Restoring healthy economic growth requires, sine qua non, getting rid of the distortions in the allocation of bank credit.

Restoring healthy economic growth requires, sine qua non, getting rid of the distortions in the allocation of bank credit.Sir, Martin Wolf writes: “we are missing a profound transformation in how macroeconomic stabilisation will have to be conducted. Whether we like it or not, we must rely on active fiscal policy.” “Restoring growth is more urgent than cutting public debt” December 14.

Of course, we need active fiscal policy, but what about the private sector? E.g. we must be able to rely on effective allocation of bank credit. And that, because of the risk weighted bank capital requirements, is simply not happening. Two examples: 

Much lower bank capital requirements when lending to the government than when lending to citizens, de facto implies bureaucrats/politicians know better what to do with credit they are not personally responsible for than e.g. entrepreneurs. And unless we are communist, or in love with taking decisions with other people’s money, we know that’s not true.

Banks are also allowed to leverage their equity much more with residential mortgages than with loans to small businesses/entrepreneurs, those who create the jobs that helps service mortgages and pay utilities. That favors the increase of house prices and weakens the economy. Insane!

Wolf argues: “It is essential to lock in low interest rates. The maturity of UK public debt has always been relatively long. The aim now should be to make it as long as possible, by taking advantage of exceptional borrowing conditions.”

But, those “exceptional borrowing conditions” are artificial. What would the free market rate on UK public debt in absence of QEs and the low bank capital requirements mentioned? And is not the difference between that rate and current ultra-low interests, de facto, not a well camouflaged tax, retained before the holders of those debts could earn it?

We all, Martin Wolf included, should be able to have confidence in that our banks are regulated by sensible and competent people. For a starter that requires regulators understanding that those excessive exposures that could be dangerous to our bank systems, are always built up with assets perceived as safe, never ever with assets perceived as risky.

Sir, July 12 2012, Wolf wrote that when "setting bank equity requirements, it is essential to recognise that so-called “risk-weighted” assets can and will be gamed by both banks and regulators. As Per Kurowski, a former executive director of the World Bank, reminds me regularly, crises occur when what was thought to be low risk turns out to be very high risk." 

Seemingly he still does not ​really ​understand what I meant.

My 2019 letter to the Financial Stability Board

@PerKurowski

What would the Milton Friedman of 50 years ago, have thought of the Martin Wolf of today?

Sir, I refer to Martin Wolf ‘s “Friedman was wrong on the corporation” December 9.

Wolf writes that among his contributions to the ebook Milton Friedman 50 Years Later, and in relation to what a “good game” would look like, that this is “one in which companies would not kill hundreds of thousands of people, by promoting addiction to opiates; one in which companies would not lobby for tax systems that let them park vast proportions of their profits in tax havens; [and] one in which the financial sector would not lobby for the inadequate capitalisation that causes huge crises”.

Really? Would Friedman have promoted “addiction to opiates”?

Really? What is parked in tax havens? Profits, or titles to assets that are for the most, 99.99%, not parked in these tax havens?

But yes, the financial sector certainly lobbied for a low capitalization, but why should this sector be more blamed than those regulators who, based on the nonsense that what’s perceived as risky is more dangerous to our bank systems than what’s perceived as safe, allowed it?

Wolf quoted Friedman with “there is one and only one social responsibility of business — to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition without deception or fraud.” Yes, that’s true. But what should not be allowed though are for instance regulators setting much lower bank capital requirements when lending to the government than when lending to citizens, something which de facto implies bureaucrats know better what to do with credit they’re not personally responsible for than e.g. entrepreneurs.

Wolf writes about "unbridled corporate power has been a factor behind the rise of populism, especially rightwing populism". For me worse is much more unbridled technocracy power. What's more populists than a Basel Committee telling the world: "We know all there is to know about what's to our bank systems, so we have decreed credit risk weighted bank capital requirements".

Sir, Wolf says he used to believe Friedman, but that he was wrong. I just wonder what Milton Friedman would have thought of the Martin Wolf of today

A final question, Martin Wolf, what if corporations taking upon themselves to act in a “corporate socially responsible way” generated less employment and had less profits, and therefore paid less taxes?

@PerKurowski

Thou shall not sell carbon emission indulgences

Sir you write: “Polluters can purchase “carbon credits” to mitigate the effects of their activities. This allows them to continue with their existing business while claiming that they are doing their bit to combat climate change” “The merits of a global carbon offset market” December 7.

