusted returns on equity financing the safer present than financing the riskier future.

The 2008 crisis resulted from too much exposure against too little capital to “safe” AAA rated securities, or to sovereigns decreed safe, like Greece.

The minimal response of the real economy to all stimuli, like QEs, is in much the result of “risky” SMEs and entrepreneurs not having a competitive access to bank credit.

To top it up a zero risk-weight of governments with one of 100% of citizens has nothing to do with democracy and all to do with statism brought in through backdoors.

“Democracy says all citizens have a voice; capitalism gives the rich by far the loudest.” Indeed but self appointed besserwisser regulators gave “the safe” more voice than “the risky.”

Wolf’s article ends with “After the crisis, hostility to free-flowing global finance is strong on both right and left”.

Mr. Wolf, that hostility was preceded, and caused, by that insane regulatory hostility against free-flowing bank credit, about which you have decided to keep mum on.

@PerKurowski

Has Brexit and Trump just been too much for Martin Wolf to handle?

Sir, on December 30, 2009 Martin Wolf wrote: “the civilisation we pray survives for our descendants is indeed at stake”, "The challenges of managing our post-crisis world", December 30.

As a father, then not yet even a grandfather, I shared entirely that concern: "The monsters that thrive on hardships haunt my dreams"

But now it would seem that Wolf has given up all hope, as when he seemingly in panic writes: “As a species, our power is now too great to afford today’s essentially uncontrollable competition among myopic states. I do not expect us to achieve a world government. But that is also why I expect humanity to do unimaginable damage to itself and the planet over the coming centuries”, “What’s the big — and the bad — idea?” September 16.

And to avoid those “unimaginable damages to” humans, Wolf would now “like to see a world government. It would be a confederation, with a governing council, no president. Maybe three consuls.”

What on earth as gone into Wolf’s mind, what would that guarantee us?

In April 2003, when as an Executive Director of the World Bank I commented on the World Bank's Strategic Framework 04-06, I opined: "A mixture of thousand solutions, many of them inadequate, may lead to a flexible world that can bend with the storms. A world obsessed with Best Practices may calcify its structure and break with any small wind."

So Sir, for me to substitute with some three besserwisser the wisdom of all us individual humans, is sort of the last thought that enters my mind.

On the contrary, what we must do is to increase the changes for the most insignificant of citizens, like me, to question the wisdom of any self or network appointed consuls of the world.

For instance Wolf could do much good by helping me ask bank regulators why on earth they decided to assign a risk weight of only 20% to what is AAA rated and which therefore could provoke the creation of dangerously high bank exposures; while giving the below BB- rated, those so innocuous because bankers won’t touch them with a ten feet pole, a whopping risk weight of 150%.

Sir, I do feel sorry for Martin Wolf, I suspect Brexit and Trump has been too much for him, it has short-circuited his great mind.

@PerKurowski

Having experienced Saudi-Venezuela’s Plan, I know Saudi Arabia’s “National Transformation Program” will fail

Sir, Jason Bordoff writes about Saudi Arabia’s “National Transformation Program, a bundle of targets and initiatives designed to deliver the “Vision 2030” plan to diversify the country’s economy and reduce its reliance on oil revenue… head-spinning 543 initiatives and 346 targets… laudable focus on concrete targets, measurable outcomes, transparency and accountability, along with a strong focus on boosting the education and skill levels of Saudis.” “Saudi Arabia’s reform slowdown reveals its painful dilemma” September 12.

That sounds so much like Venezuela’s ambitious plan of how to deploy the booming oil revenues, plus all that indebtedness that oil riches stimulated, during Carlos Andres Perez first presidency, 1974-79, a time that even became known as that of Saudi-Venezuela.

That plan provided clearly insufficient results, something that later helped clear the road to power for populist Chavez. Chavez and Maduro, in about 15 years, then managed to turn an even greater oil boom into the current pure minuses.

What amazes me is that Bordoff seems to imply that there is a possibility that the NTP could work. It does not! Centralized oil revenues, topped up with “$100bn for a public investment fund”, all managed by “a complex government bureaucracy” is a recipe for disaster. And if by any chance they got something right, that could be so easily wiped out by new generation of besserwisser government technocrats.

Before my two years as an Executive Director of the World Bank, 2002 2004, my only experience with the government sector was as the first Diversification Manager at the Venezuelan Investment Fund set up in 1974. That gig lasted me only two weeks because, when pressured by politicians for a fast approval (one week) of a US$ 2 billion pet project (Plan IV Sidor), I knew the system would not work and, as I told the Fund’s board members when I resigned, I was too young to risk being hanged if that or other projects failed.

