The still ticking 0% Risk Weight Sovereign Debt Privilege bomb, awaits Mario Draghi’s successor at ECB

Sir, Martin Wolf, sort of implying Mario Draghi followed his recommendations, which of course could be true, holds that “Draghi did the right things, above all with his celebrated remark in July 2012 that ‘within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro’”. “Jens Weidmann casts a shadow over the ECB” June 11.

Did Draghi resolve that crisis for the better, or did he just postpone it for the worse?

That’s is not at all clear. In March 2015 the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) published a “Report on the regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures.” Let me quote from its foreword:

“The report argues that, from a macro-prudential point of view, the current regulatory framework may have led to excessive investment by financial institutions in government debt. 

The report recognizes the difficulty in reforming the existing framework without generating potential instability in sovereign debt markets. 

I trust that the report will help to foster a discussion that, in my view, is long overdue.” Signed Mario Draghi, ESRB Chair

The regulatory aspect that report most refers to is, for purposes of risk weighted capital requirements for banks (and insurance companies), the assignment of a 0% risk weight to all Eurozone sovereigns. 

Though the report states that: “Sovereign defaults… have occurred regularly throughout history, including for sovereign debt denominated and funded in domestic currency”, it does not put forward that all these eurozone sovereign debts are denominated in a currency that de facto is not a domestic printable one of any of these sovereigns.

Since Mario Draghi seems to have done little or nothing since then to diffuse this 0% Sovereign Debt Privilege bomb, which if it detonates could bring the euro down, and with it perhaps EU, this is the most important issue at hand. 

So when choosing a candidate to succeed Draghi as president of ECB the question that has to be made is whether that person is capable enough to handle that monstrous challenge. Who is? Jens Weidmann? I have no idea.

Sir, it would be interesting to hear what Martin Wolf would have to say to the new president of ECB about this. What would a “Do what it takes” imply in that case? 

PS. And when Greece was able to contract excessive debt precisely because its 0% risk weight should not the European Union have behaved with much more solidarity, instead of having Greece walk the plank alone?

PS. If I were one of those over 750 members of the European Parliament here are the questions I would make and, if these were not answered in simple understandable terms, I would resign, not wanting to be a part of a Banana Union.

PS. "The current regulatory framework may have led to excessive investment by financial institutions in government debt." Really?

PS. Is there a way to defuse that bomb? Perhaps but any which way you try presents risks. One way could be to allow all banks to continue to hold all eurozone sovereign debt they current posses, against a 0% risk weight, until these mature or are sold by the banks; and, in steps of 20% each year, bring the risk weight for any new sovereign debt they acquire up until it reaches 100%... or more daringly but perhaps more needed yet, set the risk weight for any new sovereign debt acquired immediately to 100%, so as to allow the market to send its real messages. 

The same procedure could/should be applied all other bank assets that currently have a risk weight below 100%, like for instance residential mortgages.

Would it work? I don’t really know, a lot depends on how the market prices the regulatory changes for debt and bank capital . But getting rid of risk weighted bank capital requirements is something that must happen, urgently, for the financial markets to regain some sense of sanity.

PS. An alternative would be doing it in a Chilean style. Being very flexible with bank capital requirements, even accepting 0%, even having ECB do repos with banks non-performing loans: BUT NO dividends, NO buybacks and NO big bonuses, until banks have 10% capital against all assets, sovereign debts included.

PS. I just discovered that Sharon Bowles, MEP, 
Chair Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee
 of the European Parliament, in a speech titled "Regulatory and Supervisory Reform of EU Financial Institutions – What Next?
 at the Financial Stability and Integration Conference,
 2 May 2011, said the following:

“I have frequently raised the effect of zero risk weighting for sovereign bonds within the Eurozone, and its contribution to removing market discipline by giving lower spreads than there should have been. It also created perverse incentives during the crisis.”

That is very clear warning that something is extremely wrong... and yet nothing was done about it.

PS. And in 2015 the European Commission also described the problem with the zero-risk weighted sovereign debts within the eurozone.