For more than a decade I have argued that “carbon credits” are like the indulgences sold by the Catholic Church for the forgiveness of sins, and which Martin Luther protested. And carbon credits are currently much promoted by Germany.

In his 2015 Encyclical Letter LAUDATO SI’ Pope Francis wrote: "171. The strategy of buying and selling “carbon credits” can lead to a new form of speculation which would not help reduce the emission of polluting gases worldwide. This system seems to provide a quick and easy solution under the guise of a certain commitment to the environment, but in no way does it allow for the radical change which present circumstances require. Rather, it may simply become a ploy which permits maintaining the excessive consumption of some countries and sectors."

So, in a strange twist of history, it seems the Catholic Church is now telling the Lutheran Church “Thou shall not sell carbon emission indulgences”

Could the Basel Committee learn enough from puzzles and poker so as to correct their misinformation?

Sir, I refer to Tim Harford’s “What puzzles and poker can teach us about misinformation” FT Weekend December 5.

When deciding on what’s more dangerous to banks the regulators in the Basel Committee, with “expert intuition” and great emotion shouted out the “below BB-” and, for their risk weighted bank capital requirements, assigned these a 150% risk weight, and a very smallish 20% to what’s rated AAA.

But, with what type of assets can those excessive exposures that could really be dangerous to our bank systems built-up, with assets rated below BB- or with assets rated AAA?

Never ever with assets perceived as risky, always with assets perceived as safe.

Sadly, the regulators had missed their lectures on conditional probabilities.

And their “expert intuitions” are so strong that they were not able to understand the clear message sent by the 2008 AAA rated MBS. 

What does Tim Harford think regulators could learn from puzzles and poker to correct their misinformation?

PS. Trying to understand the how come of the so loony bank regulations, by reading Daniel Kahneman’s “Thinking, Fast and Slow” 2011.

@PerKurowski

The need for debt to equity conversions is an inescapable reality

Sir, Martin Wolf writes: “It will be crucial to deal with debt overhangs. As the OECD stresses, converting debt into equity will be an important part of this effort”, “A light shines in the gloom cast by Covid” December 1.

Indeed, with so much corporate debt in being pushed down by Covid-19 into junk rated territory, both debtors and creditors will need massive debt to equity conversions, in order to buy the time needed to reactivate assets, before these also become junk. And whether highly indebted companies, are important and viable enough to merit help from taxpayers, from money printers or from banks, by grants or other means, the proof in the pudding is precisely first seeing hefty debt to equity conversions.

The credit rating agencies could also be helpful by indicating how much of each investment grade rated bonds that has been downgraded to junk, should be converted into equity so as to have the remainders of those bonds recover an investment grade rating.

Now, with respect to the restructure emerging and developing countries’ debts, given the current very low interest rates, we unfortunately do not count with the highly discounted US 30 years zero coupon bonds, those which helped create the guarantees that allowed the Brady bonds to become so useful when restructuring many Latin American debts in 1989. 

@PerKurowski

12 years since, and yet the true cause of the 2008 crisis shall seemingly not be told

Sir, John Flint a former Before chief executive of HSBC writes: “Before 2008, regulators’ approach to conduct risk in banking was what they called “principles based” — deliberately light touch. It relied too much on banks’ abilities to govern themselves and it failed.” “Warning lights are flashing for Big Tech as they did for banks” November 30.

“principles based”? Yes, but tragically with risk weighted bank capital requirements based on a very wrong principle, namely that what’s perceived as risky is more dangerous to our bank system than what’s perceived as safe.

“It relied too much on banks’ abilities to govern themselves and it failed.”? No, it relied way too much on some very few human fallible credit rating agencies, a systemic risk.

“deliberately light touch”? If as Basel II allowed​, ​ banks could leverage a mindboggling 62.5 times their capital with assets rated AAA to AA, I would not call that a “light touch”, I would call it putting Minsky Moments on steroids.

“This time it is the technology sector rather than the financial that is leaving us all exposed.”

Sir, current bank capital requirements, 12 years since the 2008 crisis, are still mostly based on the expected credit risks banks clear for on their own; not on misperceived credit risks, 2008’ AAA rated MBS, or unexpected dangers, like COVID-19. Therefore, banks will again stand there with their pants down. A good job Sir?

@PerKurowski

Here a formal statement in 2003 as an Executive Director of the World Bank 

Here my brief explanation of the 2008 crisis

And here the 2019 letter I sent to the Financial Stability Board

FT you have the manpower to analyze how risk weighted bank capital requirements distort the allocation of bank credit.

