October 03, 2022

Five comments on Patrick Jenkins “Failure to learn lessons of 2008 caused LDI pension blow-up”

Five comments on Patrick Jenkins “Failure to learn lessons of 2008 caused LDI pension blow-up”. Not sent by a letter to the Financial Times.

“There’s no such thing as risk-free” 

“Ultra-low interest rates have obscure side-effects”
Indeed, especially when those ultra-low interest rates are the result of manipulations. The current risk-free rate has nothing to do with the risk-free rate before risk weighted bank capital requirements and QEs.

“A leveraged bet — to ‘juice’ otherwise low returns”
Assets assigned the lowest risk, for which bank capital requirements were therefore nonexistent or low, were what had the most political support: sovereign credits & home mortgages...A ‘leverage ratio’ discouraged holdings of low-return government securities” Paul Volcker


“In the UK, the government wants to make it easier for pension funds and life insurers to invest in riskier assets”

“Amateurish governance is dangerous. One of the lessons of bank failures in 2007-8 was that expertise matters”

And I could make many more similar comments.

September 21, 2022

Britannia, to have a chance to become its former self, needs to free its financial systems from its mis-regulators.

Sir, Martin Wolf asks: “Britannia is not ‘unchained’. It is instead sailing in perilous waters. Can the new captain and first mate even see the rocks that lie ahead?” “The economic consequences of Truss” FT September 21.

Wolf writes: “Thatcher and those who followed her allowed the search for safety in corporate pensions to shift portfolios away from the supply of risk capital to business to ownership of government bonds. This in effect turned the plans into state-backed pay-as-you-go schemes.”. 

Sir, more than three decades late Martin Wolf seems to notice that huge rock of Basel I that, for its risk weighted bank capital requirements, decreed weights of 0% government, 30% residential mortgages and 100% citizens. Better late than never… but really?

These bank capital requirements are based on that what’s perceived as risky, e.g., loans to small businesses and entrepreneurs are more dangerous to bank systems than what’s perceived as safe, e.g., government debt and residential mortgages.

That de facto translates into it being much more important for banks to hold government debt and residential mortgages than loans to small businesses and entrepreneurs. Something which, with Solvency II, applies to its insurance companies too. Really, is that how Britannia got to be strong?

Sir, the Western world’s banks were taken from the hands of savvy loan officers who knew their first duty was to know their clients and understand what their loans were going to be used for and placed into the hands bank own capital minimizing/leverage maximizing dangerously creative financial engineers.

“UK has a deregulated economy… in which the successful are well rewarded, but those who do less well are penalised. Such Thatcherite aims then are now a reality” No! Bank regulators reward those ex-antes perceived or decreed as safe over those perceived as risky. That has zero to do with their ex-post success. Has the UK's public debt been well employed?

Let’s hope someone like Liz Truss dares to set aside whatever mandates she might have, no matter how worthy these might be, in order to tackle a real financial regulatory reform.

Sir, what would Edmund Burke with his intergenerational social contract have opined about prioritizing the refinancing of the “safer” present over the financing of the riskier future?   

 

April 28, 2022

Why does the world ignore regulations that totally disrupt the allocation of bank credit?

Sir, I refer to Martin Wolf’s “Shocks from war in Ukraine are many-sided. - The conflict is a multiplier of disruption in an already disrupted world” FT April 27.

The concentration of human fallible regulatory power in the Basel Committee has, since 1988, resulted in bank capital requirements mostly based on that what’s perceived as risky e.g., loans to small businesses and entrepreneurs, is more dangerous to our bank systems than what’s perceived or decreed as safe e.g., government debt and residential mortgages; and not on misperceived risks or unexpected events, like a pandemic or a war. 

What can go wrong? I tell you Sir.

When times are good and perceived risks low, these pro-cyclical capital requirements allow banks to hold little capital, pay big dividends & bonuses, do stock buybacks; and so, when times get rough, banks stand there naked, just when we need them the most.

And of course, meanwhile, these capital requirements, by much favoring the refinancing of the safer present over the financing of the riskier future, have much disrupted the allocation of credit

Why has the world for decades ignored this amazing regulatory mistake?

Sir, perhaps you could ask Martin Wolf to explain that to us.

