Excessive “intellectual gravitas” can sometimes be just as dangerous, or even more, than an insufficient one.

Sir, James Politi writes: Greg Mankiw, a respected Republican economist, did not mince words when he posted his reaction to Donald Trump’s nomination of Stephen Moore for a seat on the Federal Reserve board saying: “Steve is an amiable guy, but he does not have the intellectual gravitas for this important job.” “Donald Trump’s Fed nominee faces broad backlash” March 25.

That reminded me (again) of Edward Dolnick’s “The forger’s spell” (2009), which makes a reference to Francis Fukuyama saying that Daniel Moynihan opined: “There are some mistakes it takes a Ph.D. to make”. 

The intellectual gravitas of all those at the Fed and of all their colleagues in the bank regulatory sphere, primarily in the Basel Committee, came up with: risk weighted capital requirements for banks based on the utter nonsense that what’s ex ante perceived as risky, is more dangerous to our bank systems than what’s perceived as safe. 

An outrageous example of it is how Basel II, in its standardized risk weights, to that so dangerous because it is rated AAA to AA, they assigned a meager 20% risk weight, while, to that which is so innocous, because it has been rated a below BB-, they smacked with a 150% one.

And now, 10 years after a crisis that broke out because of excessive exposures to AAA rated securities, or to assets to which an AAA rated entity like AIG had issued a default guarantee for, the intellectuals with gravitas, persist in their mistake.

Sir, I do not know Stephen More but, if he possesses common sense, some experiences on Main Street and the willingness to question, then his possible lack of intellectual gravitas should be welcome, as something of that sort is much needed to guarantee diversity able to help block some of the incestual thinking processes.

@PerKurowski

IMF, what are tariffs on billions of trade, when compared to tariffs and subsidies on trillions of bank credit?

Sir, Chris Giles, James Politi and Stefania Palma write about concerns during recent IMF meetings in Bali, “With the world’s two largest economies slapping tariffs on $360bn of goods so far this year, and possibly more to come” “Geopolitical tension casts pall over annual IMF meeting” October 15.

Last year I read somewhere that the just world’s 10 largest banks combined had over $25 trillion in assets. So when I think on how much the allocation of those assets might be dangerously distorted by the risk weighted capital requirements, I find it hard to understand that “the world’s two largest economies slapping tariffs on $360bn of goods so far this year”, was of so much concern during the recent IMF meetings

Sir, get it, the risk weighting of banks’ capital requirements, for bank protection purposes, translates de facto into tariffs and subsidies that will steer the allocation of bank credit.

The damage, by promoting banks way too much to be into banks “safe” AAA rated securities, residential mortgages and loans to sovereigns, while de-incentivizing loans to “risky” entrepreneurs and SMEs, is immensely worse than what the current trade-wars, sort of Lilliputian vs. Blefuscu in comparison, could produce.

Sir, again, for the umpteenth time, what the risk weighted capital requirements for banks guarantee is: 

Especially large exposures to what’s perceived as especially safe, against especially little capital, which dooms or bank system to especially severe crises. 

Especially low exposures to what is perceived as risky, like loans to entrepreneurs and SMEs, which dooms our economies to weakness and to not being able to reach their potential.

@PerKurowski

Regulatory risk aversion exposes our Western civilization to the risk of a “Mom, dad, you move down to the basement!”

Claire Jones writes on Alexandru saying: “Out of every 10 of my friends, only one works. It’s not a good situation for my generation,” Alex says. He and many of his friends still live at home with their parents. “When I talk to them about the past it sounds better. They all had a job and the opportunity to have a family.” “Temporary fortunes” July 6.

And Ms Bellieni “lives with her young child and husband, who also does many temporary jobs, in a property that belongs to his parents. “Otherwise we couldn’t make it”

Banks are allowed to hold much less capital when financing houses than when financing SMEs and entrepreneurs, as regulators think the former is much safer for the bank than the latter. As a result banks can earn much higher risk adjusted returns on their equity financing houses than financing “the risky”.

But since SMEs and entrepreneurs are job creators par excellence, could these regulations create an excess of basements in which the unemployed or underemployed young can live with their parents, and a substantial lack of jobs?

Mario Draghi, the Chair of the Financial Stability Board and his ECB officials clearly do not see this as a problem, hey they might not even see it as a distortion. That could be since like overly worried nannies they are totally focused on avoiding bank crises, and do not care one iota about how banks do their job in the in-betweens.

Sir, the younger generations, squeezed by this anti Western civilization value of risk aversion, and an increased loss of jobs to robots and automation, could at some point become sufficiently enraged so as to say… “Mom and dad, you move down to the basement, it is our turn to live upstairs!”

Note: Not the first time: 2009: "Please free us from imprudent risk-aversion and give us some prudent risk-taking"

@PerKurowski

To avoid collateral damages, the fines of those who create and finance jobs should be paid in new shares and not in cash.

Sir, I refer to Henry Foy’s and James Politi’s “Volkswagen scandal fuels fears for jobs across Europe” October 13.