@PerKurowski

If a citizen of an oil-cursed nation, like Nigeria, would you like a FT lending support to its central besserwissers?

Sir, you write “If the government were to reduce its stakes in the oil joint ventures to a minority it would not only raise some $20bn towards achieving other objectives. It would liberate the oil companies to invest, providing the country with a more realistic chance of raising production” “Nigeria’s recovery plan gives grounds for hope: A burst of reform will help Africa’s most populous nation to fly again” March 9.

Is that really so? Could it not be that its government would then just waste the $20bn obtained now against the loss of future oil revenues; and that a future populist could easier come to power exploiting a re-nationalization platform? By the way, for how long is the extraction of a non-renewable natural resource be described as “production”

Sir, you know that Nigeria, like Venezuela, are oil cursed nations in which oil exports represent 90% or more of all the exports, and the revenues governments receive from oil 70% or more of all fiscal revenues. And yet you seem to indicate that with a correct recovery plan, which means centralized government bureaucrats still calling the shots, perhaps with somewhat less ammunition, there is “grounds for hope”. 

Sir, if you were an oil-cursed citizen, I am sure you would not like a renowned international financial paper lending such support, to those powerful local oil bureaucrats, vulgar redistribution profiteers, that insist they should manage oil revenues, since they are much more experts and therefore know much better than you what good for you and your family.

Or is it perhaps that you are too beholden to all governments that do the oil-revenues spending?

@PerKurowski

A holier than thou alliance of hysterical extreme besserwisser progressives, is pushing too many into No No Land

Sir, Janan Ganesh opines that visceral/hysterical reaction against Trump no matter how correct it might be, might evidence to many voters that progressives do not share their deeply felt concerns about national security, crime, welfare dependency and similar. “Liberalism can only win if it holds a hawkish line” February 7.

Ganesh is absolutely correct. As a Venezuelan I can testify on that this type of reaction, by a similar holier than thou besserwisser group mostly correct in their opinions preaching to the choir, only made Chavez stronger.

For instance I utterly dislike walls, foremost because you can never be real sure you or your grandchildren end up on the right side of it. But, in the case of the Mexican Wall, much more constructive would a “Yes let’s build it” be. That followed up of course with “The USA puts up the land, the Mexicans the cheaper labor, perhaps the Canadians the materials needed, and the FED, by means of a wall-easing program, buys the 1%, 50 years bonds that are needed to finance it all”. I guess that would bring the emotionally laden discussions about that wall to a more sane level… better for all.

Sir, but Ganesh also writes: “Whenever the state imposes a counterterror measure, especially one as brute as the US president’s, statistics are dug out to show that fewer westerners perish in terror attacks than in everyday mishaps. Slipping in the bath is a tragicomic favourite. We chuckle, share the data and wait for voters and politicians to see sense.”

And that, as you might intuit, irresistibly provokes me to ask the following: When the state imposes a regulatory measure based on something so brutish as believing that what is perceived as very risky is riskier for the bank system than what is perceived as very safe… why does then so few chuckle, share the info, and wait for regulators to see sense?

@PerKurowski

FT, you have good reporters; send them to the Whitehouse to pose Trump some constructive questions on protectionism.

Sir, you write: “Forcing industrial output to return to the US is likely to create work for US-based robots rather than workers” “Take the US president’s protectionism seriously” January 25.

Precisely, that is what I have tweeted for some time now, and on which I have written some letters that you have steadfastly decided to ignore, like those on the subprime banking regulations, without thinking of it as any type of censoring, or without “without favour”.

But, without resorting to qualifying Trump’s protectionism as “profoundly retrograde” which means so little, which sounds so besserwisser, and which can only insult those who are then implied of having voted for a “retrograde”, why don’t you use your voice to send a journalist to Washington to ask of the Whitehouse, directly, some constructive questions?

For instance: “With current and future actions taken against foreign suppliers, in order to make America great again, what ratio of new employments of humans to robots do you foresee? How many robots have substituted for humans in jobs in USA during 2106?

And, if there’s a chance and a will, dare ask: Why does the Whitehouse think that trade protectionism is worse than that financial protectionism that is imbedded in the current risk weighted capital requirements for banks?

@PerKurowski

It is time for America to ask bank regulation’s risk weights of 0% Sovereign and 100% We the People, to take a hike!