PS. Two tweets today on bank regulators’ credit risk weighted bank capital requirements.

What kind of banks do we want?
Banks who allocate credit based on risk adjusted interest rates?
Or banks who allocate credit based on risk adjusted returns on the equity that besserwisser regulators have decreed should be held against that specific asset?

Bank events' matrix
What’s perceived risky turns out safe
What’s perceived risky turns out risky
What’s perceived safe turns out safe
What’s perceived safe turns out risky
Which quadrangle is really dangerous?
Covered by current capital requirements?
NO!

March 11, 2022

Chile can also set a great example for the developed world.

Sir, in “Chile can set an example for the developing world” FT, March 10, 2022, you refer to “the risk of European levels of debt”

With bank capital requirements mostly based on perceived credit risks, not on misperceived risks or unexpected events, like a pandemic or a war in Ukraine, you can bet that, at any moment, many banks will stand there naked, precisely when they’re most needed. 

When that happens Chile could set a great example for the developed world… and FT could provide much help with a Big Read that describes better than I can, how Chile so intelligently managed their huge 1981-1983 bank crisis.

The main elements of Chile’s plan were, in general terms:

a. The purchase of risky/defaulted loans by the Central Bank by means of long-term promissory notes accruing real interest rates and with a repurchase obligation out of the profits of the banks' shareholders before those promissory notes came due, plus some limitations on the use of their operative income… e.g., limits on bonuses. 

b. A forced recapitalization of the banks, in those pre-Basel days one capital requirement against all assets, and in which any shares not purchased by current shareholders, would be acquired by the Central Bank, and resold over a determined number of years. 

c. And finally also an extremely generous long-term plan for small investors to purchase equity of banks. 

Just think about where e.g., Deutsche Bank could be, if the Bundesbank and Germany’s Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin), had applied a similar mechanism during the 2008 crisis?



@PerKurowski

March 05, 2022

FT, on banking and finance who are you to believe, Francis Fukuyama or Paul Volcker?

Sir, Francis Fukuyama in “The war on liberalism” FT March 5, writes:

Liberals understand the importance of free markets — but under the influence of economists such as Milton Friedman and the “Chicago School”, the market was worshipped and the state increasingly demonised as the enemy of economic growth and individual freedom. Advanced democracies under the spell of neoliberal ideas trimmed back welfare states and regulation, and advised developing countries to do the same under the “Washington Consensus”. Cuts to social spending and state sectors removed the buffers that protected individuals from market vagaries, leading to big increases in inequality over the past two generations.

While some of this retrenchment was justified, it was carried to extremes and led, for example, to deregulation of US financial markets in the 1980s and 1990s that destabilised them and brought on financial crises such as the subprime meltdown in 2008.”

Paul A. Volcker in his autobiography “Keeping at it” of 2018, penned together with Christine Harper, with respect to the risk weighted bank capital requirements he helped to promote and which were approved in 1988 under the name of Basel I wrote:

The assets assigned the lowest risk, for which capital requirements were therefore low or nonexistent, were those that had the most political support: sovereign credits and home mortgages. Ironically, losses on those two types of assets would fuel the global crisis in 2008 and a subsequent European crisis in 2011. The American “overall leverage” approach had a disadvantage as well in the eyes of shareholders and executives focused on return on capital; it seemed to discourage holdings of the safest assets, in particular low-return US government securities."

Sir, in reference to advising developing countries with the “Washington Consensus”, in November 2004 you kindly published a letter in which I wrote:

Our bank supervisors in Basel are unwittingly controlling the capital flows in the world. How many Basel propositions will it take before they start realizing the damage they are doing by favoring so much bank lending to the public sector? In some developing countries, access to credit for the private sector is all but gone, and the banks are up to the hilt in public credits.”

So, there are two completely different bank systems:

Before 1988, one in which banks needed to hold the same capital against all assets, credit was allocated based on risk adjusted interest rates and the market considering the bank’s portfolio, accurately or not, values its capital.

After 1988, one risk weighted capital requirement banks where credit is allocated based on risk adjusted returns on equity, something which clearly depends on how much regulators have allowed their capital to be leveraged with each asset... clearly favoring government credit, which de facto implies bureaucrats know better what to do with (taxpayers') credit than e.g., small businesses and entrepreneurs. Communism!