Sir, Megan Greene writes: “Stubbornly low interest rates have failed to generate significant aggregate demand. That suggests the world has been stuck in a prolonged liquidity trap.” “Financial policymakers are right to fight the last war”, November 24.

FT would do all a favor if it sends out its savvy journalists to investigate bank rates given the current different capital requirements. That should cover assets risk-weighted 20%, 50%, 100% and 150%. And then they should try to analyze how these rates relate to each other and how this compares the relation of interest rates for similar assets, before the introduction in 2004 of the risk weighted bank capital requirements for private sector assets.

That would allow FT to understand how these regulations distort the allocation of credit in favor of those who being perceived as safe are favored anyway, and against those who perceived as risky are anyhow disfavored.

But what fighting the last war is Greene talking about? The 2008 crisis was caused by AAA rated securities turning out risky but our bank regulations still are mostly based on the expected credit risks banks should clear for on their own; not on misperceived credit risks or unexpected dangers, like COVID-19. As a consequence, banks will now stand there with their pants down. Good job!

PS. http://subprimeregulations.blogspot.com/2019/03/my-letter-to-financial-stability-board.html

@PerKurowski

By not asking all the questions that need to be asked, journalists also fail society.

Sir, Henry Manisty writes “financial journalism plays a vital role in upholding the integrity of financial markets”, “EU regulators have form on obstructing journalists” November 9.

Indeed, but in many respects, financial journalists have often failed society by not doing that. For instance, here are just three examples of questions that should have been posed directly to the regulators, long ago.

We know that those excessive bank exposures that can be dangerous to banks and bank systems are always created with assets perceived as safe, never ever with assets perceived as risky. Therefore, can you please explain your risk weighted bank capital requirements based on that what’s perceived as risky is more dangerous than what’s perceived as safe?

Before risk weighted bank capital requirements credit was allocated on the basis of risk adjusted interest net margins and a view on the portfolio. After that it is allocated based on risk adjusted returns on equity; which obviously those that banks can leverage less with, e.g. “risky” SMEs and entrepreneurs. Explain how this does not distort the allocation of bank credit?

Even though none of Eurozone sovereigns can print euros on their own, for your risk weighted bank capital requirements you decreed a zero-risk weight for all of their debts. What do you think would have happened in the USA if it had done the same with its 50 states?

Sir, paraphrasing Upton Sinclair one could say that “It's difficult to get a journalist to ask something, when his salary, or being invited to Davos, depends on his not asking it.”

PS. My 2019 letter to the Financial Stability Board (FSB)

The most dangerous underlying condition of the US, is that like so many other nations, it has been hit by the Polarization Pandemic.

Hannah Kuchler writing about her FT lunch with Atul Gawande on the battle to beat Covid-19, writes: “The US is polarised over its priorities, between those arguing in favour of putting the economy first, and those who want to concentrate on saving lives.”. It also states “People are more at risk of Covid-19 if they have underlying conditions such as diabetes and hypertension.” 

Sir, when compared to age, diabetes and hypertension read like truly insignificant underlying conditions. In USA, as of October 14, those older than 70 years comprise 89% of all those dead from Covid-19 in USA, those under 45 years, 3%. Yet, in terms of who will have to pay the economic/ mental health/ societal costs of any top down imposed responses to the virus that favors saving lives, the reverse percentage is to be expected. 

Sir, with those kinds of figures, don’t you think one could develop a response to Covid-19 that could better consider both priorities?

Of course, one could. Just look at Sweden keeping schools up to 9th year open while asking grandfathers to refrain from hugging their grandchildren.

Why has that not happened in the US? The answer to Hannah Kuchler’s “Is the US as a country more at risk because of the underlying condition of its healthcare system?” Is YES! It also suffers the polarization virus, and way too many polarization profiteers just don’t want harmony vaccines to appear.

Communications in a polarized world

@PerKurowski

Risk taking is the oxygen of all development. God make us daring

Sir, I refer to Arvind Subramanian’s “Developing economies must not succumb to export pessimism” October 16.

In October 2007 at the High-level Dialogue on Financing for Developing at the United Nations, New York I presented a document titled “Are the Basel Bank Regulations Good for Development?”

Let me quote just two paragraphs from it:

“Credits deemed to have a low default or collection risk will intrinsically always have the advantage of being better perceived and therefore being charged lower interest rates, precisely because they are lower risk. But, the minimum capital requirements of the Basel regulations, by additionally rewarding "low risk" with the cost saving benefits resulting from lower capital requirements, are unduly leveraging the attractiveness of "low risk" when compared to "higher risk" financing.