Sir, Martin Wolf, in reference to the United States writes: “In the country of the blind, the one-eyed man rules… the next administration will take over a country with mediocre growth of productivity, high inequality, a growing retreat from work and a declining rate of creation of new businesses and jobs… loss of dynamism… business fixed investment has been persistently weak… rise of new regulatory barriers is disturbing.” “An economic in-tray full of problems” November 9.

Of course, as usual, obsessively, Wolf says not a word about the possibility that the risk weights of 0% sovereign, 20% AAA rated, 35% residential housing and 100% SMEs, set for the purpose of defining the capital requirements for banks, are distorting the allocation of bank credit to the real economy, with disastrous consequences.

At least last week, during IMF’s Annual Research Conference, at the very end of the conference, none other than Olivier Blanchard, the former Chief Economist of the IMF, admitted that: indeed more research was needed to better understand the underlying factors for the trend to lower public debt interests that can be observed the last 30 years; and that this trend might very well be explained to a certain extent by current bank regulations.

When the truth about the risk weighted capital requirements for banks unravel, I wonder how Mr. Wolf is going to explain his and FT’s silence on my thousands of letters.

By the way, after yesterdays American election results, is it not high time for the Home of the Free and the Land of the Brave to ask those risk weights of 0% Sovereign and 100% We the People, to take a hike?

PS. What caused the unexpected election results? I really don’t know, I am not American so I did not have to vote (phew what a relief) but the irritating smugness of technocrat and media besserwissers, sure must have played an important role.

PS. I forgot, fairly recent I twitted: “As I see it there's one vote for the next 4 years, and then there’s one for the next 40. The latter could be for Gary Johnson”

@PerKurowski

With tighter bank capital rules and lower bank profits, risk weighting hurts economic dynamism more than ever.

Martin Wolf asks “Is globalisation reversing?” And answers “No, but it has lost dynamism… partly because opportunities for expanded processing trade have diminished, and partly because the era of large-scale trade liberalisation is over.” “Sluggish global trade growth is here to stay” October 26.

Indeed that matters, but Wolf refuses to acknowledge that the economies could also have lost much dynamism, because of credit access protectionist regulations, applied globally, that have banks refinancing more the “safer” past and present than financing the "riskier" future.

How can Wolf ignore that? I haven’t the faintest Sir; you must of course know him much better than I.

Anyone besserwissing I can besserwiss better, I can betterwiss better than you, Mr Wolf.

PS. Here again is an aide memoire on some of the monstrous mistakes of the risk weighted capital requirements for banks.

@PerKurowski ©

FT, are you aligned with the interests of redistribution profiteers and besserwissers, or with citizens’?

Sir you refer to that “Next month, Switzerland will hold a referendum on whether to introduce an Unconditional Basic Income”, and then you opine “this measure seems premature today [though] it is worth running data-driven pilot projects to test the concept’s future viability. More effective tax regimes and smarter forms of wealth redistribution will be needed to ease our social strains.” “Bring on the robots but reboot our societies too” May 7.

I come from Venezuela, where the poor, from that so lauded 21st Century Socialism, have not received more than about 15 percent of what should have been their individual share of the fabulous oil revenues over the last 15 years, tops. So please don’t tell me an unconditional universal basic income, in this case funded by oil revenues, “seems premature”… it is way overdue.

And Sir, why do we really need to test the hypothesis that people know better what to do with their own resources than what the governments with other’s resources? Is that to find ways to help profiteers and besserwissers to keep control over the redistribution?

As I have written to you I support a worldwide gas/carbon tax which revenues should be paid out by means of a universal basic income, in order to align the incentives in the fight against climate change and against inequality.

And I also support a social pro-equality tax, which revenues should be paid out entirely by means of a universal basic income, from citizens to citizens, so as to avoid all the dangerous populist and demagoguery intermediaries.

Sir, if we can separate all the redistribution from governments’ normal functions, then we will also be able to make these perform better for us. For instance, we might suddenly realize that all tax evasion and tax avoidance put together could be less than government waste.

PS. And bring on the robots to bank regulations. These at least have smaller egos that stand in their way of admitting and learning from their mistakes. The robots would, long ago, have eliminated the risk weighted capital requirements for banks, which only dangerously distort the allocation of bank credit to the real economy, for absolutely no good reason at all. 

@PerKurowski ©

To manage risks our bankers are always better free, in God’s hands, than in hands of some hubristic sophisticated besserwissers

Sir, Martin Wolf writes: “Market liquidity is likely to disappear when one needs it most. Building our hopes on its durability is risky. That is correct, but when he argues: “the absence of regulation exacerbated the liquidity boom and subsequent bust”, his implicit message is… that regulators should do something about it. “Beware the liquidity delusion” October 7.