Sir, I am of course just small fry, not even a PhD, but, if you have to choose between describing what has happened in the financial markets since 1988 as a “deregulation”, as Fukuyama opines, or an absolute statist and politically influenced misregulation, as Volcker valiantly confesses, who do you believe?

Sir, is this topic taboo… or just a too hot potato for the “Without fear and without favour” Financial Times?

PS. In Steven Solomon’s “The Confidence Game” 1995 we read: “On September 2, 1986, the fine cutlery was laid once again at the Bank of England governor’s official residence at New Change… The occasion was an impromptu visit from Paul Volcker… When the Fed chairman sat down with Governor Robin Leigh-Pemberton and three senior BoE officials, the topic he raised was bank capital…

@PerKurowski

February 25, 2022

What if the State of Maryland USA, where I live, was treated by the Fed as Italy is by its EU bank regulators?

Sir, Tony Barber writes: “Paradoxically, as Italy’s debt has ballooned in size, it has become more manageable. Particularly over the past two years, the crucial factor has been European Central Bank support” “Reforms and ECB help are key to Italy debt sustainability” February 25.

Although already Maryland, as all other US states is already treated quite (too) generously by bank regulators, since it cannot print dollars on its own, the capital banks need to hold when lending to it, do at least depends on its credit ratings. 

Not so in the Eurozone. Though none of its sovereigns, like Italy, can print euros on their own, and independent of their credit ratings, the banks in EU can lend to all Eurozone sovereigns, against zero capital. Something much agreed by and pushed by Mario Draghi.

It’s been hard for me to understand, especially after Brexit, why FT has kept so much silence on this Eurozone’s sovereign debt ticking bomb.

@PerKurowski

February 23, 2022

For inflation, where the money supply goes, matters a lot too

Sir, I refer to Martin Wolf’s “The monetarist dog is having its day”, FT February 23.

Yes, the money supply impacts inflation, no doubts but, when it comes to how much, that also depends on where that money supply goes.

If central banks inject liquidity through a system where, because of risk weighted capital requirements, banks can leverage more, meaning easier obtain higher risk adjusted returns on equity with Treasuries and residential mortgages, than with loans to small businesses and entrepreneurs, does that not favor demand over supply?

It does, and you should not have to be a Milton Friedman to understand that sooner or later that can only help inflate any inflation.

Wolf holds that “Central banks must be humble and prudent” Yes, and that goes for bank regulators too.

“Humble” in accepting there are huge limits to their knowing what the real risks in an uncertain world are; and “prudent” as in knowing bank capital requirements are mainly needed as a buffer against the certainty of misperceived credit risks and unexpected events, and not like now, mostly based on the certainty of perceived credit risks.

@PerKurowski

February 18, 2022

Compared to more than three decades ago, what is the current leverage ratio of our banks?

Sir, Martin Wolf, in FT on July 12, 2012, in “Seven ways to clean up our banking ‘cesspit’” opined: “Banks need far more equity: In setting these equity requirements, it is essential to recognize that so-called “risk-weighted” assets can and will be gamed by both banks and regulators. As Per Kurowski, a former executive director of the World Bank, reminds me regularly, crises occur when what was thought to be low risk turns out to be very high risk. For this reason, unweighted leverage matters. It needs to be far lower.”Soon a decade since, are bank capital requirements much higher and really sufficient?

No! Though bank capital requirements are mostly needed as a buffer against the certainty of misperceived credit risks & unexpected events, in this uncertain world, these are by far, still mostly based on the certainty of the perceived credit risks.

Consequently, when times are rosy, regulators allow banks: to lend dangerously much to what’s perceived as very safe; to hold much less capital; to do more stock buybacks and to pay more dividends & bonuses. Therefore, banks will stand there naked, when most needed. 

The leverage ratio is also important because it includes as assets, loans to governments at face value, and thereby makes it harder for excessive public bank borrowers to hide behind Basel I’s risk weights of 0% government, 100% citizens. No matter how safe the government might be, those weights de facto imply bureaucrats know better what to do with credit they’re not personally responsible for than e.g., small businesses and entrepreneurs.

