Showing posts with label Edmund Phelps. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Edmund Phelps. Show all posts

March 03, 2015

Edmund Phelps, Europe has not run out of ideas, it has run out of the will of trying these out… "it’s too damn risky”

Sir, I refer to Edmund Phelps, the 2006 Nobel laureate in Economics’, the director of the Center on Capitalism and Society at Columbia University’s “Europe is a continent that has run out of ideas” March 3. He argues Europe “needs to fight for an economic life worth living”. Indeed but perhaps it is not because a lack of ideas.

In Europe bank credit is one of the main sources for implementing ideas, and any continent which allows its banks to leverage more on what is “safe” than on what is perceived as “risky”, which means allowing its banks to obtain higher risk adjusted returns on equity on safe than on risky assets, is simply a continent that does not want ideas to be tried out, as new ideas quite often signify more risks.

Professor Phelps, in Europe, banks are refinancing the past and not financing the future.

Professor Phelps, I am sorry but I must inform you of the sad fact that the banks of the Western world have been castrated.

June 14, 2014

Most certainly Martin Wolf did not explain to Edmund Phelps how bank regulations are stacked against small banks and their clients.

Sir, Martin Wolf’s lunch with Edmund Phelps ends with Phelps saying “I would like to see the American economy go back to small banks rooted in communities where the banks know something about the local start-ups” "A romantic economist?" June 14.

Unfortunately Professor Phelps, that is impossible, because regulators have structured modern banking around the concept that those who are primarily to know the clients of the banks are not the bankers, but some credit rating agencies. And if by any chance the small bank would try to get to know his local client, and decided to trust him with a loan, then it would be required to hold much more capital since the Basel Committee seemingly believes that anything small and local has to be very risky.

Sir, most certainly Martin Wolf did not explain anything of this to Phelps, since he clearly thinks that this is of absolutely no importance.

PS. Sir, just to let you know, I am not copying Martin Wolf with this, as he has asked me not to send him any more comments related to the capital requirements for banks, as he understands it all… at least so he thinks.

January 31, 2014

When regulators exorcised primal risk-taking from the banks, they doomed our economies to decadence.

Sir, Edmund Phelps writes that “Nations with once-dynamic economies will be helpless to recover their prosperity as long as they misunderstand what causes economic progress”, "Free innovators from the state’s deadening hand”, January 31.

Indeed before it is realized that primal risk-taking is what leads to innovations and start-ups, and which is what keeps the economy sturdy muscular. Any economic growth based on risk-aversion leads only to economic obesity. Unfortunately, bank regulators, with their loony capital requirements based on ex ante perceived expected losses exorcised such risk taking from the banks.

And Edmund Phelps also correctly states “The state is no better suited to take a big role in the technical innovation than in artistic creation”. But Phelps might not be aware of how bank regulations are stacked in favor of the state assuming such role. Currently when a bank gives a loan to a “risky” innovator, let’s for example call it a Solyndra; it is required to have much much more capital than when lending it to the “infallible sovereign”, and so that instead a bureaucrat can relend that money to an innovator, like a Solyndra.

August 28, 2013

Much of our nations’ “desire and dreams” were killed in the laboratories of bank regulators

Sir, Luke Johnson quotes Professor Edmund Burke, from his book “Mass Flourishing” believing “that the ‘glorious history of desire and dreams’ has run out of steam”, “The small start-ups are as vital as the starts” August 28.

Of course it has. How could it not, with bank regulators who allow banks to finance the “absolutely infallible”, the AAAristocracy, against much less capital than when lending to the small risky start-ups… and which means that the banks will earn a much higher risk adjusted return on equity when lending to the former, than when to the latter.

As I had the opportunity to do in a letter yesterday I would also suggest Luke Johnson to compare today’s banking with how, in Mary Poppins, Mr. Banks and his colleagues describe their Fidelity Fiduciary Bank

If you invest your tuppence, wisely in the bank, safe and sound

Soon that tuppence, safely invested in the bank, will compound
And you'll achieve that sense of conquest, as your affluence expands
In the hands of the directors, who invest as propriety demands
You see, my friend. You'll be part of railways through Africa.
Dams across the Nile. Fleets of ocean greyhounds.
Majestic, self-amortizing canals. Plantations of ripening tea
All from tuppence, prudently, fruitfully, frugally invested.

We used to pray for in our churches “God make us daring!” Clearly our bank regulators never attended mass.

April 15, 2009

What bedevilled the world was the belief in certainty.

Sir Edmund Phelps writes that “Uncertainty bedevils the best system” April 15 and though I agree of course with that uncertainty is part of any system, what has really bedevilled us lately has been the belief in certainty. In this respect Mr. Phelps would do well reading the basic first pillar of the bank regulatory system that emanated from the Basel Committee and in the minimum capital requirements for the banks he would find that the regulators formally authorized an astonishing 62.5 to 1 leverage if banks lent to corporations rated AAA to AA- by some human fallible credit rating agencies.

If there ever was a dysfunctional, naive and gullible regulatory system that arrogantly believed it had the risks under control, this was it. Our current problem is that the same regulators that came up with this are still in charge of regulating.

October 20, 2008

Yep 9 different credit ratings per security would do it!

Sir Roman Frydman, Michael Goldberg and Edmund Phelps tell us that “We must not rely solely on the rosiest ratings” October 20, and that “No single individual or institution can render a definitive judgment on the riskiness of securities. Friedrich Hayek showed that only markets can aggregate knowledge that is not given to anyone in its totality”, which is of course absolutely right.

But then they tell us “Rating agencies and issuers of securities have to help the market perform this function” and in order to do so “when assessing an asset, agencies should be required to report at least two ratings and the methodology used to arrive at each: one assuming that historical patterns will continue and at least one other assuming the reversals in the trends of major variables” which is of course totally incongruous with their first statement.

Unless their idea is to have the credit rating agencies reporting so many scenarios that they dilute themselves in a sea of irrelevance… Yes, that is an idea on how to get rid of the credit rating agencies without having to tell them so. Let us ask for nine scenarios covering the range between an AAA and a Caa2!