November 30, 2020

12 years since, and yet the true cause of the 2008 crisis shall seemingly not be told

Sir, John Flint a former Before chief executive of HSBC writes: “Before 2008, regulators’ approach to conduct risk in banking was what they called “principles based” — deliberately light touch. It relied too much on banks’ abilities to govern themselves and it failed.” “Warning lights are flashing for Big Tech as they did for banks” November 30.

“principles based”? Yes, but tragically with risk weighted bank capital requirements based on a very wrong principle, namely that what’s perceived as risky is more dangerous to our bank system than what’s perceived as safe.

“It relied too much on banks’ abilities to govern themselves and it failed.”? No, it relied way too much on some very few human fallible credit rating agencies, a systemic risk.

“deliberately light touch”? If as Basel II allowed​, ​ banks could leverage a mindboggling 62.5 times their capital with assets rated AAA to AA, I would not call that a “light touch”, I would call it putting Minsky Moments on steroids.

“This time it is the technology sector rather than the financial that is leaving us all exposed.”

Sir, current bank capital requirements, 12 years since the 2008 crisis, are still mostly based on the expected credit risks banks clear for on their own; not on misperceived credit risks, 2008’ AAA rated MBS, or unexpected dangers, like COVID-19. Therefore, banks will again stand there with their pants down. A good job Sir?

@PerKurowski



November 24, 2020

FT you have the manpower to analyze how risk weighted bank capital requirements distort the allocation of bank credit.

Sir, Megan Greene writes: “Stubbornly low interest rates have failed to generate significant aggregate demand. That suggests the world has been stuck in a prolonged liquidity trap.” “Financial policymakers are right to fight the last war”, November 24.

FT would do all a favor if it sends out its savvy journalists to investigate bank rates given the current different capital requirements. That should cover assets risk-weighted 20%, 50%, 100% and 150%. And then they should try to analyze how these rates relate to each other and how this compares the relation of interest rates for similar assets, before the introduction in 2004 of the risk weighted bank capital requirements for private sector assets.

That would allow FT to understand how these regulations distort the allocation of credit in favor of those who being perceived as safe are favored anyway, and against those who perceived as risky are anyhow disfavored.

But what fighting the last war is Greene talking about? The 2008 crisis was caused by AAA rated securities turning out risky but our bank regulations still are mostly based on the expected credit risks banks should clear for on their own; not on misperceived credit risks or unexpected dangers, like COVID-19. As a consequence, banks will now stand there with their pants down. Good job!


@PerKurowski

November 09, 2020

By not asking all the questions that need to be asked, journalists also fail society.

Sir, Henry Manisty writes “financial journalism plays a vital role in upholding the integrity of financial markets”, “EU regulators have form on obstructing journalists” November 9.

Indeed, but in many respects, financial journalists have often failed society by not doing that. For instance, here are just three examples of questions that should have been posed directly to the regulators, long ago.

We know that those excessive bank exposures that can be dangerous to banks and bank systems are always created with assets perceived as safe, never ever with assets perceived as risky. Therefore, can you please explain your risk weighted bank capital requirements based on that what’s perceived as risky is more dangerous than what’s perceived as safe?

Before risk weighted bank capital requirements credit was allocated on the basis of risk adjusted interest net margins and a view on the portfolio. After that it is allocated based on risk adjusted returns on equity; which obviously those that banks can leverage less with, e.g. “risky” SMEs and entrepreneurs. Explain how this does not distort the allocation of bank credit?

Even though none of Eurozone sovereigns can print euros on their own, for your risk weighted bank capital requirements you decreed a zero-risk weight for all of their debts. What do you think would have happened in the USA if it had done the same with its 50 states?

Sir, paraphrasing Upton Sinclair one could say that “It's difficult to get a journalist to ask something, when his salary, or being invited to Davos, depends on his not asking it.”

PS. My 2019 letter to the Financial Stability Board (FSB)