November 19, 2004, in a letter you published I wrote: “Our bank supervisors in Basel are unwittingly controlling the capital flows in the world. How many Basel propositions will it take before they start realizing the damage they are doing by favoring so much bank lending to the public sector?” That this factor, in the face of huge government indebtedness, is not even discussed, as I see it can only be explained by too much inbred statism.

Before the Basel Committee Accord became operative in 1988, Basel I, banks were generally required to hold about 10 percent of capital against all assets, meaning a leverage ratio of 10.

Where do banks find themselves now? I know well it’s hard, and extremely time consuming, to make tails and heads out of current bank statements, but I’m absolutely sure most financial media, if they only dared and wanted, have the capacity to extract that information.

Should not such basic/vital data be readily available and perhaps even appear on front pages? It’s not! Why? Has media been silenced by capital minimizing/leverage maximizing dangerously creative financial engineers?

Sir, I’m not picking especially on financial journalists, the silence of the Academia, especially the tenured one, is so much worse.

@PerKurowski

How can you hold governments accountable, while their borrowings are being non-transparently subsidized?

Sir, Aveek Bhattacharya discusses various options to improve the productivity and effectiveness of public spending. “A future case for the ‘retro’ policy of public sector reform” FT February 18, 2022.

He fails to mention: Current bank capital requirements are much lower for loans to the government than for other assets. This translates into banks being able leverage much more their capital – and so making it easier for them to earn higher risk adjusted returns on equity when lending to the government than when lending to the citizens. That, which de facto implies bureaucrats know better what to do with credit they’re not personally responsible for than e.g., small businesses, turns into a subsidy of the interest rates government has to pay on its debts. Top it up with that the quantitative easing carried out by central banks is almost all through purchases of sovereign debt, and then dare think of what sovereign rates would be in the absence of such distortions.


Sir, in a letter you published in 2004, soon two decades ago I asked “How many Basel propositions will it take before regulators start realizing the damage, they are doing by favoring so much bank lending to the public sector?” Do you think this only applied to developing nations? If so, please open your eyes.

@PerKurowski

February 07, 2022

If we want public debt to protect citizens today and tomorrow, it behooves us to make sure it cannot be too easily contracted.

Sir, I refer to John Plender’s “The virtues of public debt to protect citizens” FT February 7, 2022.

Sir, as a grandfather I do fear debt burdens we might impose on future generations, but I’m absolutely not an austerity moralist. I know public debt is of great use if used right but also that the capacity to borrow it a reasonable interest rates (or the seigniorage when printing money), is a very valuable strategic sovereign asset, especially when dangers like war or a pandemic appear, and which should therefore not be irresponsibly squandered away.

In 2004, when I just finished my two-year term as an Executive Director of the World Bank, you published a letter in which I wrote “Our bank supervisors in Basel are unwittingly controlling the capital flows in the world. How many Basel propositions will it take before they start realizing the damage, they are doing by favoring so much bank lending to the public sector?”

1988 Basel I’s risk weighted bank capital requirements decreed weights of 0% the government and 100% citizens. It translates into banks being allowed to hold much less capital - being able to leverage much more, with loans to the government than with other assets.

Of course, governments, when their debts are denominated in the currency they issue, are, at least in the short-term and medium term, and in real terms before inflation might kick in, less risky credits. But de facto that also implies bureaucrats/ politicians/apparatchiks know better how to use taxpayer’s credit for which repayment they are not personally responsible for than e.g., small businesses and entrepreneurs. And Sir, that I do not believe, and I hope neither you nor John Plender do that.

Such pro-government biased bank regulations, especially when going hand in hand with generous central bank QE liquidity injections, subsidizes the “risk-free” rate, hiding the real costs of public debt. In crude-truth terms, the difference between the interest rates sovereigns would have to pay on their debts in absence of all above mentioned favors, and the current ultra-low or even negative interests they pay is, de facto, a well camouflaged tax, retained before the holders of those debts could earn it.

But of course, they are beneficiaries of all this distortion, and therefore many are enthusiastically hanging on to MMT’s type Love Potion Number Nine promises.

@PerKurowski