It is very sad when a developed nation decides making risk-adverseness the primary goal of their banking system and places itself voluntarily on a downward slope, since risk taking is an integral part of its economic vitality, but it is a real tragedy when developing countries copycats that and falls into the trap of calling it quits.”

Risk taking is the oxygen of all development. God make us daring!

The risk weighted bank capital requirements represent a monstrous “intellectual dereliction of duty” and so is the continued silence on it by “Western economists, academics and policy advisors”

@PerKurowski

Let’s be very wary of Big Tech and Governments forming Big Brother Joint Ventures

Marietje Schaake holds that “regulators should be able to assess all sectors for harms done to democracy, using specified skill sets… Empowering them to probe, investigate, discover and assess companies’ respect for democratic principles would ensure broader and more explicit accountability” “Weakened democracy is another harm caused by Big Tech”, October 15.

That sounds very reasonable but it behooves us citizen to know that about the worst thing that could happen to our democracies, is the formation of Big Brother Joint Ventures between Big Tech and politician/government bureaucracy.

In the same vein, on October 13 Chris Giles in “Rich nations draft blueprint for $100bn revolution in corporate tax” reported on the large appetite that exists when it comes to taxing “the likes of Google and Amazon”. Sir, do we really want to see the taxman having financial incentives in the exploitation of our personal data? We do not.

Now, if all advertising revenues generated by exploiting such data was shared 50-50 with us who supply the data, for instance by means of helping to fund an unconditional universal basic income, that would much better align the incentives of all participants.

But Sir, this does not mean I see no role for regulators when it comes to Big Tech. On the top of my mind I can list:

That they help guarantee we’re always receiving messages from parties that we can easily and accurately identify.

That they help us to be targeted as precisely as possible, so that our scarce attention span is not wasted in irrelevant/useless advertising/information.

That they do their utmost to keep out all those redistribution or polarization profiteers who, with their messages of hate and envy, destroy our societies.

Sir, one last question. If an author can get a copyright for a book, should we not be able to get a copyright on our preferences, that which we include in our book of life?

PS. Sir, since soon I’ve written you 3.000 letters on the topic of the incredibly mistaken bank regulations that cause so much societal harm, you must understand that the whole topic of regulations makes me nervous. 

@PerKurowski

Though meteorologists announce rain, regulators allow banks to operate as if the sun shines.

Sir, Tommy Stubbington writes: “A coronavirus-linked credit rating downgrade by Fitch prompted speculation that Rome was headed for ‘junk’ territory” and “Italy is the most heavily indebted major eurozone country, and yet it can fund itself for free”; “Italy’s interest-free bonds enjoy strong demand as buyers bet on ECB support” October 14.

Mark Twain (supposedly) said: “A banker is a fellow who lends you his umbrella when the sun is shining, but wants it back the minute it looks to rain” and, if now revisiting banking, Twain could just as well opine: “A bank regulator is a fellow that allow banks to hold little capital when the sun is shining, so banks can pay high dividends and buy back stock, but wants banks to hold much more capital, the moment it starts to rain”

But, Twain, in the case of Italy, or any other Eurozone over-indebted sovereign, would not be entirely correct, because even though credit rating meteorologists now warn about heavy rains, EU authorities still decree sunshine, and even though Italy cannot print euros on its own, they allow their banks to hold its debt against zero capital.

Sir, does Stubbington ignore this? I’m not sure, but Upton Sinclair also held that “It's difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary depends on his not understanding it.” That could perhaps apply to him… and, sorry, perhaps to you too Sir.

https://teawithft.blogspot.com/2019/06/the-still-ticking-0-risk-weight.html

Where would the City of London be if in the 19th Century it had been placed under the thumb of a Basel Committee?

Sir, I refer to your “The City must not be forgotten in Brexit talks” September 29. In view of the City’s real existential problem, I find it a bit irrelevant 

Creative financial engineers tricked or ably lobbied bank regulators into accommodating their wishes for leverage maximization/equity minimization, by introducing risk weighted bank capital requirements nonsensically based on that what’s perceived as risky is more dangerous to bank system than what’s perceived as safe.

That caused loan officers to allocate credit not as it used to by means risk adjusted interest rates but to allocate it by means of risk adjusted returns on equity. If the City of London is to survive as one of the prime banking centers of the world it needs to get rid of that distortion.