Again it points to reasons why the world should not impose fines payable in cash on those who misbehave and deserve punishment, but who generate jobs, or credit. That would only weaken them and thereby cause many casualties among the civilians who are not responsible.

Have them instead to pay all fines by issuing new shares to be delivered to whomever a judge feels should get these.

The dilution of existent shareholders is more than enough punishment to guarantee that management will be more careful.

And this is especially valid when regulators, by their incompetence or any other reasons, have helped to induce the misbehavior. 

http://teawithft.blogspot.com/2015/10/vw-emissions-controls-fines-for.html

http://teawithft.blogspot.com/2015/10/bank-fines-should-be-paid-with-bank.html

@PerKurowski © J

Does Schäuble know ECB’s Draghi agreed with allowing German banks to leverage over 60 times when lending to Greece?

Sir, Anne-Sylvaine Chassany, James Politi and Peter Spiegel write about “Wolfgang Schäuble, advocating a Greek ‘timeout from the eurozone’ for ‘at least the next five years’ if Athens did not accept the bloc’s exacting conditions for a new bailout”; and of that “Germany puts more onus on stricter rules and control from the centre”. “Fears over German power as Merkel and Schäuble end the good cop, bad cop routine” July 18.

That leads me to question whether Wolfgang Schäuble really knows that rules and control from the centre, in this case by the Basel Committee, allowed German banks, between June 2004 and November 2009, to leverage their capital over 60 times when lending to Greece.

And does Schäuble know that banks in Greece are currently required to hold much less capital when lending to Germany or France, than when lending to Greek SMEs and entrepreneur, so as to help Greece develop the means to be able to at least somewhat serve its monstrous debts?

I ask so because it would seem much more important for Schäuble to request a very long timeout from all ongoing negotiations about the future of Europe, the Eurozone and Greece, of the Basel Committee and of all those who have directly had anything to do with current bank regulations.

And does Schäuble know that Mario Draghi, as a former chair of the Financial Stability Board, is one of those severely compromised bank regulators?

Is the Catholic Church now telling the Lutheran Church: “Thou shall not sell carbon indulgences”?

Sir I refer to James Politi’ and Giulia Segreti’s “Pope says multinationals and greed threaten environment” June 19.

Pope Francis’ encyclical Laudato Si states: “171. The strategy of buying and selling “carbon credits” can lead to a new form of speculation which would not help reduce the emission of polluting gases worldwide. This system seems to provide a quick and easy solution under the guise of a certain commitment to the environment, but in no way does it allow for the radical change which present circumstances require. Rather, it may simply become a ploy which permits maintaining the excessive consumption of some countries and sectors.”

I have for years I argued that the “carbon credits” so much promoted by Germany among others, are like the indulgences sold by the Catholic Church for the forgiveness of sins, and which Martin Luther protested. And so now, in a strange twist of history, it seems it is the Catholic Church that is telling the Lutheran Church “Thou shall not sell indulgencies”

@PerKurowski

When you cut off economic buds from fair access to bank credit you cannot but get slim pickings in the job market

Sir, I refer to James Politi’s report on US jobs “Slim pickings” July 21.

When you have bank regulations which, by means of capital requirements based on perceived risk, discriminate against fair access to bank credit of medium and small businesses, entrepreneurs and start-ups, you stop energizing the labor market, and therefore all you will get is some obese growth… and so of course there will be slim pickings… like mostly low-wage jobs increases. And the same or even worse goes for Europe.

Risk weighted capital requirements undoubtedly distorts the allocation of bank credit to the real economy. To see this problem being completely absent from the discussions at for instance the Federal Reserve, is truly sad.

Perhaps that silence has to do with no one being able to coherently explain a valid reason for those regulations… or, as John Kenneth Galbraith worded it in his “Money” 1975, “There is a reluctance in our time to attribute great consequences to human inadequacy – to what, in a semantically less cautious era, was called stupidity” [all made worse because] “men of reputation naturally see the person who has been right as a threat to their own eminence”.

Indeed... why not a tax on too-big-to-fail-banks?

Sir, I refer to James Politi’s and Gina Chon’s “Big banks pledge to fight tax on assets” February 26.

In May 2003, more than a decade ago, as an Executive Director of the World Bank (2002-2004), below is what I told some hundred bank regulators gathered at the World Bank for a Risk Management Workshop.

“There is a thesis that holds that the old agricultural traditions of burning a little each year, thereby getting rid of some of the combustible materials, was much wiser than today’s no burning at all, that only allows for the buildup of more incendiary materials, thereby guaranteeing disaster and scorched earth, when fire finally breaks out, as it does, sooner or later.

Therefore a regulation that regulates less, but is more active and trigger-happy, and treats a bank failure as something normal, as it should be, could be a much more effective regulation. The avoidance of a crisis, by any means, might strangely lead us to the one and only bank, therefore setting us up for the mother of all moral hazards—just to proceed later to the mother of all bank crises.