PS. https://perkurowski.blogspot.com/1998/11/burning-bridges-in-europe.html

PS. In Financial Times 2004: “How long before regulators realize the damage, they’re doing by favoring so much bank lending to the public sector? In some countries, access to credit for the private sector is all but gone, and the banks are up to the hilt in public credits”

The empowerment of the Bureaucracy Autocracy

“Assets for which bank capital requirements were nonexistent, were what had most political support: sovereign credits. A simple ‘leverage ratio’ discouraged holdings of low-return government securities” Paul Volcker

PS. December 6, 2025, because of:

https://subprimeregulations.blogspot.com/2025/12/ai-chatgpt-grok-does-basel-committees.html
I nominated ChatGPT and Grok, for the 2026 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences.

https://x.com/PerKurowski/status/1996870656542330994

@PerKurowski

The 0% risk weight assigned by Eurozone authorities to Greece’s sovereign debt helped put that nation’s weaknesses on steroids.

Sir, Tony Barber quotes Roderick Beaton’s Greece: Biography of a Nation, with a Greek former government minister saying in 2017 that the homegrown causes included “poor governance, clientelism, weak institutions [and] lack of competitiveness”. For his part, Beaton observes: “Systemic problems . . . combined in a toxic way with structural weaknesses in the European project, particularly the systems devised to oversee the single currency without a single fiscal authority for the eurozone.” “Greece’s eternal conflict”, March 23.

I have not read the book but, if a former government minister can describe Greece as he does it should be absolutely clear that such sovereign does not merit a 0% risk weight, much less so when it is taking in debt denominated in a currency that de facto is not it domestic (printable) one. 

But yet the Eurozone authorities did so, which of course only could help to feed “poor governance, clientelism, weak institutions [and] lack of competitiveness”

The sad part is that those authorities have refused to recognize their mistake, and so Greece has been forced to take the full blame for its crisis. EU, what a Banana Union! 

@PerKurowski

If there’s a re-vote on Brexit, what will the Remainers suggest Britain remains in?

Sir, Jeff Colegrave makes a well reasoned case of why, if there is a new vote on Brexit, it is on the Remainers’ shoulders to make very clear what they are supporting to remain in. “Remainers risk hubris without a positive case for the union” December 17.

The three outstanding problems Colegrave wants to have a clear definition on are:

How the Eurozone can avoid that a generation of youth becomes again sacrificed, on the altar of the common currency.

How the EU can avoid manifestly failing to adequately address the issue of migration. 

And “the lack of democratic political architecture within the European project, [which] cannot lightly be dismissed as some kind of arcane irrelevance. 

I could not agree more. I would be a committed Remainer, only if EU shows clear intentions to stop being such a Banana Union. You do not build a real United European States with a bureaucracy such as that currently present in Brussels.

Let me be clearer yet. If a Remain wins, the last thing British citizen, or all of their other EU citizens colleagues need, is for that to be presented as a triumph or an endorsement of Brussels.

PS: With respect to the sacrifices on the altar of the common currency, I have sent you many letters, in which I have blamed EU authorities for the tragic over-indebtedness of many euro sovereigns, when assigning to the public debt contracted in a currency that de facto is not their domestic (printable) currency, for purposes of bank capital requirements, a 0% risk weight. But of course these letters are ignored, because Per Kurowski suffers just an obsession about current bank regulations. 

@PerKurowski

Is Italy’s 0% risk weighted sovereign debt in euros really denominated in their own currency? NO!

Sir, on the eve of the euro, November 1998, in an Op-ed titled “Burning the bridges in Europe” I wrote: “The possibility that the European countries will subordinate their political desires to the whims of a common Central Bank that may be theirs but really isn’t, is not a certainty. Exchange rates, while not perfect, are escape valves. By eliminating this valve, European countries must make their economic adjustments in real terms. This makes these adjustments much more explosive.”

Now you write: “On Tuesday the European Commission, taking a step without precedent in the euro’s 20-year life, demanded that Italy should re-submit its 2019 budget” “Roman theatre clashes with the EU rule book” October 25.

EC’s demand is the direct consequence of Italy no longer possessing the escape valve that a devaluation of their lira used to signify. Not only that. As Italy’s debt is no longer denominated in liras, it will not really have the domestic “benefit” of inflation in their own devalued currency. It is now supposed, like Greece, to serve its debt in euros partly made stronger, by surplus countries like Germany. 