FT, without fear and without favor dare to think what would have been of the City of London if in the 19th Century it had to operate under the thumb of Basel Committee inspired risk adverse regulations?

PS. And if in 1910 that savvy loan officer George Banks had been asked about risk-weights, Tier 1 capital and CoCos, I am sure he would have gone to fly a kite.

Thou shall not sell environmental crimes indulgences

Sir, albeit a bit late, I refer to David Sheppard’s Big Read “Carbon trading: the ‘one-way’ bet for hedge funds” FT August 23.In his Encyclical Letter 'Laudato Si’ of 2015, Pope Francis wrote:

"171. The strategy of buying and selling “carbon credits” can lead to a new form of speculation which would not help reduce the emission of polluting gases worldwide. This system seems to provide a quick and easy solution under the guise of a certain commitment to the environment, but in no way does it allow for the radical change which present circumstances require. Rather, it may simply become a ploy which permits maintaining the excessive consumption of some countries and sectors."

With “permits” Pope Francis was here de facto referring to some type of “indulgences”, which help pardon environmental sins. 

It was Martin Luther’s attacks on the Catholic Church’s sale of indulgences for the remission of temporal punishment for forgiven sins, which caused the rift that led to the creation of the Protestant Church. Therefore, more than 500 years since Luther in 1517 (supposedly) nailed his “Ninety-five Thesis” on the door of Old Saints' Church in Wittenberg, I found it curious (and equally correct) to read a Catholic Pope accusing many protestants who favor carbon trading, for sort of a similar procedure.

As a protestant belonging to the Swedish church, ser wife and catholic children, I do not like carbon trading, as I previously explained in a letter you published, I much prefer high carbon taxes shared out equally to all, as that would align the incentives in the fight against climate change and the fight against poverty. 

http://ourpiedaterre.blogspot.com

@PerKurowski

Inflation has already returned

Sir, I refer to your editorial “The economy is too weak for inflation to return” August 14, 2020.

No! The inflation has already returned, it is just not being measured yet. 

The Consumer Price Index (CPI) market basket is developed from detailed expenditure information provided by families and individuals on what they actually bought, and there is a time lag between the expenditure survey and its use in the CPI.

The consumption basket in a weak economy differs considerably from that of a strong economy. Ask anyone who on a tight budget has recently gone to the grocery store, and you can be sure he will complain about rampant inflation. 

PS. TIPS (Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities) are based on CPI while the Fed targets PCE. Does this have any implications?

PS. In these in real time information times, I am amazed there’s still a long time lag between the expenditure survey and its use in the CPI.

PS. What if the CPI market basket was developed from detailed information provided by families and individuals about what they would have wanted to be able to buy if its prices had not gone up?

Not the first time I have questioned CPI/Inflation

PS. The truth, in theory and in practice, is that everybody's inflation, might be nobody's inflation.

@PerKurowski

The privileged subsidizing of sovereign debt that apparently shall not be named

Sir, let us suppose that as credit risks, banks perceived Martin Wolf and me as equally risky or equally safe. We would then, for the same amount of borrowings, be charged the same risk adjusted interest rate.

But then suppose that for whatever strange reason, regulators allowed banks to leverage much more with loans to me than with loans to Martin Wolf, and so banks would therefore obtain higher returns on equity when lending to me than when lending to Martin Wolf.

And also suppose that for some even stranger reason, Bank of England would buy my loans from the banks, but not those loans given to Martin Wolf.

Clearly the result would be that I would be able to borrow much more and at much cheaper rates from banks than what Martin Wolf could.

Would Martin Wolf in such a case opine that the higher interest rates he had to pay was the result of the market?

I ask this because Martin Wolf frequently makes reference to the very low rates that many sovereigns have to pay, and holds they should take advantage of it by borrowing as much as they can, in order to invest for instance in infrastructure.

And Martin Wolf seemingly refuses to consider those “very low rates” a consequence of regulatory favors of sovereign debts and QE purchases of it.

That distorts the allocation of credit in such a way that, de facto, regulators and central banks believe bureaucrats / politicians know better what to do with credit they’re not personally responsible for than for instance entrepreneurs. 

In the best case I would call that crony statism, in the worst outright communism. 

One day future historians will recount, and Paris’ Musée de L’Homme exhibit: “1988 Basel I: When Regulators introduced Financial Communism”

Free markets were set up to go bad, because of bad bank regulations.

John Thornhill writes: “The global financial crisis of 2008 exploded the ideology that markets always deliver the goods” “Three game-changing ideas to shape the post-pandemic world” Life and Arts, May 30.