I on the other hand have always worried about that bank regulators, when they act on their own perceptions of credit and liquidity risk, in any sort of complex form, introduce distortions, systemic risks, which can make everything so much worse. 

What feeds our credulity to believe something is more safe just because we perceive that something to be more safe? Is it not so that the safer an asset is perceived, the more we can run the risk of everyone demanding it excessively, and thereby make that asset really risky?

What feeds our credulity to believe something is more liquid just because we perceive that something to be more liquid? Is it not so that the more liquid an asset is perceived, the more we can run the risk of everyone demanding it excessively, and thereby at one point make that asset absolutely illiquid… at absolutely the worst moment?

Wolf suggests: “It would be better if investors appreciated the risks of a freeze in market liquidity in riskier financial assets”. Yes, but one must also argue the importance for regulators to appreciate the risks of a freeze in market liquidity for “safe” financial assets. A freeze of those assets would obviously hurt much more. (Like what happened with the AAA rated securities collateralized with mortgages to the subprime sector)

Wolf suggests: “markets characterized more by longer-term commitments, and less by hopes of finding ‘greater fools’ willing to buy at all times, might be better for most of us. This will not be true for all assets — notably government bonds. But it will be true for many private instruments”. Indeed, more long-term commitments could be good, but why does Martin Wolf believe that government bonds could never become a dangerously overpopulated safe haven in which we all got stuck gasping for oxygen? Is it ideology?

Of course dangers surround us, our financial markets and our banks, all the times; many more than credit and lack of liquidity risks. To manage those risks I am convinced we are better of being free, in God’s hands, than in the hands of some sophisticated besserwissers suffering immense hubris. But that’s just me.

Does this mean I don’t want any regulations? Of course not! But keeping those simple, and essentially considering the unexpected instead of the expected, would go a long way. The expected always finds a way to take care of itself… though I must admit that sometimes that takes strangers going strange ways and using strange tools.

@PerKurowski ©  J

Again besserwisser Martin Wolf ignores the regulatory discrimination against “the risky” when accessing bank credit

Sir, I refer to Martin Wolf’s “Legitimate business unlocks growth” June 4.

In it he writes that answering the question “What lies behind the falling productivity and rising share in total employment of small businesses [in Mexico]?” McKinsey advances, as one of three hypotheses, that: “small businesses lack access to credit. 33 percent of GDP, outstanding loans are extraordinarily small. They are also expensive”… “The unmet capital needs of firms with 10 to 250 employees represent 75 percent of what we estimate to be a $60bn credit gap in Mexico”.

But Wolf steadfastly ignores my arguments that I have expressed to him and FT in hundreds of letters… his besserwisser ego does not allow him to do otherwise, and so he does not get it.

Mexico has been on the forefront of applying Basel Committee Basel II bank regulations… and the capital requirements for banks of these instruct banks not to lend to “risky” small businesses because, if they do, they must hold much more capital than when lending to, for instance, the “infallible sovereign” of Mexico.

PS. Sir, again, just to let you know, I am not copying Martin Wolf with this, as he has asked me not to send him any more comments related to the capital requirements for banks, as he understands it all… at least so he thinks. His problem is that, in this case, he has encountered a more correct and perhaps an even more besserwisser than he is :-)

Ever more complex finance requires denser and duller, bordering on brain-less, hard-headed stubborn bank regulators.

Sir, Tracy Alloway writes “If the institutions which create these [sophisticated financial] products cannot correctly asses their value, then what hope is there for us?”, “Ever more complex finance parts way with economic reality” May 3.

Indeed but it is worse than that… because what hope can we have that our bank regulators understand those products? In 2003, when Basel II was being discussed I told some hundred regulators during a workshop the following: “Let me start by sincerely congratulating everyone for the quality of this seminar. It has been a very formative and stimulating exercise, and we can already begin to see how Basel II is forcing bank regulators to make a real professional quantum leap. As I see it, you will have a lot of homework in the next years, brushing up on your calculus—almost a career change.”

The truth is that regulators did not know what they were doing with simple Basel II and they know of course much less with Basel III, which is about a hundred times more complex and technical.

And this should lead us to the truth of regulations… the more complex the issue is the more dumb must the regulators act, like refusing trying to understand it all, and stubbornly holding to some simple rules of thumb… like 8 percent of shareholder’s equity against any asset.

The role of the regulators is not to control the banks for the perceived ex ante risks, the expected losses, that is the job of the bankers and, if they can’t do that they should not be bankers. The role of the regulator is to safeguard against eventual ex post risks, unexpected losses, and since the unexpected cannot be calculated, they can for instance allow themselves not having any knowledge of calculus.