To rub salt into the wound, EU authorities, the European Commission, for the purpose of the risk weighted capital requirements for banks, by means of something known as “Sovereign Debt Privileges” or “Equity Capital Privilege”, assigned a 0% risk weight to Italy, which of course had to doom it to unsustainable public debt.

Sir, it is mindboggling how little EU has done to really confront the challenges posed by the euro, those that if unresolved will bring the EU down.

Similarly, it is mindboggling how in all overheated Brexit/Remain discussions, so little attention has been given to the EUs very delicate conditions. How would history recount if the day after Britain capitulates and hands over its Remain, the EU would break up?

Sir, again, I am strongly in favor of the European Union, but not a Banana Union run by eurocrats whose children or grandchildren do most certainly not know how to sing the European Union’s anthem, and if they did, would never put as much enthusiasm into it as Sofia Goggia did when singing her Italy’s national anthem at the Winter Olympics of 2017. 

@PerKurowski

Instead of working on a Brexit, Britain should do all Europeans a favor and negotiate a very tough EU Remainer

Sir, Simon Kuper, in a back and forth discussion on Brexit, ends upcontemplating “a soft Brexit or Brino, in which Britain becomes a poorer Norway, accepting all European rules including freedom of movement to keep trade and travel flowing.” “Why there won’t be a no-deal Brexit” October 4.

As a reason for that Kuper opines “Few European officials want the UK back now, anyway”. Indeed I can understand that EU’s Brussels bureaucrats feeling rejected and questioned want to spank the Brits for Brexit, but do Europeans want that too? I don’t think so.

Sir, as I see it, and as I have been writing to you for some time, the best way out is a tough Remainder offer in which Britain lays clear what it wants the EU to do, in order to want to remain a member of it.

I am not a Brit, and I do not live in Europe, but my list of request would include:

1. EU needs to solve the challenges that the euro poses to it and about which they have done little to nothing in the twenty years since its inception. If they do not do that, the EU has no future. And don’t let them tell you those challenges were not known.

2. EU must make sure never again treat one of its members like it treated Greece, which for the risk weighted capital requirement it assigned a risk weight of 0%, and thereby doomed it to tragic excessive indebtedness, only to later put the whole blame, and costs of that, mistake on Greece.

3. Understand that Europe has no future with risk adverse risk weighted capital requirements for banks that distort the allocation of credit to the real economy, and sets it up to a financial crisis of monstrous proportions, by means of incentivizing dangerous excessive bank exposures to something considered especially safe, against especially little capital. 

4. That EU stops behaving like a Banana Union getting involved into such issues as regulating the entry fees to Romanian monasteries.

Sir, if those requests would come to fruition, many Europeans would be immensely thankful to Britain… again.

@PerKurowski

What if Britain could use a Remain to make the EU a more worthy union?

Sir, Martin Wolf writes “EU is a peace project that works by embedding mutual relations in a framework of equally-applicable and legally-binding rules. The mutual trust necessary to make the EU work depends on this.” “Misunderstanding the European project” October 5.

How beautiful, but does the reality stand up to this? I don’t think so. As example EU authorities, for the risk weighted capital requirements for banks decreed a 0% risk weight for Greece and, as a direct consequence Greece was offered too much credit and, unable to resist, took on too much debt. But then EU blamed Greece for it all, and left it alone to pay for it all.

Also, the number one EU challenge is to help many of its members meet the challenges the euro poses, challenges that were known from the very start. Have they done this? No, in the euro’s soon twenty years, EU techno/bureaucrats have spend more time on a lot of other minor issues that sometimes makes one think more of a Banana Union. 

How can/should a Remainder Britain respond to EU? Definitely not with a “sorry, we made a mistake” but much more by requiring EU to do whatever is needed to make it what Martin Wolf wants it to be.

Britain might need a EU but EU might need Britain just as much. So what a great historic opportunity it would be if Britain used a Remain to leverage EU into something much better?

If nothing comes from it that might be because the European Union dream might have been taken over by European Union profiteers and, if so, Brexit shines much better.

PS: Wolf writes “the parallel Jeremy Hunt drew between the EU and Soviet Union was so stupid and offensive. The Soviets sent tanks into East Berlin in 1953, Budapest in 1956 and Prague in 1968.” I am not that sure, the Basel Committee, with the enthusiastic approval of EU sent in 0% risk weights for sovereigns and 100% for citizens. These will prove to be more dangerous to the Western World than all Russian tanks multiplied by thousands.