Sir, that is the problem, because that is exactly what all those against free markets want us to believe. 

The 2008 crisis resulted from huge exposures to securities collateralized with mortgages to the subprime sector in the USA, turning out risky. 

And those huge exposures were a direct result of: Regulators allowing European banks and US investment banks to hold these securities, if these were rated AAA to AA, which they were, against only 1.6% in capital; meaning banks could leverage their equity an amazing 62.5 times. 

Securitization, just like making sausages, is the most profitable when you pack the worst and are able to sell it of as the best. If you can sell someone a $300.000 mortgage at 11 percent for 30 years, which was a typical mortgage to the subprime sector, and then package it in a security that you could get rated a AAA to AA, so that someone would want to buy it if it offered a six percent return, then you would pocket an immediate profit of $210.000. 

The combination of those two temptations proved irresistible.

The doom loop between government and banks was created by regulators.

Sir, I refer to Martin Arnold’s “Soaring public debt poised to heap pressure on eurozone, ECB warns” May 27

For the risk weighted bank capital requirements, all Eurozone sovereigns’ debts have been assigned a 0% risk weight, and this even though none of these can print euros on their own. Would there be a “doom loop” between governments and banks if banks needed to hold as much capital when lending to governments as they must hold when lending to entrepreneurs? Of course not!

In a speech titled “Regulatory and Supervisory Reform of EU Financial Institutions – What Next?” given at the Financial Stability and Integration Conference, in May 2011 Sharon Bowles, the then European Parliament’s Chair Economic and Monetary Affairs opined:

“I have frequently raised the effect of zero risk weighting for sovereign bonds within the Eurozone, and its contribution to removing market discipline by giving lower spreads than there should have been. It also created perverse incentives during the crisis.”

In March 2015 the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) published a report on the regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures. In the foreword we read:

"The report argues that, from a macro-prudential point of view, the current regulatory framework may have led to excessive investment by financial institutions in government debt. 

The report recognises the difficulty in reforming the existing framework without generating potential instability in sovereign debt markets. 

I trust that the report will help to foster a discussion which, in my view, is long overdue.

Mario Draghi, ESRB Chair"

Six years later, and now even more “long overdue”

Does Martin Wolf’s “The tragedy of two failing superpowers” conform with FT’s beautiful motto of “without favour”?

Wolf opines about Donald Trump in terms of “a malevolent incompetent” and for this looks for the support of that totally unbiased Jeffrey Sachs who writes about “devastatingly of the ill will and ineffectiveness on display”. “The tragedy of two failing superpowers” April 1.

Sir, if this is what it comes down to, let me be clear that I much prefer the support of a highly incompetent but more principled Donald Trump, against our evidently thousand times more malevolent incompetents, like Hugo Chavez and Nicolas Maduro, than the support given to them by “extremely competent” Barack Obama and Jeffrey Sachs.

Wolf then writes: “For those of us who believe in liberal democracy” Really? Are we to believe that anyone who, for purposes of bank capital requirements, agrees with assigning a risk weight of 0% to his sovereign’s debt and 100% to fellow citizen’s debts, something which de facto implies that bureaucrats knows better what to do with credits for which’s repayment they're not personally responsible for than for example entrepreneurs, could be defined as a believer in a liberal democracy? I don’t think so, to me he would just be a disguised communist.

@PerKurowski

British Museum’s “Currency in crisis: German emergency money 1914 – 1924”

British Museum’s “Currency in crisis: German emergency money 1914 – 1924”

“Notgeld”

Do we have a banking system with banks as they are supposed to be?

Sir, I refer to your “Non-bank lenders will bear brunt of credit crisis”, March 25

John Augustus Shedd (1859–1928) opined: “A ship in harbor is safe, but that is not what ships are for”

But bank regulators paid banks with lower capital requirements to stay safe, thereby overcrowding “safe” harbors. As a result, those who had real reasons to stay in safe harbors, like many non-bank lenders, and were less prepared to do so, like many non-bank lenders, had then to take to the risky oceans.

You opine “we are in a better place today because regulators forced greater protections on the banking system” What greater protection? A measly 3% leverage ratio supposed to cover for misperceptions of risks, like 2008’s AAA rated, and unexpected dangers, like coronavirus? You’ve got to be joking.

You quote Ben Bernanke “If you do not have a banking system, you do not have an economy.” Sir, do we really have a banking system with banks as the bank’s we used to know, or as banks are supposed to be?