God save us from the hubris driven intelligent besserwisser spread-sheet equipped regulators trying to outsmart bankers.

About “Why bank regulators are intellectually naked”, and about besserwisser journalists

Sir, Martin Wolf has suddenly seen light as he now writes “A sophisticated mistake is the idea that capital can be properly ‘risk-weighted’. This has proved fatally flawed”, “Why bankers are intellectually naked” March 18.

I have over the last five years written more than a hundred of letters to the editor commenting on articles by Martin Wolf explaining that capital requirements for banks based on perceived risks which have already been cleared for, is sheer stupidity, and creates all type of distortions. But my arguments have been mostly ignored and Wolf has even qualified me as a monothematic bore… something which I accept might very well be true, but all for a good cause.

And so of course I will read “The Bankers’ New Clothes” by Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig, with much interest, to see with what arguments they finally convinced Wolf. That is of course as long as Wolf’s new found conviction is the correct one. I say this because why then did he not title his book review “Why bank regulators are intellectually naked”

Wolf writes the book reveals why “we have failed to remove the causes of the crisis”, and I wonder whether the arrogant besserwisser attitude of some financial journalists who think they know it all, might be included there.

PS. I have not read it yet, but if Admati and Hellwig’s suggestion of a 20-30 percent equity ratio is based on risk-weighted assets, then sadly they have not understood it completely either, and the distortions could be even worse. And, if that 20-30 ratio is for unweighted assets, then it would be very interesting to hear how they propose to raise the bank capital needed to fill the hole created by the zero percent risk-weighting of sovereigns.

PS. Sir, just to remind you that I am not copying Martin Wolf more. He has told me not to send him anything more on “capital requirements”… he already knows it all, so he thinks.

The willingness to take risks is the true locomotive of an economy

Sir, Sir Samuel Brittan ends his “Britain has a funny way of firing up the locomotive” of January 18 with “Keynes…was up against the self-destructive instincts of political leaders, who transferred home truths about family budgets to wrong-headed principles for running national economies.” 

Indeed, just as I am up in arms against the self-destructive instincts of bank regulators, and who transfer home truths about individual risk avoidance into wrong-headed principles for our banks. 

Sir, again, for the umpteenth time, if you know all bank crises have been caused by excessive exposures to some erroneously classified as absolutely safe, why on earth, as Basel regulations require, need banks to hold much more capital when lending to “The Risky” than when lending to The Infallible? 

It is any risk-taking austerity that most causes a nation to stall and fall. The willingness to take risks that is the true locomotive of an economy. And that is precisely why we go to our churches to pay “God make us daring!” while ignoring that some besserwisser regulators have kept themselves busy castrating our banks.

In this age of media driven besserwissers we need to be more skeptical than ever about “expertise”

Sir, John Lloyd writes “It is a source of [British] pride that disorganization is transformed into magnificence” but “that now some have developed an anxiety about muddling through, and the lack of strategic thinking among leaders in public life”, and concludes in “That those who command the public and private summits of the future should be schooled away from the temptation to avoid recognizing complexities”, “Class notes from a course on the age of complexity” December 24. 

Yes! But also… No! Because sometimes the best and only cure to an excessive complexity is simplicity, and so it is vital for those involved in strategic thinking, never ever to consider themselves so superior so as to be capable to manage any complexity. 

Equally, in this age of media driven besserwissers, it is more important than ever for the society to remain healthy skeptical knowing that even the most reputable experts can be very wrong. 

For instance, the primary cause for the bank and economic crisis happening and for the real economy not recovering, lies squarely with the bank regulator “experts”. Arrogantly thinking themselves to be capable of managing the risks for the world, with their capital requirements based on perceived risk, and their risk-weights, they expelled all common sense from markets and banks. 

And five years after the outburst of the crisis nothing has really been corrected, and instead much has been made worse, only because, as a society, we find it so hard to accept that experts can be so incredibly dumb. 

But I assure you, there is no limit for how dumb experts can be, especially when gathered in a mutual admiration club where no one is held accountable. Occupy Basel!

We do not need FT to be a Besserwisser

Sir in your “Muzzle the market manipulators” March 22, you just come through as a Besserwisser saying “All long term-investors can do is ignore rumours, ignore share price volatility and concentrate on the facts. Easier said than done, in a world where there are more finance courses on how those real not that good Besserwisser and rumourmongers we know as the credit rating agencies could change their opinions than there are course on how to analyze the rated companies themselves.