PS. What would Martin Wolf suggest Britain says to the European Union if it backs down from Brexit? “Sorry EU we did not really mean it?

@PerKurowski

Does Britain still have sufficient resolve capacity? If yes, perhaps a no-deal Brexit could be a good time to exercise that muscle.

Sir, Wolfgang Münchau though he states“If the UK were to crash out of the EU I doubt the bloc’s leaders would sit down to negotiate” he also a bit contradictory opines“the EU has a much lower political pain threshold for a hard Brexit.” “A no-deal Brexit creeps closer” September 24.

Even though the debates on Brexit seem to have been politically skewed to only mention Britain suffering from Brexit, in any which shape it comes, I agree with Münchau on that the EU could also suffer a lot of political pain.

I am not a Brit. Way back I spent a year in London practicing at a now sadly extinct merchant bank, and studying at London Business School and London School of Economics. I have also had English corporations as clients, and of course I have many good friends there. So let me say the following from the heart.

If Britain has the needed resolve capacity to take on a no-deal Brexit then, having to use it could help to strengthen its resolve capacity for the many other probably even larger challenges awaiting them and all of us around the corner. If Britain does not have it, then accommodating to EU wishes, will de facto also weaken its general inventory of resolve capacity.

All that is made worse by the fact that in many ways many of EU’s “successes” seem more the result of heavy marketing by the European Commission, than grounded on real results. For me that EU has not been able in twenty years to really tackle the challenges posed by the euro; and that after its own authorities assigned a risk weight of 0% to Greece, it left that nation to pay on its own for the over-indebtedness that had to result, makes it clear that something very serious is amiss in the EU. In fact, when I see some of its promo material such as regulating the entrance fees to a monastery in Romania I have even caught myself thinking of a Banana Union.

At the time of the Winter Olympics, I was blown away when I saw the enthusiasm of Italy’s Soffia Goggia singing her national anthem after getting a gold medal. Surely few would sing the European anthem that way. And though I know, after looking it up on the web, that Maryland USA, were I live, has an anthem I have never ever heard it.

Sir, creating a Union is something that also needs a lot of heart put into it. Do those hearts exist sufficiently in Britain or in Europe? If the answer is no, then perhaps it would not be contrary for Britain to exercise some of its resolve capacity now. Like with any other muscle, if you do not use it you lose it. 

@PerKurowski

In the case of Greece EU violated a fundamental principle of a Union... solidarity.

Sir, Jem Eskenazi in his letter writes about EU’s “fundamental principle of integrating a fractured continent into a peaceful whole”“EU is right to protect its fundamental principles” September 21.

I agree but EU authorities have egregiously violated that principle in the case of Greece. 

Given Greece’s historical trajectory as a debtor country, for purposes of the capital requirements for banks, it could perhaps have been assigned a 200% risk weight. Instead some of EU’s head-honchos, I have no names, there usually are no names behind these decisions, decided to risk weigh Greece 0%. 

That, in very simple terms, meant that European banks did not need to hold one single euro in capital when lending to the sovereign of Greece. So of course European banks could not resist the temptations of lending massively to Greece, and of course the Greek government did not have the strength to resist such offers, and so of course it all ended up in a tragic over-indebtedness.

But did EU recognize its role creating this mess and has really paid up for its mistake? No! So now all newborn Greeks will have to grow up in a land burden by a monstrous mortgage, more than € 30.000 for each one of them,unless they decide to emigrate. That is no way to treat a member of a union.

Neither have EU authorities, like the European Commission, dedicated itself sufficiently to solve the immense challenges the euro poses, busying themselves instead with so many other minutia and issues that are none of their business.

There will soon be 20 years since the euro was adopted, and at that time I wrote an Op-ed titled “Burning the bridges in Europe” that should give me some rights to opine. 

I do not believe EU authorities, like the European Commission, has dedicated itself sufficiently to solve the challenges posed by the euro and which, if left unresolved, could lead to a tragic break up of EU, with immense consequences to the world. I have seen it though engaging in minutia, like negotiating entry fees for tourists to Romanian monasteries, and which has only lead me to think about a Banana Union. 

