Showing posts with label monoline insurers. Show all posts
Showing posts with label monoline insurers. Show all posts

March 11, 2008

Better confused than wrong!

Sir Saskia Scholtes writes that “Agencies’ differences add to confusion” March 11, describing how credit rating agencies differ in their appreciation of companies in this case of bond insurance companies, to which I would just have to add a Hallelujah!, since it is clearly better being confused than wrong.

It is precisely the fact that the whole concept of risk relates to so many different variables that can be analyzed with so many possible methodologies over so many different time horizons, and that makes it impossible to come up with a true risk assessment, that the world should never have allotted so much power and influence to some few credit rating agencies.

The mess these credit rating agencies got the world into by all three of them giving prime ratings to securities collateralized with junk mortgages, is bust just a small example of why we should welcome more of the confusion that reigns in real life and that real investments are all about.

March 08, 2008

The born again financiers

Sir Aline van Duyn in her report "Banks spend $500m on Ambac shares" March 8, quotes Michael Callen the chief executive of Ambac saying that "The market gods were totally against us"; which must be very humbling to say for a member of a profession that so recently believed themselves to be the gods of the market.

That said the operation also begs the answer for how the banks are going to account in their books for the registry of what basically amounts to an expense in order to avoid having to expense even larger losses if the credit risk insurance provided by Ambac is shown to be worth less than a prime rating.

February 08, 2008

Installing fire detectors at the insurers against fire

Sir William Gross is most probably right in that “Rescuing monolines is not a long term solution” February 8, but it might be an expeditious short term approach to buy us some time to find a solution or at least lower the temperature of an overheated financial system.

That the whole issue is tremendously confusing there could be no doubt. It all sounds like having to help the insurance company that covers your home against the risk of fire, to pay for the installation of fire detectors in their offices, so that they do not burn up and leave you standing alone on your yet unburned but still at risk of a fire property.

January 26, 2008

FT should not lend support to the sophisticaters!

Sir in “The start of the great unwinding” January 26 you say “Complexity also adds to the dangers that any part of the hyper-financial system can bring down the whole” and you are right. Nonetheless, you follow it up by saying “Monoline insurers exemplify this kind of reef under the water” and this is clearly wrong; since having some undercapitalized insurers selling coverage while their good fortune last has nothing to do with complexity.

Many of us warned repeatedly about the counter-party risks with agents such as the monoline insurers and the reason it was hard to get that message heard was that it was so easy for them to find in their sleeves the sophistications that confused the issues and killed the debates. FT should not help the market to hide within the complexity in order to hide the simplicity, and perhaps a non-Davos retreat to reflect on what are the simple and time-honoured truths that lie behind the current turmoil could be a good place for you to start.

November 19, 2007

Who do they think they are?

Having much argued for that the bank regulators should give the banks more time to adapt their capital requirements when there is a systemic downgrading going on of course I would agree with that the monoline insurers should be given some time to improve their capital position so as to avoid a downgrading, as stated in Gillian Tett´s and Saskia Scholtes´ “Bond insurers act to keep their rating” November 19. My question though is about who on earth gave the credit rating agencies these type of power to stay the execution of a downgrading and who is responsible for what happens during the stay? It would really seem that the credit rating agencies are moving up from being mere opinion makers to policy makers.