Knowing that “the larger they are, the harder they fall,” if I were regulator, I would be thinking about a progressive tax on size. But, then again, I am not a regulator, I am just a developer.”

And while you're at it, Mr. Dave Camp, US Congress, House Ways and Means Commitee, look into this too

Bernanke’s “close to zero interest while unemployment is high” squares mostly with increased public sector employment

Sir, on your front page of December 13, we read about Ben Bernanke announcing “The US Federal Reserve is expected to keep its rates at close to zero until unemployment falls below 6.5 percent”. 

Excuse me Mr. Bernanke: Interests at close to zero for whom? For those for which banks can lend without holding much capital, “The Infallible”, triple-As and the sovereign, that might be true. But for those banks are required to hold many times more capital against, like all borrowers that do not have a credit rating or do not have a top credit rating, "The Risky", like small and medium businesses and entrepreneurs, some truly important job creators, that is certainly not true. The fact is that the real risk adjusted interest rate differential between “The Infallible” and “The Risky” must be widening by the minute, as bank capital grow scarcer and scarcer, as some of "The Infallible" ex-post join "The Risky"

And since according to the regulators the most infallible of them all, is the Government, and would therefore be the one receiving more and more of these “close to zero interest” funds, it would seem that the only way we will be able to have unemployment to fall below 6.5 percent is by creating public sector employment. Is this the unstated objective? If so, that is not very transparent.

To reform financial regulations we need to reform the Basel Committee.

In May 2003, as an Executive Director of the World Bank, I told those many present at a risk management workshop for regulators the following with respect to the role of the Credit Rating Agencies. “I simply cannot understand how a world that preaches the value of the invisible hand of millions of market agents can then go out and delegate so much regulatory power to a limited number of human and very fallible credit-rating agencies. This sure must be setting us up for the mother of all systemic errors.” And this I repeated over and over again, in FT, even in a formal statement at the Board.

Now as reported by Alan Beattie and James Politi in “IMF points to danger of ‘over-reliance’ on credit ratings for sovereign debtors” September 30, the IMF is finally admitting “Policy makers should work towards the elimination of rules and regulation that hardwire buy or sell decisions to ratings”

That is good, better late than never. But the real question that needs an answer is why on earth it had to take a financial crisis of monstrous proportions to reach a conclusion that should have been apparent to any regulator from the very beginning.

I saw it happen in front of my eyes and I know why it happened. As I wrote in a letter published in the Financial Times in November 2004, it was the result of the whole debate about bank regulations being sequestered by the members of a small mutual admiration club.

Therefore if there is now something even more important than rectifying the faulty financial regulations, that is to break up the Basel Committee and make absolutely sure it represents a much more diversified group of thinkers. That would have at least guaranteed that the basic question of what the purpose of the banks should be would have been put in the forefront before regulating them. Current regulations do not contain one word about that.

Besides me there were not plenty of experts who raised the question of whether the credit rating agencies should have such a prominent role and made many other valid criticisms. These persons should participate in designing and putting in place the needed reforms. It is simply unacceptable that the reforms that carry with them such huge global implications are implemented exclusively by Monday morning quarterbacks.

We need to slam Moody too!

Sir, “Moody’s slams private equity” is how Francesco Guerrera and James Politi title their report on July 9 about the strong criticism that this credit rating agency is making about the private equity industry; and I believe it is high time for us to slam Moody as clearly the powers they yield over the markets is getting to their heads. Who do they think they are? Is a neutral credit rating agency supposed to get involved into what business their clients do? If they do not like how the business is structured, and believe it will affect negatively the credit ratings, then they should say so, in their ratings. To come up with unsolicited a priori advices that could only bias their future outlooks is not what they are supposed to do. Next time they might just opine on the cars that GM should produce to get a rating.

Let’s face it, if we do not stand up to the credit rating agencies we will help to create and strengthen some real financial Frankenstein monsters, authorized to dictate their feelings about anything. And, do not get me wrong, there is not a world in Moody’s comment about the private equity industry that I would object to, I just object, totally, that they should be the messenger. The credit rating agencies have already far too much power for their and our own good.

About the low cost of equity and the need of Chinese “sovereign” walls

Sir, John Plender in “An unseen risk in sovereign wealth funds” (from China) June 22, mention that they might lead us “from unusually low interest rates to the conundrum of an artificially low cost of equity capital”. It sounds correct but then when later reading, that same day and just four pages away, “One door opens…” by Francesco Guerrera and James Politi that describes Blackstone’s core business as “buying companies and assets, loading them up with debt and selling them for a profit; and Ben White’s “A banking flotilla offers safe passage” that indicates a proposed Blackstone valuation of “about 26 times last year’s pro-forma economic net income, Plender’s risk prediction becomes more a reporting of facts. Also, given that China’s willingness to keep on continuing financing the market will have an impact on interest rates one cannot help but to think of how to adapt the corporate concept such as a “Chinese wall” which separates traders with conflicts of interest to a sovereign environment.