Sir, I would not have voted for Brexit but now I am not really sure. Lately, some of the discussions remind me of passengers in a lifeboat trying to negotiate their future with the captain of the Titanic.

PS. I forgot to mention the fact that the euro is not a real domestic currency for any eurozone nation, which makes the 0% risk weight even harder to explain.

PS. Again, even with a hard Brexit, if the euro challenges are kept unresolved, Britain might end up having left EU in the nick of time

@PerKurowski

If EU does not face and solve the challenges posed by the euro, it will break down.

Sir, you write, “Joining the euro meant losing the ability to depreciate its currency — long Italy’s safety valve when its competitiveness failed to keep pace with its neighbours.” “Italy needs real economic plans, not empty slogans” September 6.

On the eve of the euro in an Op-Ed I wrote, “Exchange rates, while not perfect, are escape valves. By eliminating this valve, European countries must make their economic adjustments in real terms. This makes these adjustments much more explosive.”

And that EU authorities must have known was the main challenge the euro posed. And of course it is not only about Italy. Without the euro the Deutsche Mark would have revalued and Germany would not have its current trade surplus.

But what have the European authorities done to face up to that challenge? Basically nothing, just empty slogans. Instead EC have even dared to keep busy with helping to solve cases like persuading church authorities to establish non-discriminatory entry fees for the monasteries... that's acting like a Banana Union.

But, as if that was not enough they also went and risk weighted the capital requirements for banks for all EU sovereigns at 0%, which means that market interest signals on sovereign debt have been artificially lowered, and so that EU banks can easier finance any disequilibria... and that even though all Eurozone sovereigns denominated their debt in a currency that is not really their domestic (printable) one.

Sir, irresponsible EU authorities are dooming that beautiful dream of the European Union, to turn into a real nightmare… and I am truly surprised by how little that fact has played out in all the discussions on Brexit.

PS. Though Greece should perhaps have been risk-weighted 200%, EU authorities assigned it 0%. As a consequence, Greece took on too much debt; and EU ignored its responsibility for it. Now each newborn Greek carries a huge mortgage. Is that how a Union should behave? I don’t think so.

PS. I first read about that monastery fees issue in a brochure that the then European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services, Michel Barnier, handed out in June 2011 during a conference in Washington at the Brookings Institute.

PS. On a different topic: The following, from a transcript, is a question I made during that conference, and Mr. Barnier's answer.

"MR. KEROVSKY: Yes, my name is Pere Kerovsky. Europe is there -- is what it is because of a lot of willingness to take risks, and in fact partisan songs often include “God make us daring,” and Pope John Paul II asked us to fish in deep waters, not settle for the (inaudible). But the last 20 years we have had bank regulations that are based on perceived risk and that have introduced a risk adverseness into the system, obviously a crisis that detonated in triple A-rated land and sovereign is not a crisis because of excessive risk taking but because of excessive adverseness of risk. You still are going the same route. Does this mean, really, that Europe has called it quits? Has capitulated and doesn’t want to really go forward because they’re giving up their willingness to take the risks needed? 

MR. BARNIER: I was amused by your first reference to fishing in deep water. I was a fisher’s minister (laughter), so I’m very interested in that. There’s less and less fish in deep waters, you know that. Watch out. 

Don’t count on me to say it’s business as usual. It’s not possible. Perhaps it is what certain bankers wish or -- but it’s no longer possible for citizens. We are not there to prevent risk-taking. We’re there to prevent excessive risk-taking. The payers are not the ones who are taking risk; it’s the taxpayers. When I see how compensations and bonuses have been calculated with riskier and riskier systems since the riskier the more paid you were, I think it’s one of the reasons of the crisis, and you know it. Who paid in the end? Taxpayers here and elsewhere. But we’re not there to prevent risk-taking. Everybody has to assume the risk responsibilities and pay the price, and we have to know who is doing what. 

I don’t see how a general system, which is not there yet, in food transparency would prevent risk-taking, but I think we should take risk, and I take risk in my planning, but those who take risks must be ready to accept that it is well known and then assume the responsibility.” 

Sir, I hope you understand by now how far Michel Barnier was from understanding the risk of excessive regulatory risk aversion, that which caused the 2007-08 crisis explosion, because of especially excessive exposures by banks, against especially little capital, to what was perceived or decreed as especially safe.

@PerKurowski