March 11, 2022
Sir, in “Chile can set an example for the developing world” FT, March 10, 2022, you refer to “the risk of European levels of debt”
With bank capital requirements mostly based on perceived credit risks, not on misperceived risks or unexpected events, like a pandemic or a war in Ukraine, you can bet that, at any moment, many banks will stand there naked, precisely when they’re most needed.
When that happens Chile could set a great example for the developed world… and FT could provide much help with a Big Read that describes better than I can, how Chile so intelligently managed their huge 1981-1983 bank crisis.
The main elements of Chile’s plan were, in general terms:
a. The purchase of risky/defaulted loans by the Central Bank by means of long-term promissory notes accruing real interest rates and with a repurchase obligation out of the profits of the banks' shareholders before those promissory notes came due, plus some limitations on the use of their operative income… e.g., limits on bonuses.
b. A forced recapitalization of the banks, in those pre-Basel days one capital requirement against all assets, and in which any shares not purchased by current shareholders, would be acquired by the Central Bank, and resold over a determined number of years.
c. And finally also an extremely generous long-term plan for small investors to purchase equity of banks.
Just think about where e.g., Deutsche Bank could be, if the Bundesbank and Germany’s Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin), had applied a similar mechanism during the 2008 crisis?
@PerKurowski