Showing posts with label capital flows control. Show all posts
Showing posts with label capital flows control. Show all posts

January 14, 2011

Just the same old pound locks!

Sir, Gillian Tett in “Stand by for new ways to control hot money bubbles”, January 14, refers to instruments like special levies on banks foreign exchange positions. These instruments are far from new and have very often been used all over the world as pound-locks in order to guard for the asymmetries in the size of flows between the small lakes of small countries and the big global oceans.

For a time free market zealots were against even these pound-locks but most of us knew it was just a question of time before they were going to be used again. And by the way the zealots never realized that capital requirements for banks based on perceived risk were a hundred times more intrusive and distorting than these transparent levies and pound locks… just look at the tsunami into the triple-A rated waters they produced.

What would though be thought provoking, interesting and new would be to see the big oceans needing protection from the flows from the small lakes.

October 21, 2009

Serious intentions or just a one night stand?

Sir Jonathan Wheatley and Alan Beattie in “Brazil taxes foreign portfolio flows in bid to stem exchange rate rise”, October 21, make a reference to the Chilean capital controls, and it is important to understand that these were of quite different nature than Brazil’s tax.

Chile’s capital controls, intelligently, wanted to make certain that the foreign investments flows wanting to go in into Chile, as pretenders, had serious long term intentions, and were not just looking for any one night affairs. It was therefore based primarily on freezing the use of funds for one year, so as to assure a proper courting.

Compared to that, Brazil’s 2 percent tax, just raises the price of having an affair in Brazil. And what is 2 percent in these days of hedge-funds fees if the signorina is beautiful?

February 26, 2008

They have not even imagined how right they are

Sir having for more than thirty years argued about the dangers for the bathtubs of a small economies to lie completely open next to the global financial oceans exposed to their tsunamis I could not but fully agree with the general direction of Dani Rodrik’s and Arvind Subramanian’s “Why we need to curb global flows of capital” February 26.

Having said that I would much rather use the term “slow” than “curb” because it is the speed of how the financial resources move that causes the most damages.

But let me put forward a much more important comment. When the authors say that one should not be “too optimistic about the potential of prudential regulation to stem excessive risk-taking” they are more right than they have imagined in their wildest dreams or wildest hypothesis. In fact, it was precisely the running away from the risks, forced upon the financial market by the regulators through their minimum capital requirements for the banks and that was based exclusively on risk-assessments carried out by the regulator’s own outsourced risk overseers, the credit rating agencies that set us up to all what is currently happening.

August 14, 2007

This time though ignorance was mostly fabricated

Sir John Kay in “The same old folly starts a new spiral of risk” August 14 recounts a story from the files of Lloyd’s to make a case for how “people who knows a little of what they are doing pass risks to people who knows less” and so therefore risks tend not to spread but to concentrate setting us up for an explosion. I agree that we might or should have already learned our lessons from that but in the current turmoil there are in fact two new elements that give a fresh perspective on financial history. The first, the most ironic, seems to be that it was in fact those most knowledgeable participants that with their excessive arrogance fabricated with their sophisticated financial models their own ignorance and second, more tragic, that the market was not allowed to apply its own and perhaps even more wise ignorance, but was instructed, by the regulators, to follow the advice of the experts, the credit rating agencies. The concentration of risks under such circumstances could prove to be even much more explosive.