I mean, with zero bank capital requirements against loans to the government and eight percent against loans to citizens you do not have a free market economy, you have financial communism.

With lower bank capital requirements for residential mortgages than for loans to the entrepreneurs or SMEs, those who can create the jobs needed in order to service utilities and mortgages, you will not have a functional economy, and houses have morphed from being affordable homes into being the main risky-investment of way too many families.

Sir, for the umpteenth time the Basel Committee’s risk weighted bank capital requirements: guarantees especially large bank crisis, caused by especially large exposures held against especially little capital to assets perceived as especially safe, but one of which suddenly one turns out as especially unsafe.

If John A. Shedd was alive today he might have opined: “A ship is safer on the oceans than staying in  a safe harbor, which might become dangerously overcrowded.”

http://subprimeregulations.blogspot.com/2019/07/risk-weights-are-to-access-to-credit.html

@PerKurowski

The coronavirus will unleash a horrific Minsky moment in our bubbled-up debt overextended economies

Sir, I refer to Martin Wolf’s “The virus is an economic emergency too” March 18. 

Indeed, more than a week ago I tweeted: “The world is prepared somewhat for the expected, but not enough for the unexpected. That’s why, worldwide, coronavirus will cause larger number of deaths because of its economic consequences, than because of its health implications”.

And for years I have also tweeted, “The current fake-boom, put on steroids by huge central bank liquidity injections, low interest rates, and Basel Committee’s pro-cyclical risk weighted bank capital requirements, will end in a horrific Minsky moment bust, equally put on steroids.”

Sir, bank capital requirements used to be a percentage of all assets, something which to some extent covered both EXPECTED and UNEXPECTED risks. But currently Basel Committee’s risk weighted bank capital requirements, those that operate over the silly low 3% leverage ratio, are solely BASED ON EXPECTED credit risks. So even if Wolf can write “The pandemic was not unexpected”, for banks and its regulators it sure was completely, 100%, unexpected. And all the banks will now soon stand there completely naked.

And what help can banks be expected to give entrepreneurs and SMEs when they are required to hold much more capital when lending to these, than when holding “safe” sovereign debts and residential mortgages? Will banks be able to raise the needed 8% in capital or will regulators lower that requirement?

Wolf writes, again, “Long-term government debt is so cheap”. Sir, when will Wolf dare think about what those rates would be, for instance in Italy, if its banks needed to hold the same amount of capital against loans to their government than against loans to their Italian entrepreneurs?

“Governments can just send everybody a cheque”. Yes, a perfect moment to build up an unconditional universal basic income scheme; but it needs to be well funded, not with public debts expected to be repaid by our grandchildren. Possible sources are high carbon taxes, something which would align the incentives in the fights against climate change and inequality; another possibility is to tax those advertising revenues generated by exploiting our personal data.

PS. As to USA it should immediately eliminate of all health sector discrimination in price, access or quality, between the insured and the uninsured.

PS. As to education all professors and administrative personal should have their salaries reduced, something which should be compensated by participating somewhat in their students’ future income streams.

http://subprimeregulations.blogspot.com/2020/03/the-basel-committee-for-banking.html

@PerKurowski

The seeds of the next debt crisis are to be found in the kicking of the 2008 crisis can forward, without correcting for what caused that crisis.

Sir, I refer to John Plender’s “The seeds of the next debt crisis” March 4.

Plender writes: “From the late 1980s, central banks — and especially the Fed — conducted what came to be known as “asymmetric monetary policy”, whereby they supported markets when they plunged but failed to damp them down when they were prone to bubbles. Excessive risk taking in banking was the natural consequence”

Not exactly “risk taking”! The risk weighted capital requirements caused excessive dangerous bank exposures, not to what was perceived risky, like loans to entrepreneurs, but to what was perceived safe, like residential mortgages; or decreed as safe, like the sovereign; or concocted as safe, like what banks’ internal risk models produced.

Plender asks: “Has the regulatory response to the great financial crisis been sufficient to rule out another systemic crisis and will the increase in banks’ capital provide an adequate buffer against the losses that will result from widespread mispricing of risk?”

No, it has not been sufficient. That because the incoherent response to a crisis caused by AAA rated securities backed with mortgages to the US’s subprime sector, was to keep on using risk weighted bank capital requirements based on perceived EXPECTED losses, and not on UNEXPECTED losses.

