October 30, 2019
Sir, Martin Wolf correctly points out “Without the shelter of the eurozone, the Deutschmark would have greatly appreciated in a low-inflation world” “How Germany avoided the fate of Japan” October 30.
Indeed it would have appreciated, but that does not necessarily mean that it would have been bad for Germany… or for the rest in the eurozone.
Wolf holds that Germans need to realize “that the euro is already working to their benefit, by stabilising their economy, despite its huge savings surpluses.”
Q. Without the euro would those huge savings surpluses exist? A. No!
Q. Without the euro could not whatever smaller saving surpluses have resulted much better invested? A. Yes!
Wolf points out: “Even at ultra-low interest rates, domestic private investment in Germany fell far short of private savings. [And] since the government too ran fiscal surpluses, in Germany, capital outflows absorbed all the private surplus [much through] German financial institutions, with their huge foreign assets”
And that’s their problem. Because of risk weighted bank capital requirements that favors financing the safer present over the riskier future, plus that insane debt privilege of a 0% risk weight assigned to all Eurozone’s sovereign debts, even though none of these can print euros, most of those German saving surpluses ended up financing mediocre eurozone governments… and building up such unsustainable huge debt exposures, that it will come back to bite all, the euro, perhaps the EU, and of course Germans too.
The day when Germans citizens realize the real meaning of that their banks need to hold around 8% of capital when lending to German entrepreneurs, but need zero capital lending to eurozone sovereigns, and that they will not be able to collect on those loans, those German citizens are going to be very wütend.
.And Sir, again, for the umpteenth time, Wolf returns to his: “The chance to borrow at today’s ultra-low long-term interest rates is a blessing, not a curse.”
Wolf just refuses to accept that today’s ultra-low long-term interest rates, is an unsustainable artificial concoction that mainly benefits public debts, in other words, pure unabridged statism, based dangerously on that government bureaucrats know better what to do with credit, for which repayment they are not personally responsible for, than for instance the private entrepreneurs. When it comes to bank regulations a Communist Wall was constructed in 1988, one year before the Berlin Wall fell.
@PerKurowski
October 29, 2019
What the Eurozone would need a common budget the most for, is to help rescue many of its members from their huge risky 0% risk weighted sovereign debts.
Sir, Martin Arnold reports that Mario Draghi, “the outgoing ECB boss repeated his call for eurozone governments to create a sizeable common budget that could be used to provide greater economic stability in the 19-member currency zone by supporting monetary policy during a downturn.” “ECB chief Draghi uses swansong to call for unity” October 29.
As I see it the eurozone, unwittingly, already had a sizable non transparent common budget, namely that of, for purposes of risk weighted bank capital requirements, having assigned to all eurozone sovereigns’ debts, a 0% risk-weight, even though none of these can print euros on their own.
Some of these sovereigns used that privilege, plus ECB’s QE purchases of it, to load up huge debts at very low interest rates, so as to spend all that money. Now things are turning hard for many of these. Greece was small and walked the plank, and had to mortgage its future. Italy might not be willing to do so. There is a clear redenomination risk, and it is being priced more and more.
So when Draghi now says “We need a euro area fiscal capacity of adequate size and design: large enough to stabilize the monetary union” it is clear he is very subtle referring to the dangers of the euro breaking down.
But when Draghi mention that fiscal capacity should be designed as not “to create excessive moral hazard”, then its harder to understand how that moral hazard could be worse than that already present in that idiotic 0% risk weighting.
What is clear is that for a eurozone common budget to serve any real purpose, those privileged 0% risk weights have first to be eliminated.
Just like it is hard to see some states with good credit standing accepting a 0% risk weight of other in much worse conditions, it would be difficult to explain for instance to Germans why their banks need to hold around 8% in capital when lending to German private entrepreneurs, but no capital at all when lending to the Italian or Greek governments.
How to do that? Not easy but my instincts tell me it begins by allowing banks to keep all their current eurozone sovereign debts exposures against zero capital, but require these to put up 8% of capital against any new purchases of it. That would freeze bank purchases, put a pressure on interest rates to go up, and allow the usual buyers of sovereign debt to return to somewhat better conditions.
But, of course, that might all only be pure optimistic illusions, and all eurozone hell could break out.
@PerKurowski
October 07, 2019
The dangerous distortions in the allocation of credit that risk weighted bank capital requirements cause, is seemingly something that shall not be discussed.
... not even by those former central bankers who refuse to fade away
Sir, with respects to “the attack on the European Central Bank’s by six former central bankers” you write “Only one thing can match the stature of the complainants and that is the hollowness of their complaint.” “The euro’s guardians face a roar of the dinosaurs” October 7.
In their memo we read: “The negative impact of the ultra-low interest environment extends from the banking system, through insurance companies and pension funds, to the entire financial sector. The re-distribution effects in favour of owners of real assets, create serious social tensions. The young generations consider themselves deprived of the opportunity to provide for their old age through safe interest-bearing investments… and also furthers a ‘zombification’ of the economy”
Of course in the short run low and even negative interest rates benefit those who borrow more than those who save but, hopefully, one always hopes that will be made up in the future, by means of increased productivity and economic growth.
Significantly though the “dinosaurs” left out mentioning the distortions in the allocation of credit produced by the risk weighted bank capital requirements, which benefits especially the borrowings of sovereigns, that which FT does not want to discuss either.
I ask. Where would the Europe/Eurozone’s interest rates on sovereign be if banks, as it was for around 600 years before 1988’s Basel Accord, needed to hold the same amount of capital against loans to the sovereigns, currently 0%, than against loans to unrated European entrepreneurs, currently 8%? Dare try thinking about that. Ask your own journalists to try to answer that question.
And neither do they discuss the special case of the 0% risk weight assigned to all Eurozone sovereigns’ debts, even though none of these can print euros. Could it be because of a bad conscience?
And with respect to the young generation what it really should be up in arms against, are the much lower capital requirements for banks when financing the safer present than when financing that riskier future on which its good outcome the young really depend on.
@PerKurowski
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