Plender writes: “The central banks’ quantitative easing since the crisis, which involves the purchase of government bonds and other assets, is, in effect, a continuation of this asymmetric approach”

Indeed, in 2006, when an upcoming crisis was slowly being detected by some, FT published a letter in which I argued for “The long-term benefits of a hard landing”. Sadly, central bankers and regulators wanted nothing of such thing, on their watch, and kicked the 2008 crisis can forward to our children and grandchildren, as hard as they could, and here we are… with world borrowings up to the tilt, and lenders waiting to be blown away by a coronavirus.

PS. At this moment, this letter not included, in my TeaWithFT blog, there appears 2.948 letters sent to you over soon two decades on the issue of “subprime banking regulations”.

@PerKurowski

Any risk, even if perfectly perceived, cause the wrong reactions, if excessively considered.

Sir, I refer to Patrick Jenkins “In our warming world, stranded energy assets are a growing concern” March 3. It evidences the difficulties in understanding how bankers adjust to risks, before and after the introduction of risk weighted bank capital requirements.

The current risk weighted bank capital requirements, which are based on that what’s perceived as risky is more dangerous to our bank systems than what’s perceived safe, only guarantees too much exposures to what’s “safe” and too little to what’s “risky”. So now banks, while “goose herds and whaling ships” are perceived as safe, run the risk of building up too large exposures that are harder to manage when these begin to look risky. 

Therefore, in the old days, before these regulatory distortions, banks were able to handle much better than now any slowly becoming apparent perceived risks, like with “goose herds and whaling ships”. 

What was more dangerous then, and MUCH more dangerous now, is of course the unexpected… like coronavirus.

Again Sir, for the umpteenth time, before, for around 600 years, banks cleared for perceived risk by means of interest rates and size of exposures. But then the Basel Committee instructed banks to clear for exactly those same risks, in the capital too. Sadly Sir, any risk, even if perfectly perceived, cause the wrong reactions, if excessively considered.

@PerKurowski

Do we need bankers, as in good loan officers, or bankers, as in creative financial engineers?

Sir, I refer to your “Europe’s banks are losing the global race for talent” February 25. In general terms, and most especially with “Banks, like the best football clubs, should nurture their young talent”, I agree completely. That said my concern with respect to all banks, not just European, is about what banks would benefit us the most.

For around 600 years banks allocated their credit to what bankers thought would produce the highest risk adjusted net profit margins, something which required them to consider interest rates and operation costs. In those days good loan officers were of utmost importance.

After the introduction of risk weighted bank capital requirements, banks now allocate their credit to what bankers think will produce them the highest risk adjusted net profit margins adjusted to capital requirements, something which now, besides interest rates and operation costs requires them to consider leverage possibilities. In this new kind of banking creative financial engineers have an important role to play.

I am convinced traditional banking not only satisfied much more efficiently the credit needs of our economies but was also much less dangerous in terms of financial stability than “modern” banking. 

But Sir, you don’t have to take my non-PhD opinion on that. In his 2018 autobiography “Keeping at It” late Paul Volcker wrote: “Over time, the inherent problems with the risk weighted bank capital-based approach became apparent. The assets assigned the lowest risk, for which capital requirements were therefore low or nonexistent, were those that had the most political support: sovereign credits and home mortgages. Ironically, losses on those two types of assets would fuel the global crisis in 2008 and a subsequent European crisis in 2011.”

Yes, Europe and the world, of course needs a new generation of bankers, but before that, for our own good, let’s make sure they have the right type of banks to lead.

http://perkurowski.blogspot.com/2016/04/here-are-17-reasons-for-why-i-believe.html

@PerKurowski

Never create a dependency on something that might not be able to deliver.

Sir, this would be my response to Poland’s prime minister Mateusz Morawiecki’s “Setting an EU budget is about more than arithmetic” February 20.

Prime minister I would agree with most here stated but, if I were a prime minister of Poland, the first question I would make before any budget discussion would be:

Eurozone, how do you intend to disarm that bomb of all Eurozone sovereign’s debts, for purposes of bank capital requirements, having been assigned a zero percent risk weight, even though none of these can print euros on their own will? 

If that bomb is not disarmed, EU might sadly end up as a failed intellectual fantasy, something which could have horrible consequences.

Or Prime Minister, let me put it like this: 

A budget does wittingly or unwittingly always create some kind of dependency, and the last thing a government should do, for the nation or for its citizens, is to create a dependency on something that might not be able to deliver. 

PS. Just think about all that dependency on pensions and social security people have, and that will not be delivered.

PS. I am a Polish citizen who does not speak Polish because of a gender issue. My mother tongue, which I speak fluently, is Swedish.

@PerKurowski